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U.S. college campuses have been important sites of protest and social movement 
activity since the Civil Rights and New Left movements of the 1960s. Despite the 
significance of college campuses as sites of mobilization and social protest, student 
activism has received relatively little attention from social movement scholars. Further, 
very few studies of campus activism examine their outcomes or why some groups “win” 
while others “lose.” This dissertation addresses these gaps by investigating the impact of 
Real Food Challenge (RFC), a U.S. social movement organization (SMO) supporting 
student campaigns to shift campus dining toward sources that meet its multifaceted 
criteria for sustainability, while also building a youth movement to transform the global 
food system.  
RFC campaign outcomes vary widely; some have won institutional commitments 
to reach 20 percent “real food” by 2020, while others have made little progress toward 
that objective. This study uses quantitative analysis to identify contextual factors that 
support the ability of student local and sustainable food activists to win their objectives. 
An in-depth, qualitative case comparison of four RFC campaigns identifies contextual, 
organizational, and strategic variables shaping progress and outcomes in this emerging 
field of student activism. 
The study’s findings are relevant to social movement scholarship and the work of 
federated SMOs. The national quantitative analysis reveals a modest regional advantage 
for schools in Pacific Coast and Northeastern states. Related data from the qualitative 
study suggest a complex relationship between political context, university orientation 
toward conventional agribusiness, and administrative response to RFC campaigns. In 
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addition to geo-political context, the qualitative study suggests that openness to student 
petitions and campus culture also influence administrative response to RFC activism. 
Collective identity, campaign movement priorities, and strategic choices of activists, in 
relation to contextual variables, also significantly influence student progress toward 
winning “real food.” The results suggest the significance of tactical and frame alignment, 
supported by flexibility and strategic capacity, for effective student activism. The study 
also identifies ways that federated, campus-based SMOs can facilitate greater strategic 








“Come to the table, President Morehead!” On September 16, 2016, student activists and 
allies repeated this cry on social media and in the streets of Athens, Georgia. More than 
200 people had gathered at the University of Georgia (UGA) to learn, share, and engage 
in strategic planning to advance “Real Food” on dozens of college campuses throughout 
the U.S. (RFC 2016). The march to President Morehead’s office was strategically timed 
to coincide with the national Real Food Challenge (RFC) Summit, providing Real Food 
UGA with greater numbers for their demonstration. Between the first Real Food 
Challenge Summit held in 2007 at Yale University and the 2016 Summit at UGA, a small 
group of young, highly dedicated food system activists created the national RFC 
nonprofit program that supports a network of college students “to redefine real food and 
build a food system that benefits everyone” (RFC N.d.a). To date, 43 U.S. colleges and 
universities and the entire University of California, California State, University of Maine, 
and Colorado Mountain College systems have become RFC signatories, pledging to 
increase their procurement of Real Food1 to at least 20 percent by the year 2020 (RFC 
N.d.b). On dozens of other campuses, students are working to secure the same 
commitment, with varying degrees of success.2 What is Real Food and why are students 
(and others) demanding it? What explains where and how they are winning—and where 
they are not? More broadly, what explains which colleges and universities are embracing 
																																																								
1 Throughout the dissertation I will use the phrase Real Food to refer to food that meets the 
criteria described in Real Food Challenge standards. Those standards are described in detail on 
the RFC Calculator web site. Retrieved August 7, 2018 
(http://calculator.realfoodchallenge.org/help/resources). 
2 Hannah Weinronk, RFC Program Manager, personal communication, October 9, 2016. 
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Real Food in dining services, and where it receives little emphasis? This dissertation 
helps explain where and how this campus trend has taken off, the role of RFC activism, 
and how and why RFC campaigns produce widely differing outcomes on college 
campuses. The results of the study reveal key aspects of university context and student 
mobilization that have influenced progress and setbacks in the Real Food movement.  
 
1.1 Rationale 
 A growing number of small agricultural producers, scientists, consumers, and a 
diverse range of social movement organizations (SMOs) are challenging the industrial 
food system and seeking to advance “sustainable agriculture,” citing concerns including 
environmental quality, animal rights, food safety, and social justice (Parr et al. 2007; 
Carlisle and Miles 2013; Velten et al. 2015). Colleges and universities are an important 
concern for the contemporary sustainable food system (SFS) movement, for several 
reasons. First, the size and reach of these institutions as an aggregate represents a 
significant portion of the food consumer market in the U.S. Second, the growing campus 
sustainability movement provides a supportive mobilizing context for sustainable food 
activism. And third, colleges and universities are not just sites for food consumption—
they also are leading sites for research and teaching in agriculture and food systems. 
College courses and related campus engagement that raises consciousness about social 
and environmental problems associated with food production are an important part of the 
global agrifood movement (Meek et al. 2017). Land grant universities, which host the 
largest academic programs in agricultural sciences in the U.S., are key sites for both 
advances in and opposition to the agrifood movement (Beus and Dunlap 1992; Ostrom 
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and Jackson-Smith 2005; Carlisle and Miles 2013). Thus, college campuses are uniquely 
positioned to provide agrifood reform organizations with opportunities to engage 
students, faculty, and community members in education, research, and consumer-based 
change relating to food systems. 
 Campus sustainability initiatives, including attention to sustainability goals in 
food and beverage purchasing, have grown rapidly in the past two decades. More than 
600 four-year U.S. colleges and universities have become members of the Association for 
the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE), and more than 250 
have used a tool called the “Real Food Calculator” to identify ways to increase the use of 
sustainable food and beverage products in dining halls (AASHE 2018a; RFC N.d.c). 
While some campuses have made local and sustainable food procurement an important 
component of their sustainability work on campus, national reporting reveals significant 
variation, from no attention to food purchasing on some campuses to several campuses 
that far exceed the Real Food Challenge target of 20 percent Real Food.3 More than 40 
RFC campaigns already have succeeded in securing a commitment to reach that target by 
2020, while close to one hundred continue working to achieve that goal, while increasing 
transparency about the origins of food and beverages provided on campus.4   
 Student activism associated with campus sustainability generally and food and 
beverage procurement specifically has expanded rapidly in the past decade, with great 
variability among colleges and universities. A better understanding of where and why 
these initiatives are taking hold and making progress can add to scholars’ understanding 
																																																								
3 Chapter three provides a detailed analysis of Local and Sustainable Food and Beverage (LSFB) 
purchasing scores reported through AASHE’s reporting tool “STARS;” 2017 scores varied from 
“0” to the maximum attainable value “4.” 
4 Hannah Weinronk, RFC Program Manager, personal communication, October 9, 2016. 
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of student activism and its outcomes, which has received very little attention in social 
movement literature. In addition, RFC is structured and has a strategic approach similar 
to that of a growing number of SMOs that support networks of campus campaigns; a 
better understand of how why student campaigns succeed and fail is relevant to all of 
these organizations and their supporters.5 
 
1.2 Environmental Activism on U.S. College Campuses:  
A Brief History 
 
 U.S. college campuses have been important sites of protest and social movement 
activity since the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) and the New Left movements of the 
1960s (McAdam 1986; Van Dyke 1998). Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and 
emerging feminist groups drew upon organizing skills and campus networks developed 
through participation in the CRM (Evans 2010). These networks and further tactical 
innovations, including the “teach-in,” helped mobilize millions for the nation’s first Earth 
Day (Rome 2013). While this day was marked in some way in an estimated 2000 local 
communities (CBS News 1970), college campuses and their student organizers were the 
main focus of the “national teach-in on the crisis of the Environment” whose idea was 
originally conceived by Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson (Earth Day Network 2018). 
In 1969, Senator Nelson, frustrated by his inability to communicate the urgency of 
environmental problems to his colleagues on Capitol Hill, decided to leverage the skills 
and power of college student activism. He recruited a group of recent college graduates 
with campus organizing experience to plan a nationwide events for April 1970 to include 
teach-ins, demonstrations, environmental cleanup activities, and other forms of advocacy 
																																																								
5 The relevance to other campus-based SMOs is elaborated in chapters two, five, and six. 
Similarly structured organizations include United Students Against Sweatshops, Fossil Free USA, 
and Ban the Bottle. 
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designed to build momentum and force Congress to act (Earth Day Network 2018). The 
nation’s first Earth Day—in many places, a whole week or even month—was the result, 
the largest mass demonstration in U.S. history, including more than fifteen hundred 
campuses, hundreds of local community groups, and an estimated 20 million people. The 
event and the networks, organizations, and continuing activism it launched helped win 
landmark environmental legislation that shaped the federal regulatory framework for 
environmental protection in the U.S. (Rome 2013).  
 As the modern environmental movement expanded and strengthened in the early 
1970s, many universities responded to student and societal concerns by creating new 
academic programs of study in environmental issues and sciences (Cladwell 1983; 
Dunlap and Mertig 1992; Orr 1992). In addition, some traditional disciplines expanded to 
include focused attention on the environment. Laska (1993:4), for example, describes the 
emergence of environmental sociology as a direct response to the environmental social 
movement in the early 1970s. Thus, the movement college students helped to launch also 
re-shaped college curricula, fostering further student involvement in environmental 
research and civic engagement into the future. 
 By the late 1970s, the massive expansion of environmental regulation came under 
fire in the context of serious economic problems and a growing conservative movement 
(Dryzek 2005; Robertson 2012). The legislative gains and growth in professional 
environmental SMOs also helped shift environmental discourse from a crisis-based 
“limits to growth” frame to environmental problem solving. The “big ten” group of 
environmental organizations, including the Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife 
Fund, and Natural Resources Defense Council, largely shaped the problem solving 
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discourse which focused, to a great extent, on policy-making and court challenges 
(Gottlieb 1993). As a result, by the mid- to late-1970s professional environmental SMOs 
played a much more prominent role in shaping environment advocacy than student 
protest, although some scholars argue that student activism was transforming, not 
declining. A new structure of campus organizing supported by professional organizations 
was emerging, most notably through Public Interest Research Groups (PIRGs) (Levine 
and Wilson 1979).  
 A new discourse in sustainability and sustainable development emerged in the 
1980s, alongside environmental problem solving. The 1987 report produced by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development entitled Our Common Future 
popularized the term “sustainable development,” and this term, along with 
“sustainability,” quickly caught on (UNCED 1987; Caradonna 2014). The meaning of 
sustainability sought to bridge the seeming contradiction between “development,” often 
synonymous with “growth,” and “sustainable.” Some argued that sustainability had been 
appropriated by so many actors (government, business, universities, individuals), and also 
used by opponents of environmental regulation, as to be rendered meaningless.6 Over the 
past several decades, the myriad meanings of sustainability have evolved to include a 
strong focus on interdependent social and ecological systems; the interdependence of 
social justice, economic development and environmental protection; and a discourse of 
“progress” and “reassurance”; e.g., humanity can continue to improve standards of living 
in ways that do not compromise future generations (Dryzek 2005; Caradonna 2014).  
																																																								
6 See, for example, Bill McKibben’s New York Times OpEd “Buzzless Buzzword.” Retrieved 
November 30, 2016 (http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/10/opinion/buzzless-buzzword.html). 
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 Leaders in higher education quickly became engaged in the promotion of 
sustainability and sustainable development. Less than three years after the publication of 
Our Common Future, an international group of university administrators gathered in 
France to advance the role of higher education in sustainability leadership. In October 
1990, an international group of 20 university administrators developed a statement in 
Talloires, France that recognized the key role that higher education institutions could play 
in sustainability leadership. “Participants acknowledged that, as university leaders, they 
were uniquely positioned to bring together all the academic disciplines and professional 
schools on large, complex issues” to encourage societal movement toward 
environmentally sustainable development (ULSF 2015a:para. 4). The “Talloires 
Declaration” that resulted from this meeting, since signed by more than 450 university 
leaders in over 50 countries, set out a 10-point action plan for universities to foster and 
support environmental literacy, environmentally responsible citizenship, sustainability of 
operations on campus, interdisciplinary collaboration and leadership, and collaboration 
with organizations outside higher education to advance the goals of sustainable 
development (ULSF 2015b).  
 University sustainability, like sustainability discourse generally, encompasses a 
wide range of meanings and initiatives. However, most scholars and practitioners share 
the following broad understanding of sustainability: “[meeting] human needs and 
aspirations, now and in the future, in an equitable way while protecting our environment” 
(Waas et al. 2011:1645). Over time, businesses and universities developed a shorthand 
way of categorizing different aspects of sustainability: the “three pillars” of social, 
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economic, and environmental wellbeing.7 In the 1990s and into the following decade, a 
growing number of campus sustainability advocates began suggesting high-level changes 
in university policies relating to capital planning, operations, student life and curriculum. 
They described sustainability as a “design principal” that should be present in every 
aspect of campus decision-making (Barlett and Chase 2004). 
 As a result of growing interest in the role of colleges and universities in advancing 
sustainability goals, in 2005 the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in 
Higher Education (AASHE) was created to “help coordinate and strengthen campus 
sustainability efforts at regional and national levels, and to serve as the first North 
American professional association for those interested in advancing campus 
sustainability” (AASHE 2018b). AASHE began providing a wide range of resources, 
training opportunities, and tools to member institutions. In addition, it facilitates 
networking among members and manages the Sustainability Tracking, Assessment & 
Rating System (STARS), “a transparent, self-reporting framework for colleges and 
universities to measure their sustainability performance” (AASHE 2018c). AASHE 
launched the first version, STARS 1.0, in 2010 and has since released four updated 
versions, following ongoing feedback and input from member institutions (AASHE 
2018d). STARS and other national rating systems including Sierra Club’s “Cool 
Schools”8 and The Princeton Review’s “Green Colleges”9 list provided student, staff, 
faculty, and administrator sustainability advocates with standardized metrics for charting 
																																																								
7 See, for example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s “Sustainability Primer.” 
Retrieved August 7, 2018 (https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
05/documents/sustainability_primer_v9.pdf). 
8 Sierra Club’s “Cool Schools” ranking is published annually. Retrieved August 7, 2018 
(https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/cool-schools-2017/cool-schools-2017-full-ranking). 
9 The Princeton Review publishes a top 50 list of “green colleges” annually. Retrieved August 7, 
2018 (https://www.princetonreview.com/college-rankings/green-guide). 
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progress as well as a public relations argument for prioritizing sustainability investment. 
For some colleges and universities, being seen as leaders in campus sustainability was 
viewed as a significant opportunity to enhance student and faculty recruitment (Krizek et 
al. 2012). 
 
1.3 Campus Local & Sustainable Food and Beverage Procurement Initiatives 
As colleges and universities in the United States began exploring and making formal 
commitments to sustainability in operations, research, and teaching, some had changes in 
campus dining in their sights. At many institutions, sustainability programs began to 
include goals to expand local and sustainable food and beverage (LSFB) purchasing in 
campus dining operations; most colleges and universities participating in STARS 
complete this portion of the detailed sustainability report. Campus advocates have linked 
efforts to expand local or sustainably produced foods to some or all of the three 
components of sustainability: social, economic, and environmental. Procuring food 
locally or regionally can have environmental benefits as a result of reduced fuel use and 
emissions associated with transportation (Pirog et al. 2001). Local purchasing 
commitments also may reflect an interest in supporting social systems and economic 
development in rural communities, including the reconnection of producer and consumer 
(Mount 2012). Commitments to sustainably produced foods, including foods certified as 
organic, humanely raised, or harvested using fair labor standards, support environmental, 
animal rights, social and economic objectives in campus sustainability initiatives 
(Kremen and Miles 2012; Lubell, Hillis, and Hoffman 2011).   
	 10	
Colleges and universities make commitments to LSFB purchasing for a variety of 
reasons. Some make changes in response to student demand for certain kinds of food and 
beverage choices, such as fair trade coffee and humanely produced meat and eggs. 
National and campus-specific surveys have demonstrated growing student interest in and 
willingness to pay extra for local and sustainable food options (Feenstra et al. 2011; 
Porter et al. 2017). Other institutions invest in sustainable campus dining initiatives as 
part of their broader effort to improve their sustainability reputation, or as a result of 
specific “campaigns” led by students, staff, and faculty sustainability leaders  (Barlett 
2011; Krizek et al. 2012; Porter et al. 2017). 
 Case studies reveal a great deal of variation in the ways that college and 
university actors promote sustainability goals and initiatives on campus, including LSFB 
purchasing. Some changes are incremental and quite mundane, while others are highly 
contentious and include public displays characteristic of social movement activity, such 
as demonstrations and rallies (Shriberg 2003; Barlett and Chase 2004; Barlett and Chase 
2013; Bratman et al. 2016). Campus sustainability food projects also include many 
diverse approaches, from small gardens and on-site farmer’s markets to wholesale 
examination of all campus food and beverage procurement (Barlett 2011). On a “macro” 
level this dissertation examines progress by AASHE member institutions in the area of 
LSFB procurement and contextual characteristics that help explain variations in progress. 
On a campus level, it examines the role of student-led, nationally supported, Real Food 
Challenge campaigns in advancing Real Food procurement, and the influence of macro 
and micro-level variables on campaign progress and outcomes. 
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1.4 The U.S. Agrifood Movement: Origins 
 Like environmentalism and sustainability on college campuses, movements 
associated with food system reform also pre-date contemporary LSFB initiatives by 
several decades. Concerns about input intensive industrialized agriculture emerged in the 
U.S. following World War II and were popularized by J. I. Rodale and the Rodale Press 
(Goodman, DuPuis, and Goodman 2014). Proponents of alternative or organic agriculture 
in the 1960s included stakeholders with a variety of concerns about industrial agriculture, 
from “back-to-the-land” counter-culturists to agronomists concerned with soil health 
(Goodman et al. 2014; Obach 2015). Public awareness about environmental and human 
health effects of pesticides and herbicides became more widespread following publication 
of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, and the farmworker movement directed 
attention to the conditions and wages of migrant workers. Other groups focused on the 
impacts of large-scale irrigated agriculture on water resources, particularly in the West 
(Allen 2004). This 1960s activism served as a “catalyst” for a growing alternative 
agrifood movement10 in the 1970s and 1980s that increased attention to the “social and 
environmental externalities” associated with industrial-scale agriculture (Kloppenburg, 
Jr., et al. 2000:178; Obach 2015).  
 Alongside growing health, labor, and environmental concerns, the failure of many 
family farms provided another point of engagement in the agrifood movement. Following 
the widespread crises in farm income in the 1980s, Wendell Berry’s Unsettling America 
(1988) helped rally public support for the small family farm, and for the first time a 
																																																								
10 As elaborated later in this chapter, the field of alternative agrifood movements is diverse and 
often not well integrated. For simplicity, throughout the rest of the dissertation I will use the term 
“agrifood movement” to refer to the entire social movement field that encompasses social, 
economic, and environmental aspects of agrifood systems. 
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government report discussed “sustainable agriculture” as the way of the future (Allen 
2004). As with “sustainability” and “sustainable development” more generally, the term 
“sustainable agriculture” has been used in variety of ways by farmers, activists, scientists, 
and corporate actors, among others. Within the context of food system reform, the term 
“sustainable agriculture” often refers to modes of production that sustain the land as well 
as the people supported by the goods produced, but what kinds of production and 
distribution systems best sustain social and ecological health in the long-term is 
contested, even within the movement (see, for example, Goodman et al. 2014).   
 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number of bestselling books on 
food systems and consumer food choices further advanced growing public concern about 
the way food is produced in the United States and its implications for health and the 
environment. In 2002 Frances Moore Lappé updated her 1971 book Diet for a Small 
Planet with Hope’s Edge, co-authored with her daughter. Michael Pollan’s 2006 
bestseller The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals, a journalist’s 
investigation of the negative consequences of the industrial food system in the U.S. and 
its alternatives, earned him a spot on Time Magazine’s “Top 100” list of “best and most 
influential” nonfiction books since 1923 (Pickert 2011). With growing public interest in 
food supply chains and their impacts, consumer support for smaller-scale farming 
through direct-to-consumer sales has grown rapidly. For example, between 2006 and 
2014 the number of U.S. farmers markets grew by 180 percent, offering more and more 
consumers a place to purchase fresh food directly from farmers (Low et al. 2015). In 
addition, intermediated marketing channels—farmers selling directly to restaurants, local 
retail outlets, and regional distribution centers—came to comprise a large portion of 
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“local food” sales, and schools and universities are an important part of that market (Vogt 
and Kaiser 2008; Low and Vogel 2011).  
 Recent estimates that the global food system contributes about one-third of total 
human-caused greenhouse gases provided additional urgency to arguments for food 
system reform (Gilbert 2012). As segments of the movement to combat climate change 
have shifted their framing toward social justice (della Porta and Parks 2014), social and 
cultural aspects of sustainability also have become more prominent within the agrifood 
movement. For example, social justice concerns related to food production and 
distribution have expanded to include macro-level impacts of corporate consolidation, in 
addition to continuing calls for improvements in worker protections and fair 
compensation (Howard 2009; LeBlanc 2017). However, media frames have often 
simplified these complex factors into binary discussions of “organic” versus 
“conventional” foods, leaving many people with limited understanding of the full range 
of food system critiques (Lockie 2006). 
 
1.5 Land Grant Universities and the U.S. Agrifood Movement 
 Public colleges of agriculture in the United States are key sites for the agrifood 
movement--and for resistance to it--because of their central role in shaping agricultural 
production in the U.S. The Land Grant University Colleges of Agriculture and Extension 
System (LGCA system), initiated through the Morrill Act of 1862, has supported the 
development of the U.S. system of food production for more than one hundred and fifty 
years through education, research, and extension services to farmers (U.S. Congress). 
This system has been credited with “enormous contributions to agricultural research and 
technological developments that are accepted as indicators of successful agricultural 
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research advancements” (Wilkins et al. 2001:170). However, beginning in the late 1960s 
and concurrent with the agrifood movement described above, the LGCA system also has 
been criticized for its failure to address concerns about social and environmental 
consequences of industrial agriculture and for its close alliance with conventional 
agribusiness (Middendorf and Busch 1997).  
 Proponents of sustainable agriculture have formed one of the loudest 
contemporary voices challenging LGCAs, arguing that these publicly funded institutions 
perpetuate the industrial agricultural production system that the agrifood movement seeks 
to transform. Critics claimed Land Grant Universities “have promoted and contributed to 
the development of an agricultural industry that inordinately benefits large agribusiness 
interests, gives large farmers unfair advantages over smaller farmers, contributes to the 
decline of rural communities, damages soil and water resources, and exposes human and 
other species to unsafe levels of dangerous chemical agents” (Beus and Dunlap 
1992:364). The highly critical and widely publicized report Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times 
focused criticisms of industrial agriculture on the LGCA system and related public 
institutions (Hightower 1973). Criticisms of a purported bias toward high tech and large-
scale industrialized agriculture in the LGCA system remained the focus of many groups 
in the agrifood movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Buttel 2005). Attempts to 
secure reform included court challenges, such as a 1979 suit filed by the California 
Agrarian Action Project against the University of California “for using taxpayer dollars in 
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the creation of technologies that benefit large farms, and hurt small farms and 
farmworkers” (Wilkins et al. 2001:171).11 
 By the 1990s, critiques of conventional agricultural science and education within 
rural sociology and feminist scholarship, along with agrarian activism, had introduced 
some aspects of agrifood movement perspectives and claims into scientific institutions, 
including the National Research Council’s (NRC) Board on Agriculture (NRC 1996).  
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) began responding to growing 
consumer interest in and demand for locally and sustainably produced foods by creating 
new programs to support smaller farming operations and the infrastructure connecting 
them to consumers, such as food hubs. In addition, federal support for research in 
sustainable agriculture began in 1988 when Congress appropriated $3.9 million for the 
Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education (SARE) program. In its first twenty 
years of operations SARE created a national outreach office and regional centers at land 
grant universities; provided resources, professional development in sustainable and 
organic practices, agroforestry, marketing, and business development; and funded 3,700 
sustainable agriculture research projects (SARE 2008). More recently, USDA and many 
state agriculture programs have invested in training and marketing programs that support 
local and regional food markets, such as the “Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food” 
program (USDA 2015).  
 The LGCA system also has responded to growing interest in sustainable 
agriculture in a variety of ways. In November 2000 close to thirty representatives of 
																																																								
11 The final decision on CALIFORNIA AGRARIAN ACTION PROJECT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, v. REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. was made May 
25, 1989 in favor of the defendant. 
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university sustainable agriculture programs came together to identify ways to collaborate 
moving forward (Allen 2004). A number of LGCAs changed their mission statements in 
response to scholarly and public pressure to respond to calls for agrifood system reform 
(Zimdahl 2003). By 2011 there were 11 LGUs with formal degree programs in 
sustainable agriculture, and a group of faculty, staff, and students convened again to 
discuss opportunities for expanding the reach of sustainable agriculture within the LGCA 
system (Jacobsen et al. 2012). However, the task of building an agenda for an alternative 
agrifood system and reshaping agricultural science and education in support of it remains 
a great challenge for LGCAs, especially in light of ongoing “counterattack” and 
“regulatory occupation” from agribusiness interests (Kloppenberg 1991; Boström and 
Klintman 2006). In addition, the perspectives of faculty, extension agents and farmers 
within the LGCA system are diverse; some support more holistic scientific approaches 
and a sustainable agriculture emphasis, while others believe only conventional production 
methods, enhanced by biotechnology, will meet future global food production needs 
(Beus and Dunlap 1992; Lyson 1998; Wilkins et al. 2001).  
 
1.6 The Contemporary U.S. Agrifood Movement 
 Stakeholders within the agrifood movement understand the term “sustainable 
agriculture” in a variety of ways. A 1998 conference convened by the Michael Fields 
Agricultural Institute in Wisconsin engaged consumers, farmers, activists and other 
stakeholders in identifying the attributes of a sustainable food system. Participants 
characterized a sustainable food system as one with fourteen attributes including the 
following: strong communities with relationships of trust; equitable benefits and safe 
working conditions for all; farming methods that support crop and biological diversity 
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and ecological sustainability; and place-based connections among participants and 
between people, land, and seasons (Kloppenburg, Jr. et al. 2000). The agrifood movement 
“field” in the U.S. today contains all of the elements described by those conference 
participants: rural economy, labor rights, health, environment, and animal rights—but 
often with little coordination between them (Velten et al. 2015).  
 Like any social movement, the agrifood movement includes a variety of actors 
and strategic approaches that are, at times, at odds with each other. Contemporary 
agrifood movements in the U.S. generally focus on one of two broad strategic 
approaches: 1) developing alternative food systems, offering a consumer-based way to 
“opt out” of industrialized agriculture; or 2) advocacy aimed at transforming the 
conventional agribusiness system, usually through policy change (Allen 2004; Goodman, 
DuPuis, and Goodman 2014). Beginning in the 1990s, the “system transformation” 
approach shifted its focus from USDA and the LGCA system toward agribusiness, 
agritechnologies, and globalization (Buttel 2005). At the heart of the gap between these 
two strategic approaches to agrifood reform lies this fundamental question: can market-
based strategies transform industrial agriculture? Can consumer choice and grassroots 
alternative production eventually displace “big ag,” given its power and reach (Obach 
2015)? Collaboration has proven difficult between advocates that favor one of these 
strategic approaches with groups or scholars favoring the other, even if they have similar 
goals (Kleiman 2009). For example, coordinators for a network of alternative food 
initiatives in Canada reported that the wide range of strategic approaches and goals and 
objectives among participants had impeded their ability to construct a common “voice” 
for the regional movement (Levkoe 2015).   
	 18	
 The “opt out” approach within the agrifood movement often focuses attention on 
the importance of supporting farmers within or close to one’s own community using 
sustainable production methods.  Sometimes referred to as “localism,” a number of 
reasons have been advanced for the powerful appeal of this approach within the 
sustainable food movement. One contributing factor relates to the growing power of 
corporations and the retreat of federal regulatory activity in agriculture, which “creates a 
vacuum of effective political remedies” and has led frustrated advocates to seek 
alternatives, rather than political action (Allen 2004:169). In other words, consumer-
based activism holds particularly strong appeal when opportunities for political reform 
seem remote. A related explanation is that the “corporate cooptation” of organic 
standards and distrust of federal authorities fueled the growing emphasis on regional 
farms for the greater transparency they offer, compared to organic brands at the 
supermarket (Boström and Klintman 2006). Rather than emphasizing certification as a 
way to enhance transparency, consumers would rely on “interpersonal trust and farm 
visits” to ensure their food dollars were supporting sustainable practices (Starr 2010:482).   
 Communities engaging in alternative, sustainable food projects also value a 
number of social benefits associated with this approach, including strengthening rural 
economies, building relationships of trust and respect, and growing a shared commitment 
to social, economic, and environmental justice (Feenstra 2002). From the standpoint of 
small farmers, direct marketing and regional farmer networks provide many benefits 
including networking that enables them to share resources, strategies, and risk, and a 
support system that may even help farmers adapt to new challenges such as climate 
change (Furman et al. 2014). 
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 A more pragmatic argument for transforming food systems “from the bottom up” 
has been advanced by some scholars and advocates who argue that “localism” offers the 
best route to engage a very large constituency in the movement. What is the most 
effective way to engage citizens in tackling a global challenge as large as reforming 
industrial agriculture? Referring to Aldo Leopold’s call to “think like a mountain,” or 
engage with complex ecological systems in their entirety, Kloppenburg, Henrickson, and 
Stevenson have argued “though we may be able to think like mountains, we must act as 
human beings. To begin the global task to which we are called, we need some particular 
place to begin, some particular place to stand, some particular place in which to initiate 
the small, reformist changes that we can only hope may some day become radically 
transformative” (1996:41). While a minority may be willing to engage politically, a larger 
portion of concerned citizens, they have argued, can be energized through place-based 
initiatives that offer opportunities to actually see and experience sustainable farming in 
action.  In addition, the direct connections made through “farming with a face” can serve 
the movement by demonstrating to participants that alternatives are possible (Starr 2010). 
 Other scholars and advocates have argued strenuously that building sustainable 
local farm networks will not, in of itself, transform the U.S. food system, and that an 
overemphasis on “localism” may actually distract from critically important political 
reforms. The U.S. federal government has played a significant role in shaping agricultural 
production since the first the very first “farm bill,” the Agricultural Adjustment Act, was 
passed in 1933. Many sustainable agriculture advocates argue that these federal policies 
must be changed in order to truly reform our food systems. In addition, some 
stakeholders in the alternative food movement also “realize that they need to engage with 
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the agrifood institutions, such as the USDA and the land-grant agricultural research 
system, that have largely configured the current agrifood system” (Allen 2004:16; 
emphasis added).  In addition to broad-ranging policies such as the farm bill, a variety of 
more modest federal, state, and local food policies and the ways in which they are 
implemented may affect the viability of alternative approaches, from farm-to-school 
programs (Wilkins 2004) to sustainable meat production by small producers (Pollan 
2006). In the U.S. and in Canada, farmers who see themselves as part of a sustainable 
agrifood system have reported that inadequate and inappropriate government programs 
often impede their progress (Laforge, Anderson, and McLachlan 2017). Thus, critics of 
consumer-based approaches to agrifood reform have argued that neglecting the policy 
and regulatory context may ultimately undermine the alternative systems they seek to 
advance, because of the negative effects of those policies on alternative producers. 
 The question of corporate cooptation of organic standards has been the source of 
some of the tension between competing strategic approaches within the agrifood 
movement. Between 1997 and 2007, fourteen of the largest twenty food processors in 
North America had either acquired organic foods producers, processors and distributors 
or created their own organic subsidiaries (Howard 2009). Many scholars engaged in 
alternative agrifood system research have expressed concern that this consolidation of 
organic ownership undermines the viability of strategic approaches directed at 
strengthening regulatory oversight and changing federal farm policy (Jaffee and Howard 
2010).  For example, Guthman (2004:312) argues that many corporate organic producers 
in California meet federal guidelines but fall short of sustainable farming practices. 
Because these large-scale, corporate-owned monoculture operations are able to sell their 
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products at a lower price, they undermine independent, integrated operation that are 
“more committed” to sustainable practices. 
 Agrifood reform stakeholders do not all agree on the best response to the 
perceived threat of growing corporate power in organics. Some scholars argue that 
corporate control over much of the organic food market has reached a point where 
“regaining social movement influence over the industry appears unlikely” (Howard 
2009:27). As a result, some proponents for the “opt out” approach within the agrifood 
movement believe that their energy is better spent building an alternative sustainable food 
system “from the farm up,” educating consumers about the superiority of local or 
regional food systems to ‘big organic” in the process. Pollan’s The Omnivore’s Dilemma 
(2006) emphasized this solution, calling on consumers to grow the alternative food 
system through the power of their food shopping choices. Others “worry that if localism 
is taken too far, it will play into the hands of free-market ideologues… Federal 
regulations may be weak and even irrational, they argue, but the solution is to reform the 
state rather than abandon it” (Kleiman 2009:402).   
 Kleiman (2009) describes the critique made by a number of sustainable 
agriculture scholars, including Guthman, Dupuis, and Goodman, of Pollan’s call for 
consumers to focus their attention on supporting local farmers committed to sustainable 
production, saying it neglects the critical need to reform the political and economic 
structures guiding the dominant food system. Kleiman largely agrees with their critique, 
noting that Pollan himself, in The Omnivore’s Dilemma, points to a number of badly 
needed regulatory reforms that could help small, sustainable producers expand 
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production.12 Whether in response to these critiques or not, in the period leading up to the 
2008 presidential election Pollan crafted an open letter to the presidential candidates 
“laying out a detailed set of policy recommendations for the next ‘Farmer in Chief’” and 
has since regularly advocated federal support for strengthening local and regional food 
economies (Kleiman 2009:412).   
 While some scholars and advocates in the agrifood movement have invested 
considerable energy contesting one approach to food system reform over another, others 
have examined the complementary roles different strategic approaches can play within 
sustainable agriculture. As Wilkins has pointed out, “the promise of a new food system 
rests as much on reforming the existing system as on becoming food citizens” 
(2004:272). Kloppenburg, a long-time scholar-activist in food systems, has been a great 
proponent of citizen participation in his or her regional “foodshed” in direct relationships 
with farmers (Kloppenburg, Henrickson, and Stevenson 1996), while also engaging in 
political battles for control of seed technologies and other agricultural commodities, 
advocating “a conjoining of activists and scientists” to reclaim control over plant science 
from agribusiness (Kloppenberg 2004:352). In his book on fair trade coffee Brewing 
Justice: Fair trade coffee, sustainability, and survival (2007), Jaffee similarly called for 
both citizen participation in policy reform and consumer participation through the 
exercise of purchasing power. Activists, as well as scholars, have made efforts to better 
integrate consumer-based and policy-based advocacy within the agrifood movement. As 
a result, at least for some, consumption and political consciousness “are no longer in 
																																																								
12 Kleiman is referring to the problem cited in The Omnivore’s Dilemma that if a small-scale slaughterhouse processes 
meat below a certain threshold, the USDA may simply refuse to assign it an inspector and it will have to shut down. 
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opposing spheres and instead [are] being recognized as overlapping domains” (Rebughini 
2014:72).  
 
1.7 Real Food Challenge 
 Within the context of a growing presence on U.S. college campuses of 
sustainability initiatives, and an expanding, if contested, agrifood movement, in 2008 a 
new initiative called Real Food Challenge emerged. Its mission, principles, and strategic 
approach reflected a conscious effort to integrate the various historic strands in 
sustainable agriculture movements—social, economic, and environmental. RFC’s 
mission and principles also reflected both strategic priorities of the agrifood movement: 
using consumer power to support alternative producers, while building a movement to 
transform conventional agribusiness using a variety of strategies, including policy 
advocacy. Recognizing the diversity and confusion prevalent in efforts to promote “local” 
and “sustainable” purchasing (see, for example, Cleveland, Carruth, and Mazaroli 2015) 
RFC set out to coalesce a variety of food reform perspectives—environmental, social 
justice, animal welfare, public health—under a single umbrella, and operationalize this 
broader understanding as Real Food.  
 Real Food Challenge was first envisioned at a 2005 Kellogg Foundation Food and 
Society conference in a discussion session titled “Local Food, Fair Trade, and the Power 
of Procurement.” The discussion was hosted by the director of a Boston nonprofit 
organization called The Food Project and author and food activist Anna Lappé. Follow-
up from that initial discussion led to the creation of a formal network for organizing 
students to use the power of campus procurement to influence food production. In 2008 
Real Food Challenge (RFC) was formally launched as a self-funded project of The Food 
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Project (Real Food Challenge N.d.a). Led by a small full-time staff (comprised of four 
young professionals while this dissertation was in process), several regional food 
organizers, and an advisory board, the organization began working with student leaders 
on college campuses to pilot test the first version of RFC’s “Real Food Calculator.” 
 The stated mission of Real Food Challenge is to use the power of college students 
to “shift $1 billion of existing university food budgets away from industrial farms and 
junk food and towards local/community-based, fair, ecologically sound and humane food 
sources… ‘real food’ – by 2020” (Real Food Challenge N.d.b).  The program’s Real 
Food Calculator operationalizes this broad definition of Real Food by specifying detailed 
criteria in four categories: local and community-based, fair, ecologically sound, and 
humane. To date, more than 250 colleges and universities have signed up to use the 
calculator to evaluate the food and beverages served on campus (Real Food Challenge 
N.d.c.). In addition, RFC’s calculator has been incorporated into the dining score criteria 
in the most recent version of the STARS rating system, resulting in more stringent 
criteria for local and sustainable food procurement for the many colleges and universities 
using that system.13 
 RFC’s primary strategy for shifting food purchasing toward Real Food is 
mobilizing and supporting student-led campaigns on college and university campuses 
throughout the U.S.  RFC staff members provide ongoing strategic advice, educational 
materials, and national summits that provide training in grassroots organizing and build 
solidarity (Real Food Challenge N.d.d.). Campus RFC campaigns seek to implement use 
of the Real Food Calculator to audit current practices in food procurement and persuade 
																																																								




the college or university president (or chancellor) to sign the Real Food Challenge 
pledging to reach a level of 20 percent by 2020. The Commitment also sets out 
parameters for implementation, including creation of a Food Systems Working Group 
(FSWG) on campus.  
 While RFC’s primary campaign adopts a consumer-based approach to creating 
change, the organization also supports campus activism targeting farm and trade policy—
for example, protests against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (RFC 2015). Six Real Food 
“principles” outlined on its web site demonstrate broader goals related to, but extending 
beyond, campus LSFB purchasing. The “Real Food Principle” refers to the way in which 
RFC defines Real Food. The “Movement Principle” and the “Youth Principle” identify 
RFC’s place in the larger agrifood movement, and how/why they see youth as its leaders. 
The “Partnership Principle” and “Multicultural Principle” describe key partners and why 
they feel they should work together, and the “Participatory Principle” describes 
commitment to a democratic process for advancing RFC objectives (RFC N.d.a). Thus, 
while RFC’s mission and resources have largely been directed toward helping students 
implement use of the Calculator and persuade top administrators to sign the 
Commitment, staff members also have been very intentional about articulating and 
building commitment to the movement context of these campaigns.  
 A survey of the RFC blog provides a snapshot of the organization’s efforts to 
advance campaigns and also articulate movement goals and values. In 2017 and 2018, 
posts included many detailed updates on campus campaigns and past successes, including 
the California State University Food Systems Working Group call for applications to help 
craft its “Multi Year Action Plan” (Tsang 2018). Blog posts also included an article about 
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a coordinated action at seven universities where Real Food students dropped banners 
reading “Our Food System is Built on Racism” (Jacir 2017) and another by one of RFC’s 
staff organizers about the social and environmental impacts of corporate consolidation in 
Kentucky and Ohio (LeBlanc 2017).  
 This challenging RFC agenda--articulating and mobilizing around a broad and 
ambitious vision for food justice while supporting instrumental changes in LSFB 
purchasing--has produced different outcomes on different campuses. This dissertation 
uses a national, quantitative investigation to identify contextual factors shaping LSFB 
purchasing. It then presents a qualitative case comparison of four Real Food Challenge 
campaigns to reveal the most significant variables shaping progress and outcomes in this 
new field of student activism. 
1.8 Overview of Dissertation 
 The chapters that follow present the theoretical grounding, methods, results, and 
analysis of a quantitative study of national variation in LSFB purchasing and a qualitative 
investigation of variation in the outcomes of Real Food activism on U.S. college 
campuses. Chapter two provides a synthesis of relevant social movement and 
organizational theory that informed hypotheses about what variables most likely explain 
progress and setbacks in campus LSFB initiatives and Real Food campaigns. The chapter 
also outlines the research questions and theoretical framework guiding the quantitative 
and qualitative investigations. Chapter three presents the results of a quantitative analysis 
of national variation in LSFB purchasing among U.S. colleges and universities as 
measured by self-reported STARS data. The purpose of the quantitative section was to 
uncover variables that might make a campaign to increase LSFB purchasing easier or 
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more difficult to advance. Chapter four describes how Real Food campaigns unfolded at 
four large, public universities—two of which won agreement to the RFC Commitment, 
and two of which did not. In chapter five I compare contextual, organizational, and 
strategic factors across campaigns and analyze which variables had the most significant 
influence on campaign outcomes. Chapter six, the conclusion, extends that analysis by 
highlighting its relevance to social movement theory and to stakeholders with interests in 








 Why do some colleges and universities commit to and invest in locally and 
sustainably produced foods and beverages as part of their campus sustainability 
initiatives, while others do not? While sustainable food initiatives, like sustainability 
more broadly, have diffused rapidly on U.S. college campuses in recent years, isomorphic 
pressure alone cannot explain the great variation in evidence. Food production in the 
United States varies significantly by region. Do regional advantages explain some of the 
difference in food procurement initiatives? Colleges and universities also vary with 
respect to dining services management, administrative structures, campus culture, and 
leadership styles and preferences. To what extent do these variables influence 
organizational change? And what is the role of student activism in campus commitments 
to just and sustainable food and beverage procurement? Why do the outcomes associated 
with those campaigns differ widely from campus to campus? This chapter examines 
theory and empirical studies in social movement and organizational change literature that 
suggest a variety of factors that may influence change processes on university campuses. 
 Organization theory helps explain change within organizations, and social 
movement theory provides a framework for analyzing the influence of advocacy on those 
changes. Within organizations, bureaucratic structure, campus culture, past practices, 
resources and power dynamics, and the timing of proposals all influence organizational 
decision-making (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Tierney 1988; Pfeffer 1992; Scott 
1995; Simon 1997). Decisions by colleges and universities to invest in new initiatives, 
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such as campus sustainability, also may be influenced by trends among similar 
institutions—colleges and universities they consider to be their peers--through “mimetic 
isomorphic pressure” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and “institutional logics” (Lounsbury 
2001), or through a combination of mimetic processes and the influence of campus 
activism (Rojas 2006). On campuses with active sustainable food campaigns or where 
actors have promoted Real Food by other means, social movement theory can help 
predict factors explaining different rates of progress and different outcomes across 
campuses.   
 While research that investigates movements within universities and other 
organizations lags behind that of societal level movements (e.g., Civil Rights, Feminism, 
Gay Rights, Environmentalism, Anti-Globalization), a growing body of studies uses 
social movement theory as a framework for investigating contentious change processes 
within organizations as well as campaigns that target organizations (see, for example, 
Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Clemens and Minkoff 2004; Davis et al. 2005; Arthur 
2008). The ability of activists to create change inside organizations, including 
universities, is influenced by the same kinds of environmental, relational, and cognitive 
mechanisms that influence change more broadly (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; 
Campbell 2005).  
 A social movement organization (SMO) may be defined as “a complex, or formal, 
organization [that] identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a 
countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy and Zald 
1977:1218). The Real Food Challenge (RFC) considers itself to be a youth-oriented SMO 
operating within the broader social movement for food system reform (Real Food 
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Challenge N.d.a). RFC has a loosely federated structure typical of many national SMOs, 
in which the organization provides a variety of resources but local “chapters,” in this case 
informal, maintain a great deal of autonomy (Weed 1991; McCarthy 2005). If the 
national RFC group is an SMO, how do we characterize campus-based efforts, led by 
students and supported by the national group? Their status as “movement” or as 
“campaign” is an important question, as the relevance of some variables may be different 
for these two activism contexts. For example, stable mobilizing structures and access to 
financial resources are more important for long-term movements focused on broad social 
change than for campaigns targeting a narrow issue or objective (Flacks 2004). Based 
upon the characteristics of the RFC program and RFC campus groups, I considered the 
former to be a federated SMO, embedded in the U.S. movement for food system reform, 
and the latter to be informal chapters leading campaigns. 
 In the first two sections below, I describe literature on social movement outcomes 
and organizational change that are most relevant to this study investigating variation in 
campus response to pressures to expand Real Food procurement. Then, I present a 
theoretical model based on this literature and the research questions and hypotheses that 
frame my study. Finally, the last section of the chapter describes the methods I used to 
investigate those questions and test my hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Explaining Social Movement Outcomes 
 
 What kinds of outcomes do social movements and campaigns produce? When and 
why do they fall short of attaining their goals and objectives? Systematic research on the 
outcomes and consequences of social movements lags in comparison to research on 
movement emergence and mobilization (Giugni 1998, 1999). This weakness may result, 
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in part, from the difficulties of demonstrating causal relationships between movement 
activities and outcomes, even when an effect seems relatively clear (Giugni 1998; Tilly 
1999). A further challenge in studying movement outcomes is selecting what outcomes to 
study. Scholars define movement success in a variety of ways, from direct results such as 
legitimacy and “new advantages” (Gamson 1975) to indirect and unintended outcomes, 
such as developing “ideal citizens” who remain engaged in civic issues throughout their 
lives (Fendrich and Lovoy 1988:784). Actors and organizations within movements may 
hold different--even competing--goals, and these goals may be considerably more modest 
than the broader societal change (“collective goods” such as reduced inequality or 
poverty, or improved public health) that observers identify as a movement’s ultimate goal 
(Amenta and Young 1999).   
 While somewhat limited, the body of literature on social movement outcomes 
does provide evidence for several kinds of factors, internal and external, that seem to 
influence movement “success” (Giugni 1998, 1999). These variables are often grouped 
within three broad categories emphasized in the “dominant paradigm” in social 
movement theory: the context of opportunities and constraints confronting the 
movement; the forms of social movement organization or mobilizing structures that are 
available or are developed and sustained; and the collective processes of issue 
construction, or cultural framing, used to communicate a perceived problem and 
proposed solutions (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). A movement or campaign’s 
“repertoire,” or set of displays, petitions, and other actions, forms a fourth category that 
intersects with contextual opportunity and framing (McAdam et al. 2001; Taylor and 
VanDyke 2004; Tilly and Wood 2009). While many scholars focus on the influence of 
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just one aspect of the dominant paradigm on outcomes (e.g., political opportunity, 
organization, cultural framing, or tactics), studies investigating more than one tend to find 
that multiple kinds of variables--and interactions between them--influence outcomes, 
highlighting the importance of a more integrated theoretical approach (Cress and Snow 
1996, 2000; Soule and Olzak 2004; Giugni 2007).  
 Many scholars have criticized the structural bias of the “dominant paradigm” and 
have encouraged greater focus on interactions between variables and dynamic aspects of 
movements, including strategic framing, adaptive response to countermovement or 
opponent tactics, and day-to-day tactical decisions that contribute to advances and 
setbacks (McAdam et al. 2001; McAdam 2003; Jasper 2004; Meyer 2004; Goodwin and 
Jasper 2014). In addition, a number of scholars have sought to expand the dominant 
paradigm to more fully incorporate the role of cultural factors in these dynamic 
processes, adding aspects of collective identity and emotion to the closely studied area of 
cultural framing (see, for example, Polletta 2004; Jasper 2011). More recently, scholars 
have expanded theory and research examining the influence of strategic framing and 
tactical choices on outcomes to consider, more broadly, movement strategy, strategic 
innovation and adaptation, and strategic capacity, or variables associated with the ability 
of activists to develop effective strategy (Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; Jasper 2004, 2010; 
McAdam 2004; Williams 2016).  
 As described above, most social movement scholarship focuses on collective 
action targeting the state or related institutions. Zald and Berger (1978) were among the 
earliest scholars to argue that collective efforts to create change within organizations may 
be usefully viewed as social movement phenomena. Like social movement activity, 
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change within organizations can be quite contentious and involve sustained “campaigns” 
on the part of reformers over extended periods of time. In 2005, sociologists in the 
subfields of organizations and social movements collaborated on an edited volume of 
papers that highlighted ways in which decision-making and change processes within 
organizations have a great deal in common with contentious collective action, or social 
movement activity (Davis et al. 2005). Like social movements, recent literature on the 
outcomes of movement activity within organizations provides evidence for the influence 
of contextual opportunities and constraints (Lounsbury 2001), organizational structures 
(Smith 2005; Strang and Jung 2005), framing (Arthur 2011, Rojas 2006) and tactics 
(Arthur 2008) in shaping mobilization and outcomes. 
 One of the most significant differences to consider between social movements 
outside and inside organizations is the nature of the contextual factors. For example, the 
“political context” relevant to campus activism is likely to include the openness, 
responsiveness, and views of the administration, as well as external factors that shape the 
administration’s priorities. Depending upon those external relationships, political 
opportunity influencing campus campaigns also may include state actors and institutions. 
In other words, contextual variables important to campus campaigns are likely to include 
some that are external to the campus, such as relationships between decision makers and 
major donors and trustees, as well as characteristics internal to the college or university. 
In addition, with respect to the campus campaigns, the regular turnover of students and 
their ambiguous status in relation to the college or university they seek to change (not 
fully “insider” or “outsider”) also are likely to influence the ways in which mobilizing 
structures and resources function within campaigns in a university setting. In this 
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dissertation I adapted the dominant categories within social movement theory to reflect 
the types of factors relevant to campus-based campaigns: contextual factors (both 
external and internal to the college or university), organizational factors (university 
structures and resources), and strategic factors, which include framing, tactics, decision-
making processes, and other aspects of campaign implementation. In the sections that 
follow, I provide a more complete discussion of the areas of social movement literature 
on outcomes relevant to this study and discuss their relevance to college and university 
organizational change and advocacy relating to local and sustainable food systems. 
2.1.1. Contextual factors 
 
 Many contextual factors influence the progress and outcomes of social 
movements. The contextual factor most commonly discussed in social movement 
literature is “political opportunity,” which includes stable structural elements, like the 
strength or weakness of the state, as well as shifting opportunities, such as dissent among 
opponents, party control, electoral instability, or the availability of allies (Piven and 
Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 
2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Many aspects of political context may affect the 
response of the state to movement demands. The influence of contextual variables on a 
target’s openness to petition suggests that movement campaigns with very similar 
strategic approaches would experience different outcomes in different contexts (Amenta 
and Young 1999; Cress and Snow 1996; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005). 
 In addition to political context, a number of scholars have explored the impact of 
economic opportunities on mobilization and outcomes. Economic opportunity structure 
matters in cases where businesses are secondary targets, able to sway elected officials, as 
	 35	
in small business targeted by Civil Rights movement boycotts (Luders 2006).  In 
addition, for many social movements, including environmental and food reform 
campaigns, corporations, rather than political institutions, are the primary targets. For 
these cases, opportunities and constraints relating to corporate structures and 
vulnerability to negative media coverage are more important than political context 
(Pellow 2001; King 2008; Vasi and King 2012). For movements and campaigns that 
target markets through consumer purchasing power, characteristics and relationships 
within commodity supply chains create opportunities as well as challenges (Schurman 
and Munro 2009).  
 Culture and ideology may interact with and shape opportunities and constraints 
that influence movement mobilization, progress, and outcomes (Snow and Benford 1988; 
Polletta 2004). Campus culture, along with opportunities and constraints associated with 
the administrative leadership structure and priorities, is likely to influence the ability of 
RFC campaign leaders to mobilize students, recruit allies, and persuade decision-makers 
that their goals align with university priorities. For campaigns and organizational change 
relating to campus food procurement, below I describe four kinds of contextual factors 
most likely to influence campus initiatives and campaigns to expand Real Food 
procurement. 
2.1.1.1 The campus’ external political opportunity structure 
 
 What aspects of a college or university’s external environment should be 
considered as potential elements of its external political opportunity structure, in relation 
to student activism? Like movements targeting political institutions, multiple “layers” of 
contextual factors are likely to influence the outcomes of campus campaigns, some 
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outside the campus and some within. In this section I examine political factors outside the 
college or university that may shape outcomes of local and sustainable food and beverage 
(LSFB) advocacy. 
 Social movement studies that investigate demands of the state often examine the 
influence of the political make-up of governing bodies, as well as the state’s general 
openness to petition, on movement objectives. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) found that a 
Democratic president and Democratic control of Congress were associated with a 
“signaling” function for the Civil Rights Movement. Signaling refers to a political change 
(in this case, an increase in perceived allies) that leads activists to increase mobilization 
and protest activity. In addition to increased mobilization, Democratic presidential 
administrations also were associated with positive outcomes—winning policy gains. With 
respect to universities, McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) found that Republican 
legislative strength and Republican gubernatorial control was associated with a decline in 
state appropriations for higher education. While it is difficult to predict a relationship 
between a context of general fiscal constraint and a specific campus initiative, it seems 
reasonable to expect that administrations may be less open to considering petitions 
perceived to involve some cost when state revenues are in decline (see discussion of 
resources, below). 
 Of course, the nature of the movement or campaign makes a great deal of 
difference with respect to the impact of party control on movement outcomes, as political 
opportunities often are issue-specific (Meyer 1993). The political affiliations and 
sympathies of a particular governing body may be considered “opportunity” in relation to 
some campaigns while “constraints” in relation to others. As discussed in chapter one, 
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campus sustainability may be framed in a variety of ways. When framed as an 
environmental initiative or as a social justice imperative, a liberal political environment is 
likely to be a more positive political opportunity structure than a more conservation 
environment. Further, sensitivity to political context is expected to be more significant for 
public institutions than independent ones, as public institutions rely on state 
appropriations for a portion of their revenue. Another way in which state political 
leadership has a direct influence on public institutions is through the selection of trustees; 
at public, four-year institutions, typically almost half are appointed by the governor 
(Madsen 1997, cited in Pusser, Slaughter, and Thomas 2006).  
 Land Grant Universities (LGUs) form a subset of public universities that may be 
more sensitive to political context than their public peer institutions. As described in 
chapter one, LGUs have a mandate to serve their respective state’s interests and public 
needs with respect to agriculture and industry (NRC 1997; APLU 2012). In addition to 
greater sensitivity to state interests in general, the external political environment may be 
particularly significant for LSFB initiatives at LGUs, specifically, because of their close 
ties to the states’ agricultural stakeholders. As noted in chapter one, LGUs are	important	
sites	for	both	advances	in	and	opposition	to	the	sustainable	agriculture	movement	
(Beus	and	Dunlap	1992;	Ostrom	and	Jackson-Smith	2005;	Carlisle	and	Miles	2013).	
 Finally, the potential influence of a college or university’s board of trustees is an 
aspect of political opportunity structure for campus campaigns that falls at the 
intersection of external and internal. Trustees are formally associated with the institution 
and hold significant power but often serve relatively short terms and generally hold 
employment elsewhere. While size, composition and some aspects of roles vary among 
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institutions, most boards in higher education are entrusted with managing the institution 
in the public interest; effectively managing the endowment and the financial interests of 
the institution; defining and upholding its educational mission; and appointing and 
overseeing the president or chancellor (Henderson 1971). Thus, the presence of allies and 
the perspectives of trustees regarding LSFB initiatives, particularly ones that require 
approval at the level of the president, are important elements of the POS for some campus 
campaigns. Specifically, trustees may have interests aligned with or opposed to 
sustainable or conventional agriculture that would be expected to influence their views on 
LSFB initiatives.  
 Higher education scholarship reveals surprisingly little attention to the influence 
of trustee interests and relationships in university policies and decisions (Kezar 2006). 
However, studies of university and corporate “interlocks”14 have identified some of the 
university and corporate networks of college and university trustees. In general, networks 
of interlocking trustees (both with other schools and with corporations) are much more 
common at independent institutions than at public institutions, but little is known about 
the implications of these relationships for decision-making (Pusser, Slaughter, and 
Thomas 2006). Within public institutions, corporate interlocks are much more common 
than connections to other university boards, and more than half of trustees are men with 
corporate roles, but the prevalence of specific industries represented (including 






14 Interlocks refer to situations in which trustees or directors serve on multiple boards, be they 
corporate, higher education, or nonprofit boards of trustees. 
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2.1.1.2 The campus’ internal political opportunity structure 
 
 For campus campaigns, the political opportunities and constraints influencing 
outcomes are likely to include external institutions and actors with power, as discussed in 
the previous section, as well as characteristics of the college or university governance 
structures and individuals within the college or university. The discussion below 
examines variables within the university that should be considered with respect to 
political opportunity and constraint.  
 The “openness” of governance structures, on the level of nation-states, influences 
the strategic approaches adopted and outcomes achieved by social movements (Tarrow 
1994; McAdam et al. 1996). Where government openness is high, movement targets are 
more likely to respond to campaigns by searching for solutions (Kitchelt 1986). However, 
as a number of scholars note, access does not guarantee results for activists; access may 
fragment, defuse, or coopt movement goals (Piven and Cloward 1977; Jaffee and Howard 
2010). Widespread student protests in the mid-1960s resulted in greater student 
participation in university governance (Trent 1971). However, the ways in which student 
participation in governance is implemented and its effectiveness in advancing student 
interests varies widely among colleges and universities (Lizzio and Wilson 2009). RFC 
campaigns on campuses with structured access to decision-making may adopt different 
tactics and frames and experience different kinds of target responses, compared to those 
on campuses where student representation is limited to student government associations.
 The ultimate “target” of RFC groups on campus is the president or chancellor, 
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who signs the RFC commitment.15 This individual’s support will be influenced by many 
factors specific to that individual and to the particular institution. The president’s support 
also may be influenced by relationships with actors, organizations, and institutions 
outside the campus. The positions of major donors and other influential entities and the 
behavior of competitor colleges and universities both are likely influences on the 
president’s position regarding RFC goals. An RFC blogger described with concern the 
presence of large corporations, including petrochemical giant Dupont, on the board of 
trustees of the University System of Georgia, implying that these powerful actors may 
influence the university’s stance on agrifood issues (Real Food Challenge 2016). 
However, as discussed above, little is known about the mechanisms of board influence on 
university decision-making (Pussey, Slaughter, and Thomas 2006).  
 A president or chancellor’s response to specific petitions also may be influenced 
by highly time-bounded factors such as a high profile “scandal” or a large funding 
request before the state legislature, in the case of a public university. In general, 
organizations may be more open to the demands of activists or isomorphic pressure to 
adopt new practices when in a period of reputational decline (Westphal, Gulati, and 
Shortell 1997; King 2008). Decision-making processes in “loosely coupled” and fluid 
organizations such as a college or university may be significantly influenced by the set of 
other demands and issues in process at a particular moment (Cohen, March, and Olsen 
1972; Weick 1976). As a result, for campus campaigns, shifting contextual factors, 
compared to stable ones, may be particularly important in shaping the opportunity 
structure.  
																																																								
15 A second signatory also is required—someone who “will directly oversee and participate in the 
implementation process…” Real Food Challenge Campus Commitment, p.2.  Retrieved June 28, 
2018 (file:///Users/rebecca/Downloads/RealFood_CampusCommitment%20(8).pdf). 
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 Movements that seek to “displace” their targets, as compared to those seeking a 
less-threatening change in policy or stance, are significantly less likely to win acceptance 
or concessions (Gamson 1975; Mirowski and Ross 1981). RFC campaigns do not seek 
the removal of university presidents, but they may be viewed as threatening conventional 
agribusiness—indeed, RFC clearly states it seeks to shift $1 billion in consumer spending 
away from that industry toward alternative producers. In addition, as discussed in chapter 
one, RFC also supports food policy activism, such as rallies protesting proposed trade 
agreements—agreements that agribusiness interests tend to favor. Thus, university ties to 
agribusiness interests and RFC campaigns perceived to threaten that industry are 
expected to negatively influence RFC campaigns progress. 
 The presence of allies also is an important aspect of the political opportunity 
structure influencing campaigns and movements (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tarrow 
1994; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Schools that have academic and 
research units on campus that align with RFC goals may be more likely to have faculty 
and staff allies who are able to provide support to the campaign. These allies may 
influence campaign outcomes by offering advantages associated with their “insider” 
location.  Scholars distinguish between “insider” and “outsider” roles and associated 
tactics within social movements (see, for example, Gamson 1975; Werum and Winders 
2001). Institutional location influences the power and tactics of activists and their allies 
(Piven and Cloward 1977). RFC campaigns are student campaigns; the SMO supporting 
them, RFC, seeks to “leverage the power of youth” and maintain a national network of 
“student food activists.”16  Students occupy a more peripheral location—more “outsider”-
- in relation to the university’s governing structure than staff or faculty. Faculty and staff 
																																																								
16 Real Food Challenge: Our Vision (http://realfoodchallenge.org/about-real-food-challenge). 
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tend to have more “insider” positions, depending upon their positions, and they are likely 
to be more knowledge about campus structures and decision-making processes than 
students. They also are more likely to choose collaborative rather than confrontational 
approaches, avoiding actions that could jeopardize their position or professional 
relationships (Meyerson and Scully 1995; Scully and Segal 2002; Meyerson 2003), 
although some tenured faculty feel free to “rock the institutional boat” (Hart 2008:204). 
Having both “insider” and “outsider” allies can increase the pool of relevant knowledge 
and skills and the problem-solving capacity of a campaign, making success more likely 
(Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; Franceschet 2004).   
 The importance of allies and their insider or outsider status to the campaign may 
be influenced by other variables, including political and legal context, countermovement 
response, and issue complexity (Cress and Snow 1996; Santoro and McGuire 1997; 
Werum and Winders 2001). The effect of insider allies also depends upon tactical choices 
and level of opposition (Cress and Snow 2000). As a result, as with other aspects of 
political opportunity structure, it is important to examine the availability of insider allies 
in relation to other variables, including other aspects of the movement’s context and the 
ways in which activists do—or do not—develop strategic alliances with potential allies 
(Jasper 2004).   
2.1.1.3 The economic opportunity structure 
 
 Food system reform movements often seek to use market forces to achieve 
desired changes in food production. For example, the fair trade, organic, and anti-
genetically engineered food campaigns all have sought to shift consumer buying behavior 
in order to influence food production, processing and trade practices (Schurman and 
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Munro 2009; Jaffee and Howard 2010). RFC’s vision, to “leverage the power of youth 
and universities to create a healthy, fair, and green food system” (RFC N.d.a), relies on 
the third-party certification standards influenced by these broader movements. The RFC 
goal of 20 percent Real Food also relies on regional food infrastructure that makes it 
feasible for colleges and universities to purchase “community-based” food products. 
 Colleges and universities vary considerably in their access to regional 
infrastructure supporting direct farm-to-institution linkages, which may affect the 
feasibility of the RFC 20 percent target. Administrators often hesitate to agree to campus 
sustainability targets that appear very difficult to meet (Barlett 2011). Gaps in 
infrastructure, particularly “food hub” facilities that can aggregate, store, process, and 
distribute food from small producers, can be a significant barrier to expanding local 
sourcing and sourcing from certified-sustainable producers (Vogt and Kaiser 2008; 
Bloom and Hinrichs 2010; Gaskin et al. 2013). Limited storage infrastructure is a 
particularly significant issue for farm-to-campus initiatives because most food purchasing 
at colleges and universities occurs September through May, while the most productive 
growing season in many regions is in the summer months. Farm supply chains that do not 
have the capacity to flash freeze and store produce will be able to provide institutions 
with local produce for only a limited portion of fall and spring semesters. As a result, 
RFC groups in regions with less developed food hub systems may encounter greater 
opposition from decision-makers out of concern that expanding local and sustainable 
procurement is not feasible. 
 A second aspect of the food infrastructure that may influence RFC campaigns is 
internal to the college or university--the form and leadership of dining services on 
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campus. While the college or university president is the person charged with signing the 
RFC commitment, day-to-day management of dining services is the responsibility of that 
department within the university or a vendor under contract with the university to provide 
those services. The existing supply chain relationships and experience of this department 
or vendor will influence the difficulty, for dining services, of expanding community-
based and sustainable, humane, and fairly produced products.   
 Organizational routines may be resistant to change, and “structural inertia” can 
impede adoption of innovations (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Nelson and Winter 2002).  
Knowledge is embedded within organizational structures and technologies, and this 
knowledge varies for different corporate food service owners (Argote and Darr 2001).  
Dining services managers associated with different service contractors (or who are 
managed directly by the college or university) are likely to respond differently to 
inquiries based differences in their experience and knowledge base. Existing structures, 
technologies, and knowledge will influence how they perceive the challenge of 
implementing new tracking and purchasing approaches and its compatibility with existing 
dining services processes. 
 
2.1.1.4 Campus culture: mission and political orientation 
 
 Just as political and economic contextual factors often influence a movement or 
campaign’s trajectory, the cultural environment in which it operates also may influence 
the ability of actors to mobilize support and achieve their goals (Polletta 2004; Williams 
2007).  This contextual variable can have a significant influence on movement impacts 
depending on alignment with a movement’s “frames” (see discussion of framing, below). 
For example, mobilizing sympathetic farmers harmed by agribusiness policies and 
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practices to collective action calling for regulatory reform has proven very difficult in 
communities where ideological opposition to regulation is prevalent, even though farmers 
generally agreed with organizers about the source of the problem (Pechlaner 2012). 
Colleges and universities with institutional missions or with academic units that have 
missions that align with the RFC vision and goals have a more favorable cultural context 
for RFC campaigns than those that do not.   
 RFC values and principles are more closely aligned with politically liberal 
ideology than with conservative perspectives, which may facilitate frame resonance on 
more politically liberal campuses. However, studies examining the influence of political 
orientation on campuses with progressive activism are inconclusive. For example, Dixon, 
Tope, and Van Dyke (2008) found that more liberal-leaning campuses were associated 
with greater labor activism, but a national survey of early leaders in campus sustainability 
did not find that political culture predicted commitment levels (Shriberg 2002).  In 
addition, measures of political orientation may apply to the student body, and may 
therefore influence mobilization, but may not apply to activist targets. Thus, the 
significance of campus political orientation to LSFB initiative outcomes is likely to be 
moderated significantly by other factors, including other elements of the opportunity 
structure and strategic variables.  
2.1.2 Organizational Factors 
In addition to variation in context, described above, social movements and campaigns 
also differ in the kinds of resources available to them and existing mobilizing structures 
(or, opportunities to create them on campus). These variables influence the choices 
available to activists and the outcomes of their campaigns. 
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2.1.2.1 Resources 
 Movements with access to greater resources are more likely to sustain their 
activities over time, and this sustained support can be critical to winning concessions for 
movements that target the state (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Similarly, 
Dixon, Tope, and Van Dyke (2008) found that elite universities were more likely to 
experience graduate student labor organizing campaigns, which they argued was likely 
linked to the greater resources available to students at these institutions. In the case of a 
federated SMO supporting multiple campus campaigns, such as RFC, SMO support may 
be more significant in shaping outcomes than campus resources, assuming the campus 
provides all student organizations with modest resources. Real Food Challenge provides 
many strategic planning resources as well as Real Food calculator support through its 
web site (Real Food Challenge N.d.c). Other significant forms of support may vary from 
campus to campus, such as funding to attend retreats and summits, visits from field 
organizers, and other forms of ongoing strategic planning support (such as calls and email 
communication). Human and financial support from RFC, along with enough campus 
resources to allow student leaders to meet and mobilize, may enhance or constrain the 
ability of campus campaigns to sustain themselves over time, engage in regular strategic 
planning, and respond effectively to setbacks as they occur (see discussion of strategic 
capacity, below). 
2.1.2.2 Mobilizing structures 
 “The magnitude and duration of collective actions depend on mobilizing people 
through social networks and around identifiable symbols that are drawn from cultural 
frames of meaning” (Tarrow 1994:6). Social movements must create or appropriate 
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coordination structures in order to function effectively (McAdam et al. 2001). Mobilizing 
structures—informal or formal vehicles used to mobilize people for collective action—
may take a variety of forms on college campuses, including issue-focused living spaces, 
degree programs, and formal student organizations. Students activists associated with 
RFC generally create formal campus organizations to mobilize others and advance their 
campaigns. The presence of other networking opportunities, such as a related academic 
initiative, can support mobilization and the identification and recruitment of allies.  
 Case studies of successful campus student sustainability campaigns suggest that 
when single-issue student environmental groups collaborate effectively through an 
umbrella organization, they increase their ability to win change on campus (Shriberg et 
al. 2013; Dostal 2015). This variable is both organizational and tactical, as movement 
actors can make tactical decisions to enhance the potential efficacy of the organizational 
structures supporting mobilization, but their ability to do so may be mediated by the 
structures in place prior to mobilization. 
 Mobilizing structures are important for sustaining campus activism because they 
can provide stability for campaigns to extend beyond the tenure of a single cohort of 
students (Chang 2004). They also may help student activists garner resources. At the 
University of Michigan, the structure of academic units aligned with sustainability goals, 
such as the School of Natural Resources & Environment, supported student recruitment 
and provided resources for student environmental groups and student environmental 
leadership training (Shriberg et al. 2013). However, as discussed in chapter one, RFC 
campaigns have discrete, short-term goals and do not necessarily need to be sustained for 
more than a few years. As a result, mobilizing structures and university resources are not 
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expected to be highly significant to RFC campaign success, in comparison to contextual 
and strategic variables. 
2.1.3 Strategic factors 
 
 As discussed above, many social movement studies provide evidence that the 
context in which social movements operate has a significant influence on outcomes. But 
opportunities only matter if actors recognize and capitalize upon them (or create them), 
and some movements and campaigns do this more effectively than others. Focusing on 
structural variables alone ignores movement culture, misses the dynamic nature of social 
movement activity, and denies agency in social movement actors (Morris 1999; McAdam 
et al. 2001; McAdam 2003; Jasper 2004; Goodwin and Jasper 2014). Movement leaders 
make decisions about tactics and framing, assess progress, interpret opponent responses, 
and readjust their approach on a regular basis. A movement’s strategic approach often 
evolves over time; for example, disruptive tactics tend to be more common in the 
emergent phase of movements, and less likely once formal organizations are established 
(McAdam 1983; McAdam et al. 1996). How effectively movement actors align and 
adjust tactical decisions with the context in which they operate influences their success in 
attaining movement goals (Cress and Snow 1996, 2000; McCammon et al. 2008; Arthur 
2011). Strategic capacity and strategic innovation within movements help explain how 
and why movement actors make (or do not make) adaptive, strategic decisions that 
enhance the likelihood of successful outcomes (Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; Williams 2016). 
2.1.3.1 Tactics 
 Social movement actors engage in a variety of dramaturgical displays to 
demonstrate power (Benford and Hunt 1992). Activists normally make tactical choices 
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from an established “repertoire of contention” that includes a range of displays of 
solidarity and power as well as actions designed to make inaction costly (Tilly 1978; 
Tarrow 1994; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Disruption of normal institutional processes 
helps campaigns win earned media (Amenta et al. 2009) and increases the costs, for 
opponents, of ignoring the demands of challengers (Piven and Cloward 1977). 
Movements that can gather the resources to sustain regular disruptive displays often use 
the threat of continuing disruption to win concessions (Tarrow 1994).   
 Scholars disagree about the efficacy of disruptive versus non-disruptive tactics in 
movement outcomes. Some studies have found that direct confrontation is associated 
with greater likelihood of concessions (Gamson 1975; Mirowsky and Ross 1981; 
McAdam 1983) while other have found a great deal of variation in the effectiveness of 
contentious tactics (Giugni 1998). This variation lends support to arguments that the costs 
and benefits of disruptive tactics vary depending upon contextual variables, including the 
presence of allies and level of opposition (Cress and Snow 1996). Disruptive tactics may 
not be effective in a more challenging environment; for example, Biggs and Andrews 
(2015) found that favorable political and economic opportunity structures and relatively 
weak opposition increased the likelihood that sit-in protests would win concessions in the 
Civil Rights Movement.  
 The kinds of tactics selected and the extent to which they are collaborative versus 
confrontational and disruptive are related to a movement’s general orientation toward an 
“insider” or “outsider” position (Gamson and Meyer 1996). A number of scholars have 
argued that “insider” and “outsider” collaboration within movements enhances movement 
effectiveness, such as when movement leaders organize people both inside and outside of 
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political institutions (Beckwith 2000; Franceschet 2004; Friedman 2000; Ganz 2009). 
Movements may include both political insiders and outsiders and some are characterized 
by members who see themselves as simultaneously participating in both insider 
institutions and aligned with outsider, challenging groups. Meyerson and Scully (1995) 
refer to activists with this kind of dual location and association as “tempered radicals;” 
Beckwith (2000) refers to this dual strategy as “double militancy.” 
 Among organizations, including colleges and universities, evidence seems to 
support greater efficacy for non-disruptive, and more collaborative, tactics (Arthur 2008).  
Rojas (2006) found non-disruptive protest encouraged the creation of African-American 
Studies programs, and was enhanced by mimetic isomorphism as program creation 
spread.  Disruptive forms of protest did not have an effect on program adoption. Several 
reasons may explain a preference, and greater effectiveness, of non-disruptive tactics 
within organizations. Bureaucratic insiders may be essential to implementing movement 
demands, and they may find it harder to advocate on behalf of activists when they use 
disruptive tactics on campus. 
 Like movements and campaigns more broadly, the kinds of tactics that are most 
effective within organizations are likely to vary in relation to contextual factors. For 
example, the same tactics used by challengers to promote an afro-centric curriculum had 
different outcomes in three different major cities; activists were more successful where 
the tactics “resonated culturally and organizationally with the school district’s 
administrators” (Binder 2000:87). Because particular tactics may prove effective in some 
situations but not in others, the ability of movement actors to identify tactics likely to 
support their objectives and to make adjustments as needed deserve greater attention in 
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social movement research. As Jasper has noted, “participants in social movements make 
many choices, but you would never know this from the scholarly literature” (2004:2). 
Tactical choices that face movement actors include the scope of the campaign (with 
tradeoffs for broader versus more narrow goals and objectives) and whether to adopt a 
more versus less contentious position in messaging and actions (Jasper 2004; Taylor and 
VanDyke 2004). More and more scholars are calling for research that examines the 
interaction of these kinds of dynamic variables in combination with structural factors. 
2.1.3.2 Framing and “discursive opportunity structures” 
 Framing has been identified as a particularly significant strategic variable in 
social movements. Collective action frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and 
meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movement 
organization (SMO)” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). The process of constructing 
meaning within a social movement is ongoing and dynamic, influenced not only by the 
movement participants but also by external environments and actors, including opponents 
and the media (McCright and Dunlap 2003). Discursive opportunities can be stable, 
persisting over time, or volatile, in association with short-term contexts such as a war in 
progress (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McCammon et al. 2007). Movement actors need to 
recognize and make strategic decisions about how to respond to opportunities in the 
discursive environment, just as they do with respect to the political opportunity structure 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam et al. 2001).  
 The salience and credibility of collective action frames influences their 
effectiveness in supporting movement success (Benford and Snow 2000). Frame 
alignment with the cultural/ideational context also influences salience, or resonance, with 
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movement actors and targets (Snow et al. 1986). Many scholars have focused on the 
importance of framing and frame alignment for participant mobilization, and mobilizing 
large numbers of participants and key allies can support positive movement outcomes 
(Guigni 1998). Frames that are highly resonant with discursive elements in the cultural 
context also may support movement efficacy by legitimizing movement demands in the 
eyes of the broader public and with persons who may be influential with movement 
targets (Koopmans and Statham 1999). When movement goals and the way they are 
framed “fit” more readily with cultural ideology (Schurman and Munro 2009) and the 
evidence and experience of community members (Babb 1996), movements are more 
likely to make progress toward their goals. Conversely, discrepancies between beliefs, 
experience, or evidence and collective action frames can make them less persuasive 
(Snow et al. 1986; Babb 1996; Pechlaner 2012).  
 While framing dynamics within organizations, including colleges and 
universities, and their influence on outcomes, have received much less attention from 
scholars, they also are likely to be influenced by how well activists adjust tactics to align 
with the organizational context (Arthur 2008, 2011). Real Food Challenge campaigns are 
supported by a national organization that provides training and communications and 
outreach materials. If RFC campus leaders all frame their campaigns in the same way, 
using RFC principles and vision, we can expect the frames to align more readily on some 
campuses than others. The extent to which Real Food frames align and resonate with 
their cultural context is likely to affect the ability of campaign leaders to mobilize 
sympathetic students, recruit the support of allies, build legitimacy, and win influence 
with their target—the university president or chancellor. On campuses where Real Food 
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frames do not readily align with the beliefs and values of different groups on campus, 
RFC campaign leaders who adjust or extend framing to better align may be just as 
successful as those whose campus culture more readily aligns with RFC’s national 
frames.  
 Frame alignment processes imply that choices about movement frames are 
strategic, or intended to enhance a movement’s ability to achieve concrete objectives 
including student mobilization, ally recruitment, and target persuasion. At the same time, 
movements often have multiple objectives and framing serves a variety of purposes, 
including building collective identity, demonstrating solidarity with partners, and 
recruitment (Friedman and McAdam 1999). These movement objectives, as well as 
emotion and values, sometimes shape framing decisions as much as strategic 
considerations (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Jasper 2011). Attention to the strategic function 
of framing, as compared with identity and mobilization, may enhance strategic 
adaptation, discussed below. 
2.1.3.3 Strategic adaptation and capacity 
 As discussed above, while contextual variables often significantly enhance or 
constrain movement progress and outcomes, the strategic choices that activists make on a 
regular basis also matter. These decisions include a movement or campaign’s collective 
action frames and tactics, described above, and how and when to adjust them in response 
to changes in the political opportunity structure and target responses (see, for example, 
Franceschet 2004; McCammon et al. 2008). As McCammon et al. concluded regarding 
the women’s jury movement in the U.S., “…when social movement actors tailor their 
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actions to respond to exigencies in the environment they are more likely to expedite 
political success” (2008:1104). 
 Effective movement leaders are resourceful--able to adjust in response to 
changing circumstances, and innovative, developing new tactics when old ones are not 
producing results (McAdam 1983; Ganz 2000; McAdam et al. 2001; Goodwin and Jasper 
2014). Activists can increase their chances of success when they find ways to make the 
most of their own, limited resources and exploit the vulnerabilities and missteps of their 
opponents (Ganz 2009; Guthman and Brown 2016). Evaluating the effect of collective 
action frames through structured learning processes and changing course when they are 
not having the desired effects on mobilization, media, or targets influences the 
movement’s progress and efficacy (Friedman 2000; Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; Franceschet 
2004). 
 In the context of the RFC network, flexibility and innovation might mean 
rethinking a strategic approach that was successful on another campus but has failed to 
win advances in a different campaign. Campaigns with leaders and allies prepared to 
adjust their tactics and try new approaches, when needed, are likely to be more successful 
at winning desired outcomes. Further, strategic factors are likely to be more important for 
campaigns with less supportive contextual and organizing features. In other words, 
activists on some campuses will have a harder job than those in more supportive 
environments, and their ability to adjust and innovate will be more important for winning 
campaigns. 
 What factors influence the extent to which activists are resourceful and 
innovative, responding to opponents, targets, and changing circumstances in ways that 
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enhance the likelihood of success? Within organizations, understanding power dynamics 
and their sources in a particular context, including relationships and influence held by 
potential allies and opponents, is critical to the ability of actors to develop and effectively 
wield power (Pfeffer 1992). For social movements more broadly, Ganz (2000, 2004, 
2009) argues that salient knowledge is one of three elements that characterize the 
strategic capacity of social movement groups. “The better one’s information about a 
domain within which one is working, the better the ‘local’ knowledge, the more likely 
one is to know how to deal effectively with problems that arise within that domain” 
(Ganz 2000:1012). In addition to power dynamics, salient knowledge includes other 
relevant information and skills (Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009). In a college or university 
context, salient information and skills for groups interested in influencing food and 
beverage purchasing would include organizational structure and reporting relationships; 
pre-existing commitments (or decisions to decline commitment opportunities) related to 
food and to sustainability; preferences and past decisions of key administrators regarding 
student-initiated programs; key external stakeholders with an interest in dining and/or 
food procurement; and the school’s culture and history generally with respect to different 
forms of activism and organizational change. Greater salient knowledge should support 
the development of resonant frames, as SM actors must understand the values, beliefs, 
and norms of potential allies, movement participants, and targets in order to engage in 
frame bridging, amplification, or extension that enhances alignment (Snow et al. 1986). 
 In addition to salient knowledge, Ganz (2000, 2004, 2009) has identified 
motivation and learning practices as key to strategic capacity. Strong commitment of 
groups to their cause can enhance resourcefulness and creativity, which facilitates 
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problem solving. Organizational forms and practices that support regular and open 
deliberation also facilitate the kinds of creative problem solving often demanded by 
social movements, particularly those operating in challenging environments. In the anti-
sweatshop movement on college campuses, the network of activists responded to 
challenges by engaging in “egalitarian, consensus-building” processes that resulted in 
strategic innovation (Williams 2016:287). Thus, the processes and practices by which 
movement actors learn and innovate can influence outcomes. 
 Few scholars have examined the influence and implications of a federated 
structure—a national organization with local or state chapters—on movement strategy or 
outcomes (McCarthy 2005; but see Weed 1991 and Williams 2016). This organizational 
element is highly relevant to research examining Real Food Challenge campaign 
outcomes. RFC has a loose, federated structure that connects campus campaigns to each 
other and to its small groups of national staff and regional organizers. Most federated 
SMOs provide templates that create uniformity in goals and tactics among their chapters, 
with varying degrees of adaptation to local conditions (McCarthy 2005). Through its web 
site, RFC provides organizing resources for campus campaigns, including guides for 
coalition-building, campaign strategy, power mapping, media and messaging, and 
running meetings (RFC N.d.e). In addition, it provides regular retreats and summits that 
include training exercises as well as opportunities for individualized strategic support 
from field organizers (Real Food Challenge N.d.d). Diversity within organizational 
leadership can support greater strategic capacity (Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; Olzak and Ryo 
2004). As a result, the nature of federated support and its influence on diversity in 
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leadership, framing processes, and tactics are important to consider in an investigation of 
social movement outcomes. 
2.2 Organizational Change  
 
 Literature in the subfield of organization theory includes analysis of the sources 
and uses of resources and power in organizations, the development and influence of 
institutional logics, and diffusion of ideas and practices that may be relevant to 
understanding change within colleges and universities regarding local and sustainable 
food and beverage purchasing. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, while 
most scholars interested in organizational change draw primarily on either social 
movement or organization theory, a growing number have integrated concepts and terms 
across the subfields, in recognition of their overlap and mutual relevance (Campbell 
2005; Lounsbury 2005; Vasi 2006). Below I provide a brief discussion of several areas of 
organization theory that may be relevant to this study. 
 
2.2.1 Organizational resources and power 
 
 While resource mobilization theory in social movement literature emphasizes the 
importance of ongoing resources for sustaining movement activity, in the case of 
advocacy for university sustainability initiatives, the target’s resources may be influential, 
as well. Chapter one briefly discussed some of the challenges that face to farm-to-
institution initiatives, including a perception, and sometimes a reality, of higher costs for 
products that qualify as “sustainable.” In cases where proponents do not adequately 
address this concern, usually through research demonstrating affordability, an 
institution’s resource constraints in dining services may influence the efficacy of LSFB 
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campaigns. Many different external variables influence funding for colleges and 
universities, and they differ for independent and state institutions.  
 Universities depend upon resources from governmental sources, foundations, 
corporations, individual donors, and student tuition and fees. These resource flows 
reflect—and influence—power within universities, and the power of external 
stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Power dynamics are central to the study of 
social movements, in which actors construct and demonstrate power in order to persuade 
targets to make the changes they seek (Benford and Hunt 1992; Tarrow 1994). While 
often not discussed explicitly by social movement scholars, power dynamics are implicit 
in analyses of mobilization, organization, and outcomes. However, most social movement 
research considers power dynamics between movement actors and targets, whereas 
organizational research examines the sources and uses of power within organizations and 
organizational fields. To what extent can this literature contribute to an analysis of 
decision-making and campaigns within universities? 
 Organizational structures and subunit functions influence power dynamics within 
organizations, including colleges and universities, and social movement actors need to 
understand power relationships in order to develop effective strategy (Hickson et al. 
1971; Pfeffer 1992). Within large research universities, academic departments that attract 
resources important to the university, such as grants and contracts, prestige, and large 
graduate programs, tend to have greater power than peer departments, which affords them 
greater access to scarce resources including graduate student fellowships and posts on 
influential university committees (Pfeffer and Slancick 1974; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974). 
The extent to which a department is considered to be central to the university’s core 
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mission and resource negotiation skills also are associated with greater power and higher 
allocation of resources among both academic and non-academic units (Hackman 1985).  
 The relevance of power differences between academic units may influence the 
ability of faculty members advocating local and sustainable purchasing initiatives to win 
support from top administrators. Further, this research suggests that differences in 
departmental power and demonstrated effectiveness in resource negotiations may be 
important considerations for ally recruitment by student campaigns. However, national 
data on relative power of academic departments at particular institutions, and on the 
presence of faculty “champions” and their departmental affiliations, is not readily 
available. As a result, the influence of departmental power may be helpful to consider in 
case studies, but very difficult to examine in a national analysis.  
 
2.2.2 Isomorphic pressure 
 
 Institutional theory suggests that organizations within the same organizational 
fields become more and more similar over time as a result of coercive, mimetic and 
normative “mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change” (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983:150).  At the same time, scholars understand that organizations do not always 
respond to institutional pressures in the same way or at the same rate. Empirical studies 
suggest that differences in the relationship between organizations and field-level 
institutions, as well as internal organizational characteristics and current performance, 
influence the differential effects of institutional pressures on organizational change 
(Edelman 1992; Uzzi 1997; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997).   
 While there is clear evidence that isomorphic pressure has exerted a general 
influence on sustainability initiatives within higher education (for example, the growing 
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numbers of colleges and universities with sustainability offices and/or staff persons), 
colleges and universities have many options for demonstrating commitment. For 
example, institutions reporting on their sustainability progress through STARS include 
data on 11 areas of academics, 15 different aspects of campus engagement, 23 discrete 
measures in operations, and 14 different indicators within planning and administration 
(AASHE 2018e). Thus, institutions have many opportunities to demonstrate 
sustainability commitment and progress without engaging in local and sustainable food 
and beverage purchasing at all. As a result, isomorphic pressure is unlikely to explain 
variation in this specific aspect of campus sustainability initiative. 
 
2.2.3 Organizational logics 
 
 As discussed above, social movement research suggests that when movement 
frames align with the cultural context in which the movement is embedded, messages are 
more likely to resonate and support positive outcomes. Similarly, organization scholars 
discuss how “logics” at the level of organizations, industries, and society shape the 
attention and decisions of organizational leaders (Scott 1995; Fligstein 1996). These 
organizational logics “constitute a set of assumptions and values, usually implicit, about 
how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to 
succeed” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999:804).  
 In addition to their influence on the perceived legitimacy of activists’ claims and 
demands, changing and competing logics can influence the strategies and tactics they 
employ and the objectives they seek (Lounsbury 2005). In the context of American 
universities, campus culture, organizational logics, and institutional norms all are likely 
to influence the ways in which the Office of the President or Chancellor responds to 
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student initiatives to increase the university’s commitment to LSFB purchasing. The 
concept of organizational logics may also be a useful way to view the influence of the 
broader food reform movement and the Real Food Challenge organization on the 
meaning construction and strategic choices of individual Real Food campaigns. In 
addition, at the institutional level changing “logics” regarding campus sustainability may 
influence the ways in which administrators view Real Food initiatives. The latter is 
discussed in greater detail, below. 
2.2.4 Innovation diffusion 
 A number of scholars have investigated the diffusion of social movement tactics 
and campaigns from the perspective of institutional theories of innovation diffusion or a 
combination of social movement and diffusion mechanisms. “Cultural categories,” or an 
organization’s networks and peer group membership, influence diffusion of new practices 
(Soule 1997; Strang and Soule 1998), as does alignment with the organizational mission 
and context (Vasi 2006).  If we view campus sustainability, and specifically Real Food 
initiatives, as an organizational innovation spreading within higher education, these 
findings suggest that colleges and universities will be more sensitive to isomorphic 
pressure from peer institutions. The extent to which the college or university’s mission 
and culture readily align with the innovation also is likely to influence adoption. A 
mission oriented toward social change, or a student culture embracing social and 
environmental justice, may interact with isomorphic pressure from peer institutions to 
increase the likelihood that colleges and universities invest resources in expanding their 
Real Food commitment.  
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 A second kind of innovation whose diffusion is relevant to campus activism is 
innovation in campaign tactics. Campaign tactics perceived as effective diffuse rapidly 
among college campuses with similar characteristics where students are engaged in the 
same social movement (Soule 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). In the case of RFC 
campaigns, diffusion should occur easily because of the common “toolkit” and training 
provided by the national RFC program. However, as discussed above, the tactics 
themselves may be less important for predicting outcomes than the selection of tactics 
that best align with a campaign’s particular context and operational dynamics (Arthur 
2011). 
 
2.3 Theoretical Model, Research Questions, and Hypotheses 
 
 In section 2.2, above, I reviewed social movement and organization literature 
relevant to understanding how and why colleges and universities choose to make 
changes—or not—in their food procurement practices in response to institutional 
influence or campaigns advocating change. Many social movement studies focus their 
attention on just one of the major areas of social movement literature described above: 
political and economic opportunity structures (see, for example, Kitschelt 1986), 
organization and resources (see, for example, McCarthy and Zald 1977), or one or more 
strategic factors (see, for example, Snow et al. 1986; Ganz 2000). However, as scholars 
have come to recognize the complex interactions between context, movement 
organization, and strategy, a growing number have examined variables in two or more of 
these areas. For example, Franceschet (2000) found that changing political opportunity 
structure influenced changes in strategy and the development of new frames that 
influenced greater efficacy in second- versus first-wave feminism on Chile. Other 
	 63	
scholars have argued that a more integrated and agency-oriented approach to research on 
outcomes—one that does not pit one particular kind of explanation against others--is 
likely to be of greater use to movement actors (Flacks 2004; Bevington and Dixon 2005). 
For both of these reasons—uncovering complexity and enhancing the relevance of my 
findings--I developed a broad theoretical model with multiple categories of variables to 
guide my investigation. In the three sections, below, I first describe that theoretical 
model. I then provide the primary research questions I explored and my hypotheses 
associated with those questions. 
2.3.1 Theoretical model 
 As discussed above, many social movement studies explore the significance of a 
single aspect of the dominant paradigm (opportunities, organization, framing, or tactics). 
While a highly focused approach can facilitate new insights into a particular aspects of 
movement dynamics, in some cases single focus studies have sought to elevate the 
importance of a particular facet, such as political opportunity, rather than understand how 
that feature operates in interaction with others (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). A growing 
number of studies demonstrate that multiple contextual variables, interactions between 
them, and strategic adaptation all may influence outcomes attributed to a given 
movement. Further, because empirical studies of the outcomes of campus activism are so 
limited, there is little justification for choosing to privilege one kind of factor over others. 
In other words, little is known about the relative importance of contextual, organizational, 
and strategic variables influencing the outcomes of student campaigns. As a result, I 
developed a research design that includes elements of all three kinds of variables. 
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 This study’s theoretical model reflects a social movement orientation toward the 
research questions, but its methodology is flexible in order to capture evidence of factors 
that were not predicted based on dominant paradigms. Micro-scale, qualitative 
investigation of campus activism is limited to a modest number of case studies. While my 
approach is grounded in theories of change within organizations and society more 
broadly, few studies have specifically investigated outcomes of campus activism using 
qualitative methods that reveal micro-level variables, such as framing and tactics (but see 
Arthur 2011). As a result, I designed the qualitative portion of this study to reflect a 
compromise between grounded theory and hypothesis testing, to provide ample 
opportunity for uncovering factors not reflected in the model or hypotheses.  
 
Figure 2.1: Factors predicted to influence college/university decisions and campaign outcomes 

















































2.3.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
 I developed three primary research questions and related hypotheses based on the 
theoretical model described above. The first research question and hypothesis examine 
several contextual variables expected to influence university dining’s likelihood of 
increasing LSFB purchasing, including its response to student campaigns with that 
objective. The variables selected for this portion of the study are ones for which a 
national, quantitative analysis is feasible. This question framed the quantitative portion of 
the dissertation, whose results are presented and analyzed in chapter three. This 
investigation sought to uncover contextual variables associated with higher levels of local 
and sustainable food and beverage (LSFB) purchasing as reported through AASHE’s 
STARS database. Variables associated with higher LSFB scores would be expected to 
contribute to a supportive context, or opportunity structure, for student RFC campaigns.  
 I developed the second and third questions and hypotheses to examine the 
influence of contextual, organizational, and strategic variables associated with Real Food 
Challenge campaign progress and outcomes, including interactions between different 
kinds of variables. Answering these questions required micro-level data unavailable 
through databases or through RFC record keeping. As a result, I developed a qualitative, 
case study approach to answer these questions. In the section that follows I provide the 
three research questions, the hypotheses associated with each, and a brief summary of the 
theory and literature that informed them. 
Research Question 1:  What contextual and organizational factors help explain the 
variation in level of commitment to local/sustainable food purchasing at U.S. colleges 
and universities?   
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 Political and economic opportunity structures, discussed above, often influence 
the characteristics and outcomes of social movements. For campaigns on college 
campuses, internal political dynamics are complex and have not been characterized in a 
format that allows for quantitative analysis. However, the STARS database includes a 
measure for participatory governance that may serve as a proxy for internal political 
openness. Thus, campus openness was examined in the quantitative study using this 
STARS measure, and also explored in greater depth for four universities, through 
interview data, in the qualitative portion. 
 With respect to external contextual variables, political context may be measured 
by party control and dominance of state executive and legislative party branches. For 
consumer and product-based initiatives and campus campaigns, the regional economic 
context may matter at least as much as political factors. Supply chains and aspects of 
regional context influencing supply may shape the ease with which desired changes may 
be made and, therefore, the willingness of decision makers to pursue changes in 
purchasing. Thus, political leadership, geographic location (associated with growing 
regions), and several farm-to-institution infrastructure measures also were selected as 
independent, contextual variables. 
 Land Grant University (LGU) status is another aspect of political context that was 
included in the national analysis of LSFB scores, as a result of its likely influence on the 
way in which LSFB frames are interpreted and received (as explained in chapter one and 
above). LGU status was included in the quantitative and qualitative portions of the study 
and is explained further under research question three, below.  
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 Many social movement scholars consider human and financial resources to be 
important to sustaining movements (see, for example, McCarthy and Zald 1977). 
However, the kinds of resources most important to LSFB initiatives and campaigns on 
college campaigns are unclear. Certainly some dining services managers have concerns 
about potential cost increases, but whether those constraints and concerns are linked 
directly to an institution’s financial resources is unclear. In addition, there is a great deal 
of flexibility in the criteria for Real Food, including locally produced products that do not 
increase costs. In addition, access to external organizing resources is assumed to be 
equivalent, as RFC staff support all student campaigns that seek their help. Thus, 
institutional financial resources and sustainability staffing were included as control 
variables in the statistical model investigating the relationship between multiple variables 
and local and sustainable food scores, but they were not considered to be variables of 
interest.  
 Resources and opportunities associated with internal dining management also 
were expected to have an influence on outcomes because they may influence the level of 
difficulty of the change and level of opposition. I expected experience and openness of 
the dining services management to expanding Real Food purchasing to influence LSFB  
purchasing scores. Data regarding dining services management (whether it is self-
operated or contracted to a vendor) are available for many institutions on their student 
dining web sites. However, the experience and orientation of dining services staff toward 
LSFB initiatives are not readily available and are more difficult to characterize. As a 
result, the former was included in the quantitative portion of this study, while the latter 
was evaluated, as possible, through interview data in the qualitative study. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1:  Geographic region, political and agricultural context, LGU 
affiliation, openness to participatory governance, and type of dining services 
management together explain a portion of the variation in LSFB procurement scores 
among colleges and universities reporting on sustainability. 
 
Research Question 2:  What contextual, organizational, and strategic factors explain the 
variation we find among Real Food Challenge campaigns in progress toward movement 
goals? 
 As discussed above, more or less favorable contextual factors matter, but their 
influence is mediated by the “strategic capacity” of movement actors—their ability to 
design and implement the most effective approaches given the context (Ganz 2000, 2004, 
2009). For example, while the presence of insider allies should be helpful in many cases, 
that effect may be mediated by level of opposition and the activists’ tactical choices.  
Within organizations, the effects of framing and tactical choices also depend upon their 
alignment with the organizational context (Arthur 2008, 2011). As a result, I predicted 
that the effects of contextual and organizational variables would be mediated by tactical 
choices. I expected flexibility in the campaign’s responses to changing circumstances to 
be associated with more rapid and more favorable outcomes. 
HYPOTHESIS 2a:  The structure of student participation in campus decision-making 
and administrative openness to student initiatives influences the success of RFC 
campaigns. This effect is mediated by strategic choices. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2b:  The presence (and participation) of faculty and staff allies positively 
influences the progress of RFC campaigns. This effect is mediated by the presence of 
significant opposition and by strategic choices of the campaign. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2c:  Alignment between college/university mission and RFC frames, or 
adjustment of frames to more closely align with institutional mission and culture, 
positively influences outcomes. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2d:  Greater campaign strategic capacity and greater flexibility and 
innovation in response to the target’s responses is associated with greater progress. 
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Research Question 3:  How do contextual and organizational factors associated with 
Land Grant University status influence the trajectory of a campaign that challenges 
conventional food production?   
 
 Today’s land grant colleges of agriculture (LGCAs) face a very diverse 
constituency with a wide range of conflicting interests (Middendorf and Busch 1997).  
LGCAs have responded to criticisms and new demands by expanding educational 
programs and dedicating extension staff to include sustainable production methods; some 
have gone further and created new institutes or centers wholly dedicated to alternatives to 
industrial agricultural production (Lyson 1998). However, largely most LGCAs still fall 
short of fully embracing sustainable agriculture. For example, most LGCA mission 
statements “do not reflect a genuine concern for opening minds or engaging in the 
agricultural debates about sustainability, soil erosion, pesticide use and misuse, animal 
treatment and animal rights” (Zimdahl 2003:114). In addition, while USDA provides 
some funding to LGCAs for extension and research in sustainable agriculture, public 
funding for agricultural science is still overwhelmingly biased toward conventional 
methods and biotechnology (Delonge, Miles, and Carlisle 2015). As a result, RFC goals 
may conflict or, at the least, not readily align with mission statements and research 
priorities at LGUs. RFC campaigns perceived as threatening conventional agribusiness 
may provoke strong opposition at LGUs.   
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Land Grant University (LGU) status increases access to sustainable 
agriculture allies but also increases opposition, because the campaign is perceived as a 









 This research project adopted a mixed methods approach to identify the 
contextual, organizational, and strategic variables that influence changes in commitment 
to Real Food on college and university campuses. A mixed methods approach can 
provide better results than a single approach by drawing on the strengths of both 
qualitative and qualitative methods (Creswell and Clark 2007). Quantitative studies offer 
greater opportunities to link specific conditions and outcomes when data are available for 
a relatively large number of institutions. However, with respect to trends and changes in 
local and sustainable food procurement on college campuses, the kinds of variables for 
which data are available are limited to very few contextual and organizational variables 
of interest. Most significant for the purposes of this study, to the author’s knowledge 
there are no national databases tracking student activism and its outcomes. To understand 
Real Food Challenge campaigns and their impacts, a qualitative approach is required 
because there are no datasets available related to campaign activity.17 Further, many 
campus-based campaigns generate limited public media or publicly available documents. 
As a result, interviews and ethnographic approaches are essential to studying strategic 
aspects of campus campaigns. 
 The first part of the study examines more than two hundred colleges and 
universities that self-report sustainability data to investigate contextual and organizational 
variables that predict higher levels of commitment to LSFB procurement. The second 
part of the study is limited to campuses where students are leading campaigns to increase 
those scores through a framework developed by the Real Food Challenge program. I used 
																																																								
17 Through personal communication with RFC staff, we determined that their record keeping 
regarding roughly 100 ongoing Real Food campaigns was not systematic enough to make 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of a larger set of cases feasible.  
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qualitative methods to explore the effects of contextual, organizational and strategic 
choices of four campaigns on their outcomes.   
2.4.1 Quantitative study 
 
 The research question for the quantitative portion of this project was: What 
organizational and contextual factors predict level of commitment to local/sustainable 
food purchasing? To answer this research question I assembled a dataset and built a 
statistical model to examine relationships using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
This part of the study tested hypothesis one. Table 2.1 describes the variables examined 
in this part of the study. Chapter three describes in detail the regression models used to 
test relationships among variables and the findings of the quantitative analyses. 
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Table 2.1:  Variables and their measurement for the quantitative study. 
	 Variable	Type	 Measurement	
Local & Sustainable Food 
and Beverage Commitment	 Dependent Variable	 STARS 0-4 score	
Geographic	Region	 Independent	-	contextual	 U.S. Census Bureau Regions and Divisions	
Farm-to-Institution 
Infrastructure: Food Hubs	 Independent - contextual	










Numbers of farms marketing 
directly to consumers and 
institutions (by region)	
Land Grant University? Independent – contextual/organizational 
Dummy variable (LGU = 1; non 
LGU = 0) 
Political Leadership - 
Governor	
Independent -  
contextual	
Dummy variable  
(Republican = 1; Democrat = 0)	
Political Leadership - 





Type of Institution	 Independent - Control	 Dummy variables  
















































Table 2.2:  RFC Cases Selected for Qualitative Study 
 





The University of Georgia 
 
University of North Carolina 





The Ohio State University 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 























Table 2.3:  Variables and their measurement for the qualitative study. 
 Variable Type Measurement 
Geographic 
Region Control variable  
Cases were limited to two agricultural regions, 
each with one LGU and one non-LGU  
University 
Type Control variable 
Public (versus private/independent) 
Research 1 institution 
“Flagship” university 
Political 
environment Independent - contextual 
Party control of state executive and legislative 
branches 
Political influence on university decision-
making 




Independent – contextual 
Academic programs and research relating to 
food systems 
Faculty & staff willing to support campaign 
Campus 
culture Independent - contextual 
University mission 
Political leaning of student body 
Prevalence of student activism 
Mobilizing 
Structures Independent - Organizational 





Table 2.3 (continued) 




Independent – contextual  
Student representation on decision-making 
bodies 
Administrative response to student 
communications 
Formal university statements 
Frame 
alignment Independent - strategic 
Alignment between campaign frames and 
university mission and culture 
Tactical 
Flexibility Independent - strategic 
Campaign responses to target actions; diversity 
of tactical repertoire 
Strategic 
Capacity Independent - strategic 
Adaptation in response to contextual 






Significant progress = signatory achieved 
(within 3 yrs)  
Slow progress = 3+ years effort with no clear 
commitment to progress by administration 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Data collection and analysis 
 
 I completed 55 interviews across the four universities in the study. Through the 
Institutional Review Board process, I developed an informed consent document, shared 
with all potential interviewees that detailed the steps I would take to protect anonymity. 
All audio files, transcripts, interview notes, and field notes were identified by code name 
only. A single spreadsheet links interviewee names and code names and that file, along 
with all interview data, was stored on a password-protected computer. Table 2.3 presents 




Table 2.4: Record of Qualitative Study Interviewees. 
 
Affiliation Administrators and 
non-academic staff 
*  






Pitt 3 1 6 0 
OSU 1 6 5 1 
UNC 1 2 4 1 




*Includes Office of the President/Chancellor, Office of the Provost, Office of Student 
Life, Campus Operations, Student Services, and Dining Services (including contractors) 
**Includes faculty members, Department Chairpersons, and Academic Deans 
***Includes staff persons and board members with non profit organizations working on 
in food system reform initiatives within the state or region where the university is located 
****Includes national staff members and regional/field organizers 
 
 The unevenness in the distribution of interviewee by type reflects a number of 
logistical challenges. At the University of Pittsburgh, I was not able to interview 
representatives of the farming community because Pitt dining services representatives 
were not willing to share information about specific farms with whom they contract. At 
Ohio State and UGA, none of the administrative leadership team familiar with the Real 
Food campaign agreed to participate in an interview.18 At UGA, following a great deal of 
persistence, I was referred to someone in student affairs but this individual had had no 
direct contact with Real Food students.  
 The difference in the total number of interviewees across campuses reflects the 
availability of interviewees, the availability of alternative sources of information about 
the RFC campaigns, and an iterative process in which some interviewees made claims I 
																																																								
18 My efforts to reach administrative staff at OSU and UGA who had held meetings with RFC 
students included emails with multiple follow up reminders, phone calls to their assistants, and 
finding them and/or their assistants in person and introducing myself, following up with further 
calls and emails. 
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felt I needed to compare by talking with others. Because the student campaigns at Pitt and 
UNC had already won the Real Food Commitment before I began this study, some of the 
students who had been directly involved had graduated and were therefore more difficult 
to track down. In addition, because Pitt and UNC did sign the Commitment, for these 
cases I was able to find articles and press materials stating the university’s (public) views 
regarding the campaign. I interviewed more individuals at OSU and UGA, where the 
campaigns did not win the RFC Commitment, both because it was more difficult to find 
individuals with direct knowledge of the administration’s position, and because there was 
greater disagreement among interviewees about important aspects of the campaigns. The 
greatest number of interviewees at UGA reflects both a convenience bias, as I was able to 
complete several field visits to UGA, and the challenges of uncovering key variables in 
this case. Both OSU and UGA student groups faced a great deal of hurdles in their RF 
campaigns, but there is a great deal more written documentation available for the OSU 
case, due to earned media by the student group and formal, written responses by the 
administration. At UGA, students were less successful earning media coverage and never 
received a formal response from the president’s office regarding their petition. As a 
result, I interviewed significantly more faculty members and students at UGA in order to 
build as complete a picture as possible of the campaign’s experience.   
 Most of the interviews were digitally recorded, with the interviewees’ permission. 
I personally transcribed the interviews to ensure anonymity. For several interviews I 
chose not to record either for logistical reasons (locations of the interview—ambient 
noise) or out of concern than recording would limit the openness of an interviewee who 
had expressed concerns about anonymity. For these interviews I took detailed notes by 
	 79	
hand that I later transcribed. One digital recording was unintelligible due to ambient noise 
but I had anticipated that possibility and recorded highly detailed notes. 
 I used the software program Quirkos to code and analyze interview data. As in the 
structure of the interviews I conducted, the codes or themes I created to organize the data 
reflect a synthesis of my hypotheses, theme frequency, and the relative emphasis that 
interviewees gave to factors that influenced the campaigns. The results are discussed in 
chapters four and five. Appendix A provides tables detailing the codes used to sort 
interview data and their frequency by university and by social location 




CHAPTER 3:  
 
WHO’S LEADING? EXPLAINING VARIATION IN LOCAL AND SUSTAINABLE 
FOOD AND BEVERAGE PROCUREMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES IN THE U.S. 
 
 
 Statements about local foods and sustainability have become a new norm on 
campus dining web sites and even on dining hall signage, where some provide colorful 
maps showing the farm origins of some of the produce and animal products prepared by 
college chefs for student diners. College and university attention to sustainability goals in 
food and beverage purchasing have grown rapidly in the past decade. As described in 
chapter one, more than 600 four-year U.S. colleges and universities are members of the 
Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE),19 and 
more than 250 use the Real Food Calculator to identify ways to increase the use of local 
and sustainable food and beverage (LSFB) products in their dining halls.20 But while 
some campuses have made local and sustainable food procurement an important 
component of their sustainability work, national reporting reveals significant variation, 
from no attention at all at some schools to some commitments that exceed the Real Food 
Challenge target of 20 percent.21 What factors explain the differences we see in local and 
sustainable food and beverage sourcing on college campuses? This chapter presents the 
																																																								
19 As of May 1, 2018, 601 institutions of higher education were members of AASHE. An up-to-
date list may be found here: https://stars.aashe.org/institutions/participants-and-reports/. 
20 As of May 1, 2018, 257 institutions of higher education were using the Real Food Calculator to 
evaluate sourcing for more than 388 million dollars of food and beverage purchasing. A current 
tally may be accessed here: http://calculator.realfoodchallenge.org/. 
21 As indicated in Table 3.2, below, Local and Sustainable Food and Beverage scores in the 
database of institutions with current STARS reports vary from the lowest possible score (0) to the 
highest possible (4). 
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results of a quantitative analysis of variation in LSFB scores as reported through 
AASHE’s STARS tool.  
 As discussed in chapters one and two, understanding patterns of variation in 
LSFB scores nationally may reveal contextual or organizational factors that either 
support or impede efforts to advance Real Food on college campuses. The primary focus 
of this quantitative analysis was the influence of college and university geographic 
context on commitment to local and sustainable food procurement. This chapter addresses 
the dissertation’s first research question: What contextual factors help explain variation 
in level of commitment to local/sustainable food purchasing among colleges and 
universities in the U.S.? The results reveal that geographic region plays a modest role, 
and that the reasons for the advantage shared by two geographic regions—the Northeast 
and the Pacific Coast--are likely multi-faceted and complex.   
 The quantitative analysis reported in this chapter tests three hypotheses: one, 
LSFB purchasing will vary by geographic region; two, variation in LSFB scores is 
explained, in part, by farm-to-institution infrastructure making LSFB purchasing easier; 
and three, that political context also helps explain geographic variation in LSFB scores. I 
used data available through the Sustainability Tracking, Assessment & Rating System 
(STARS) created by the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher 
Education (AASHE)22 and other sources to explore the effects of geographic region, 
farm-to-institution infrastructure, and political context on local/sustainable food and 
beverage procurement scores (see Table 3.1). The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
																																																								
22 For more information about STARS: https://stars.aashe.org/pages/about/stars-overview.html. 
Data used in the analysis presented here were downloaded from current STARS reports only 
(expired reports were excluded), submitted between January 2014 and September 2016. 
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the results of the statistical models, limitations of the study, and ways in which this 
quantitative analysis relates to the design of the qualitative portion of the dissertation. 
 
3.1 Factors Likely to Influence LSFB Scores on U.S. College Campuses 
 
 Chapter one traces the origins of the recent growth in direct-to-consumer and 
sustainably sourced food and beverage purchasing in the U.S. Chapter two provided the 
rationale for choosing geographic location, farm-to-institution infrastructure, and political 
context as key independent variables for this quantitative, national analysis, with 
university type (public or independent) as a control variable. Chapter two also included 
discussion of four additional variables that are not included in the model presented here 
as a result of limitations in the database and the results of a pilot study. I originally 
included Land Grant University (LGU) status as a second variable measuring university 
type. The pilot study revealed no association between LGU status and LSFB score. Only 
22 of the 207 institutions in the database are LGUs and those institutions have LSFB 
scores ranging widely, from 0 to 1.28. The second variable dropped from the model was 
shared governance, which STARS reports on a 0-3 scale. More than half of the 207 
institutions gave themselves 3.0 points out of the possible 3.0, calling into question the 
validity of the measure, as reported, as a proxy for shared governance.23 The third 
variable eliminated from the final statistical model was dining operations management—
whether dining services were self-operated or, if not, which corporation had been 
contracted to manage dining services. While support from dining services staff certainly 
																																																								
23 This measure is PA-3 (Planning & Administration): Governance, in STARS version 2.0. The 
score is intended to be a measure of shared governance, or participation of students, faculty, and 
staff in governance decisions at the institution (See AASHE 2018e for access to the STARS 
technical manual). 
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matters for LSFB scores, the pilot study as well as anecdotal evidence and preliminary 
data from the qualitative portion of this dissertation showed that the specific contractor 
selected did not predict orientation toward LSFB initiatives. Rather, dining services staff 
seem to vary in their experience and orientation toward LSFB purchasing within each of 
the major contracting firms, as well as within schools with self-operated facilities.24 
Finally, chapter two discussed the importance of resources to social movements and to 
some campus sustainability initiatives. Endowment size and sustainability staffing were 
included as control variables in the pilot study’s statistical models and they did not have 
any relationship to LSFB scores. As a result, these measurements for campus resources 
were not included in the final statistical models presented in this chapter. 
 Table 3.1 describes the remaining variables of interest that were examined in the 
investigation of variation in Local and Sustainable Food and Beverage (LSFB) presented 
in this chapter.  
  
																																																								
24 The pilot study statistical model did not find statistically significant associations between 
dining services management and LSFB scores. Qualitative evidence of variation within different 
types of dining services management included the significant changes at University of Pittsburgh, 
which contracts with Sodexo, and University of Georgia, which is self-operating, between two 
consecutive dining services directors (people unreceptive to LSFB initiatives succeeded by 
individuals who were much more responsive). Further, at UNC dining services staff members 
throughout two waves of LSFB student activism were highly supportive despite their employment 
with ARAMARK, a major vendor typically considered by Real Food activists to be less 
responsive to LSFB initiatives than Sodexo. 
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Table 3.1:  Variables, Measurement, and Data Sources for Quantitative Study. 
 Variable Type Measurement Data source 
Local & Sustainable 
Food and Beverage 
Commitment 
Dependent 
Variable STARS 0-4 score STARS database 
Geographic Region Independent - contextual 
Dummy variables by region 
and by division 








Number of food hubs 
within 200 miles of campus 







Number of farmers markets 
within 50 miles of campus 







Numbers of farms 
marketing directly to 
consumers and institutions 
(by region) 
USDA Local Food 
Marketing Practices 
Survey (2015) 
Political Leadership - 
Governor 
Independent -  
contextual 
Dummy variables  
(Republican = 1; Democrat 
= 0)* 
Council of State 
Governments (2015) 
Political Leadership - 
Legislature 
Independent - 
contextual Percent Republican 
Council of State 
Governments  (2015) 
Type of Institution Independent - Control 
Dummy variables  
(Public =1; Private = 0) 
STARS database 
 
*Alaska’s governor in 2015 was an independent but there were no Alaska schools in the database 
so this anomaly did not affect coding. 
 
 I adjusted the original hypothesis about factors associated with national variation 
in LSFB scores described in chapter two to reflect the findings in the dataset regarding 
shared governance, LGU status, and dining operations described above. The resulting 
hypothesis was as follows: LSFB scores will vary by geographic region. Political context 
and regional food infrastructure together explain a portion of the geographic variation in 
LSFB procurement scores among colleges and universities reporting on sustainability. 
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 To summarize that rationale for this hypothesis (see chapter two for additional 
discussion), colleges and universities vary considerably in their access to regional 
infrastructure supporting direct farm-to-institution linkages. This infrastructure, which 
includes farms producing for direct sale to institutions as well as “food hub” facilities that 
can aggregate, store, process, and distribute food from small producers, has been 
identified as a significant barrier to expanding local sourcing and sourcing from certified-
sustainable producers (Vogt and Kaiser 2008; Bloom and Hinrichs 2010; Gaskin et al. 
2013). As a result, colleges and universities in regions with less developed infrastructure 
for direct farm-to-institution sales may encounter greater opposition from decision-
makers or from dining services management, out of concern that expanding local and 
sustainable procurement is not feasible. In addition, dining services directors who 
embrace advancing LSFB procurement but are in areas with more limited alternative 
infrastructure may find they are not able to increase their institution’s LSFB score at the 
same rate as institutions in regions with a more favorable agricultural context.  
 Because farm-to-institution infrastructure varies regionally,25 I expected to find 
regional variation in LSFB purchasing scores. However, anecdotal evidence from 
colleges and universities, collected at AASHE conferences and through the STARS 
database, has suggested that some institutions are able to increase LSFB scores using 
conventional suppliers. In addition, the USDA databases for food hubs and farmers 
markets rely on self-reporting and may miss elements of the agricultural context that 
support community-based institutional procurement. Thus, I examined the influence of 
geographic region alone, as well as its interactions with farm-to-institution measures, in 
																																																								
25 See, for example, this national food hub map created by the National Good Food Network: 
http://ngfn.org/resources/food-hubs/food-hubs/ 
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case available measures of direct marketing infrastructure do not fully capture this 
variable. In addition to standard forms of geographic region per the U.S. Census, I also 
examined regions in which USDA analyses have revealed the highest levels (by value) of 
direct-to-consumer sales, as a proxy for favorable farm-to-university context (Low and 
Vogel 2011).  
 In addition to agricultural factors that vary by region, I also examined the 
influence of political context. As discussed in chapter two, sustainability initiatives 
generally and sustainable agriculture specifically are politicized topics in many states. 
Political context and a college or university’s relationships with political leaders and with 
donors may influence an institution’s willingness to openly pursue higher LSFB scores. 
A full investigation of the influences of donor relationships is beyond the scope of this 
study, but evidence from the qualitative portion of this dissertation suggests that donor as 
well as political preferences have influenced some forms of local and sustainable food 
commitments at public universities (see chapter five).  
3.2 Analysis of Factors Predicting Variation in LSFB Procurement  
on U.S. College Campuses 
 
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics 





Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables for 207 Colleges and Universities 





Mean S.D. Min Max 
Local/sustainable food score 
(0-4 scale)1         0.79           0.64     0.00 4.00 
Region - South 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Region - Northeast 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Region - Midwest 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Region - Pacific 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Food Hubs2 14.09 9.22 0.00 33.00 
Farmers Markets3 89.82 82.81 5 368 
Farms That Market Directly4 27325.17 5042.85 14563 32516 
Republican Governor? 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Legislature (percent R) 0.51 0.15 0.14 0.81 
Public Institution? 0.59 0.49 0 1 
 
1 Sustainability Tracking, Assessment, and Reporting System (STARS) managed by AASHE. 
STARS data downloaded on July 1, 2017. For institutions that had more than one active report 
available using STARS 2.0, I use the more recent LSFB score. For schools with an active 2.0 
report and an active 2.1 report I use the score in the 2.0 report, as most institutions had not yet 
reported using the 2.1 version. For a small number of institutions with active 2.1 reports but 
without an active 2.0 report, I adjust the 2.1 LSFB score to align with 2.0 reporting. With version 
2.1 of STARS, the LSFB score changes from a 0-4 scale to a 0-6 scale. For these cases, I use the 
reported percentage of total dining services food and beverage expenditures on products that meet 
the criteria (0-100) and adjust it using the STARS 2.0 calculation tool (multiple by 0.053) to 
create a score comparable to the 2.0 0-4 scales.  
2 USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Local Food Directories: Food Hub Directory, calculated 
at distance of 200 miles from institution zip code on August 8, 2017 
(https://www.ams.usda.gov/local-food-directories/foodhubs). 
3 USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Local Food Directories: National Farmers Market 
Directory, calculated at distance of 50 miles from institution zip code on August 22, 2017 
(https://www.ams.usda.gov/local-food-directories/farmersmarkets). 
4 USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015 Local Food Marketing Practices Survey. 




 Variation in the dependent variable, local and sustainable food and beverage 
(LSFB) score, was great, ranging from the lowest (0) to the highest possible (4). The 
mean score of .79 out of a possible 4 points means that the average institution 
participating in STARS reported that about 15 percent of the foods and beverages 
	 88	
purchased by its dining services qualified as either local and community-based or 
sustainable, following the criteria set out in the STARS technical guide.26  
 The mean for the regional variable shows the percentage of institutions located in 
that region. For the four regions listed, the largest percent of institutions were located in 
the Northeast, followed by the South, the Midwest, and the Pacific. 
 The means and standard deviation for food hubs and farmers markets revealed a 
high degree of variability in these indicators of farm-to-institution infrastructure. The 
third variable associated with farm-to-institution infrastructure, number of farms that 
engaged in direct to consumer or direct to institution marketing, showed less variability. I 
used regional values for the number of farms marketing directly, which likely accounts 
for the more limited degree of variability in this measure. 
 With respect to political variables the mean for legislatures indicated that if all the 
state legislatures were pooled, the numbers of democratic and republican legislators 
would be almost evenly split. However, the range and standard deviation show that some 
colleges and universities were located in states with strongly republican-dominated 
legislatures (81percent); some were located in strongly democratic-dominated legislatures 
(85 percent); and most were in states that were more moderately democratic or 
republican-controlled. Sixty-three percent of reporting schools were located in states with 
republican governors (with the remaining 37 percent in states with democratic 
governors). 
																																																								
26 A detailed description of STARS 2.0 criteria for local, sustainable food and beverage procurement 
may be downloaded here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzY7o-k46NLgclZoX0F2ajZ1YWs/view. 
STARS 2.1 criteria for food and beverage procurement added an additional component—“part 2.” For 
colleges and universities that did not have a valid STARS 2.0 report, I modified their 2.1 LSFB scores 
to be consistent with 2.0 scores. I multiplied their part 1 number (percentage local/community or third-
party certified) by .053 to get their calculated score (consistent with 2.0 scores). 
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3.2.2 Statistical models 
 I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to analyze four models. The first 
model evaluates the effects of state political leadership; the second includes three 
variables that measure different aspects of farm-to-institution infrastructure; the third 
examines all independent variables; and the fourth includes only those variables with 
statistically significant effects.   
 The first model tested the relationship between local & sustainable food and 
beverage (LSFB) scores and political environments.  I used OLS regression to examine 
the effects of one dichotomous variable, political affiliation of the governor, and one 
continuous variable, the proportion of republicans in the state legislature, on the LSFB 
score. The second model tested the relationship between agricultural infrastructure and 
LSFB score using three measures: the number of food hubs within 200 miles of campus, 
the number of farmers markets within 50 miles, and a regional measure of the number of 
farms marketing directly to consumers and institutions. The third model tested the main 
effects of all independent variables as well as the control variable. 
 The fourth model includes the key independent variable predicting LSFB scores: 
location in the Northeast or Pacific coast, with the control variable included. This model 
represented the best prediction of LSFB score for all independent variables, and 




 The results of this study supported the hypothesis that LSFB scores would vary by 
geographic region. While one of the three farm-to-institution infrastructure measures, 
numbers of farmers markets within 50 miles, yielded a positive, statistically significant 
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result, it was very, very small. Statistical analysis also revealed a weak association with 
political context. The model that best explains variation included geographic region 
alone, suggesting that this regional variation is not explained fully by political context 
and farm-to-institution infrastructure. 
Table 3.3 OLS Models Predicting Local & Sustainable Food & Beverage Procurement 
Scores for U.S. Colleges and Universities (N=207) 
 








Main effects  








.912 (.278)   1.158 (.153)   .298 (.457)  .694 (.087) 
Region – South 
 
   .035 (.239)  
Region – Northeast 
 
    .624* (.265)  .366**** (.101) 
Region – Midwest 
 
   .029 (.237)  
Region – Pacific 
 
    .463 (.256)  .408*** (.137) 














 -.184* (.098) -.089 (.110)  
Legislature (percent R) 
 
 -.267 (.318)   .856 (.443)  
Public Institution? 
 
 -.199** (.092) -.134 (.096) -.114 (.093) 
R-Square 
 
.032   .056  .134  .106 
Adjusted R-square 
 
.017  .042  .070  .093 
 
Significance: *<.10, **<.05, ***<.01, ****<.001) 







Hypothesis #1:  LSFB scores will vary by geographic region. 
 
 A regression model that includes all regions (South, Northeast, Midwest, and 
Pacific) yielded just one statistically significant result when allowing a confidence 
interval of 90 percent: presence in the Northeast was associated with an increase in LSFB 
score of .366 (p<.10) (model not shown). However, running regressions by regions 
individually uncovered two regions, Pacific and Northeast, with higher LSFB scores at 
much higher confidence intervals (Model 4). Colleges and universities located in the 
Pacific region (California, Oregon, Washington) on average scored .408 higher on the 0-4 
LSFB scale (p<.01), a 10% advantage. Schools located in the Northeast region (Mid-
Atlantic and New England) on average scored .366 higher (p<.001), a 9% advantage. 
This result was consistent with regional differences in the total sales of directly marketed 
products, which are highest in Pacific Coast states and in the Northeast (Low and Vogel 
2011). 
 Hypothesis #2: Presence of a more robust farm-to-institution infrastructure will be 
associated with higher LSFB scores. 
 
 The third model presented in Table 3.3 tests the effects of three measures 
associated with farm-to-infrastructure supply chains: the number of farms engaged 
regionally in direct to consumer sales; the number of food hubs within 200 miles of the 
campus; and the number of farmers markets within 50 miles of campus. The measures 
were selected to represent farm-to-infrastructure context at three different scales of 
analysis. The model revealed a very, very weak, positive association between farmers 
markets and LSFB scores—too weak to be meaningful. I also tested interaction effects 
between pairs of the three variables, which did not produce any meaningful results. 
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Hypothesis #3: Political context explains part of the geographic variation in LSFB scores. 
 I tested the effects of political context using governor political party, percent 
republican (or democrat) representation in the state legislation, and an interaction variable 
including both variables. The interaction variable produced a statistically significant 
result in the opposite direction than expected (higher LSFB scores were associated with a 
more conservative context). However, a test for collinearity produced a mean VIF of 
10.47, invalidating the interaction result. Model 1 included both political variables and 
the control variable and found a weak association between the governor’s political party 
and LSFB score. Having a Republican governor was associated with a drop of .184 in 
LSFB score or 4.6 percent (p<.10). Percent republican or democratic representation in the 
state legislature was not associated with a statistically significant difference in score. 
3.2.4 Discussion of statistical results 
 The results of this statistical investigation of LSFB scores suggests that colleges 
and universities on the Pacific coast and in the Northeast are more likely to devote a 
higher proportion of their food and beverage purchasing to local, community-based 
products and/or products that are third-party certified as sustainable, as compared to 
schools in other regions. However, the best-fit model only explains about nine percent of 
the variation, which indicates that variables associated with geographic region are just 
one of many factors that influence these scores. 
 While the two regions associated with higher scores have tended to lean strongly 
democratic in state politics, the two political variables tested had much less explanatory 
power than region on its own. This suggests that political context is only a small part of 
the reason why those regions tend to have higher scores. Further, while I expected the 
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farm-to-institution infrastructure to explain part of the regional variation, with the 
exception of a slight benefit associated with the number of farmers markets, the three 
measures used in the model did not help explain why the Pacific or the Northeast tended 
to have higher scores. Why might that be the case? 
 Several factors may explain why this quantitative investigation was only able to 
identify one variable with meaningful statistical significance (geographic region). First, 
the flexibility in the LSFB score metric and the relatively low proportion of purchasing 
that meets the criteria at most institutions (the mean for schools in this study was a score 
of .79 out of 4) means that agricultural context may not serve as a significant constraint—
at least, not yet. In other words, because most institutions are still in an early phase of 
exploring LSFB purchasing and pursuing the “low hanging fruit,” they may not have yet 
butted up against regional limitations in food and beverage production that would 
constrain modest increases in their scores. In response to significant demand for locally 
grown and certified sustainable food at institutions, many conventional distributors have 
begun offering local and organic options. Thus, while some schools certainly have begun 
exploring relationships with food hubs or even directly with farms, many others are able 
to increase their LSFB score, at least to a point, through conventional supply chains 
alone. For example, FreshPoint, one of the largest distributors of produce to institutions 
in the U.S., now offers clients the opportunity to customize sourcing based upon their 
own definition of “local” as well as a growing range of organic products (FreshPoint 
2018).  
 Another factor that may help explain the difficulty of identifying sources of 
geographical variability is the way in which available data are aggregated by region. The 
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USDA data available by region for number of farms that market directly categorizes 
regions differently than the Pacific Coast and Northeast groupings associated with higher 
scores. A 2011 USDA study reporting the value of direct and intermediated marketing of 
local foods in the U.S. had results consistent with this study: the West Coast and 
Northeast had the highest sales by value (Low and Vogel 2011). However, USDA raw 
data provides a different regional categorization.27 Thus, there may be a direct marketing 
benefit supporting higher scores in those two regions that are simply difficult to 
demonstrate using available datasets. 
 Second, with respect to political context, while sustainability in general often 
carries “progressive” connotations, locally based purchasing can be framed in terms of 
economic development, distancing this objective from initiatives perceived to be 
associated with environment and sustainability goals (see, for example, Gaskin 2011). In 
recent years, all state departments of agriculture have developed marketing programs 
promoting “local” products that seek to support economic development in their rural 
farming communities (Onken and Bernard 2010). While the STARS criteria have become 
more restrictive in their definition of “local and community-based” in version 2.1, version 
2.0, the point or reference for the dataset used for this study, still defined that category 
broadly as products originating within 250 miles of campus, excluding those originating 
from Confined Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). Thus, while certification programs 
qualifying foods and beverages as “sustainable,” such as organic or produced with fair 
																																																								
27 USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service uses the following designations for regions: 
Region 1 (AZ CA CO HI NV NM UT); Region 2 (CT DE ME MD MA NH NJ NY PA RI VY); 
Region 3 (AK ID MT OR WA WY); Region 4 (IA KS MN MO NE ND SD); Region 5 (AL AR 
LA MS OK TX); Region 6 (FL GA KY NC SC TN VA WV); and Region 7 (IL IN MI OH WI). 
Retrieved on April 17, 2018 (https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/66D052A2-D49D-3311-
ADBB-92F405AAF0AC#B4BE2397-AAE1-34FD-8748-C33448A84A09). 
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labor standards tend to be viewed as “progressive,” colleges and universities may also 
frame purchasing that qualifies as locally produced in alignment with state-sponsored 
“buy local” programs, which have been established in every state, regardless of political 
context. 
 Third, the complexity of factors that influence progress toward advancing campus 
sustainability suggests that many contextual and organizational factors play a significant 
role in institutional change, and many of these variables are not well suited to quantitative 
comparison. The ways in which administrators, staff, faculty, and students advance 
changes in food and beverage purchasing, the kinds of roadblocks they encounter, and the 
pace and degree of progress they achieve vary significantly from campus to campus 
(Barlett and Chase 2004, 2013; Barlett 2011; Brinkhurst et al. 2011). STARS or other 
reporting systems mostly detail “what” has been accomplished, not “how.” Problems 
with STARS self-reported data of ‘shared governance,’ described above, provide one 
case in point of the limitations of decision-making measures in STARS. Further, STARS 
reports do not capture other factors that may be important for understanding 
organizational change, including: the experience and openness of the dining services 
director to considering product shifts; relationships between staff in sustainability and 
staff in dining services; and presence and persuasiveness of faculty and student 
advocates--all of which may significantly influence the LSFB score. Because these 
variables are not tracked systematically, they cannot be considered in a national, 
quantitative analysis of LSFB purchasing trends. 
 Finally, problems with the STARS dataset also may limit the strength of the 
statistical models. While STARS Technical Manuals provide clear and detailed guidance 
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on the determination of LSFB scores, colleges and universities complete all the data 
collection and analysis and self-report the results in STARS reports. All reports are 
publicly available on the AASHE web site and other schools may challenge a score if 
they find something that appears suspect. However, there has not been, as yet, any 
independent auditing process for checking the validity of self-reported scoring in the 
STARS database.  
 As described in chapter two, Real Food Challenge staff have been closely 
involved in the process of refining the LSFB purchasing credit in STARS, and the 
STARS 2.1 Technical Manual specifically refers to the RFC Calculator tool for analyzing 
food and beverage purchasing and generating a valid LSFB score. Most of the LSFB 
scores used in this analysis were based on STARS 2.0, as most schools had not yet 
submitted 2.1 reports when the dataset was compiled. Tables 3.4 and 3.5, below, provide 
a basis for comparing top performing schools based on these two related but separately 
administered measures of LSFB purchasing levels: STARS and the Real Food Calculator. 
As measured by STARS scores, 15 of the top 20 institutions are in the two regions with a 
statistically significant advantage: the Northeast and the Pacific Coast. Using schools 
reporting through the Real Food Calculator tool, a list of all schools reaching 20 percent 
or higher also reveals an advantage, albeit a weaker one, for those two regions, which 




Table 3.4 Top Twenty Scoring Institutions with Respect to Local and Sustainable Food 
and Beverage Purchasing 
 




Sterling College Northeast Vermont 4.00 Gold 
Columbia University Northeast New York 3.19 Gold 
University of North Texas South Texas 3.00 Silver 
University of Washington, Seattle Pacific Washington 2.79 Gold 
Central Carolina Community 
College 
South North Carolina 2.53 Silver 
Carnegie Mellon University Northeast Pennsylvania 2.51 Silver 
California State University, 
Fullerton 
Pacific California 2.20 Silver 
Villanova University Northeast Pennsylvania 2.09 Silver 
Saint Mary’s College of California Pacific California 2.08 Silver 
University of Buffalo Northeast New York 1.97 Gold 
Wartburg College Midwest Iowa 1.96 Gold 
Denison University Midwest Ohio 1.91 Gold 
St. Joseph’s College  Northeast Maine 1.89 Silver 
University of California, Santa 
Cruz 
Pacific California 1.88 Gold 
St. John’s University Northeast New York 1.87 Gold 
Chatham University Northeast Pennsylvania 1.86 Gold 
Western Michigan University Midwest Michigan 1.80 Gold 
University of Massachusetts, 
Lowell 
Northeast Massachusetts 1.76 Gold 
Guilford College South North Carolina 1.68 Silver 
University at Albany Northeast New York 1.62 Gold 
 
*Sustainability Tracking, Assessment, and Reporting System (STARS) managed by AASHE. 
STARS data downloaded on July 1, 2017. 
**STARS ranks reporting institutions with the following designations: reporter (lowest), bronze, 






Table 3.5 Institutions Using the Real Food Challenge Calculator Tool with Scores of 20 
Percent or Higher  
 




Sterling College Northeast Vermont 65 yes 
Antioch College Midwest Ohio 60 yes 
The New School Northeast New York 33 no 
Evergreen College Pacific Washington 31 yes 
University of Utah West Utah 31 yes 
St. Olaf College Midwest Minnesota 30 no 
Warren Wilson South North Carolina 30 yes 
College of the Atlantic Northeast Maine 29 yes 
University of California - Davis Pacific California 29 yes 
(system) 
University of California - Berkeley Pacific California 27 yes 
(system) 
University of North Carolina – 
Chapel Hill 
South North Carolina 27 yes 
Carlton College Midwest Minnesota 27 no 
Wesleyan University Northeast Connecticut 26 yes 
Northland College Midwest Wisconsin 26 no 
Johns Hopkins University Northeast Maryland 24 yes 
Occidental Pacific California 24 yes 
Oberlin College Midwest Ohio 23 yes 
Berea College South Kentucky 23 no 
Brown University Northeast Rhode Island 23 no 
University of Vermont Northeast Vermont 22 yes 
University of Montana - Missoula West Montana 22 yes 
Bard College Northeast New York 22 yes 
Hamilton College Northeast New York 20 no 
Cabrillo College Pacific California 20 no 
 
*Most recent score, reported as percentage of total food and beverage purchasing meeting 
RFC Calculator standards for either Real Food A or B. from list of 124 institutions for 
which data were available. Current as of June 2, 2017. Data provided by Real Food 
Challenge. 
 
 The RFC dataset is smaller (N=125) than the STARS dataset (N=207), and 
schools may drop out of or take a year off from reporting through either system for a 
variety of reasons, making comparison difficult. As more colleges and universities report 
through the RFC Calculator and/or through STARS 2.1, whose LSFB score is based upon 
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the calculator, representation and score validity may improve and provide opportunities 
to uncover more powerful explanations for variation among institutions. 
 
3.3 Conclusions and Implications for Understanding Changes in Campus 
Commitment to LSFB Procurement 
 
 The results of this national, quantitative survey support the hypothesis that 
geographic context provides an advantage for colleges and universities in the Pacific 
Coast and Northeast region. At the same time, it also reveals that this advantage falls 
short of providing a complete explanation of differences in local and sustainable food and 
beverage procurement across college campuses in the United States. As described above, 
this study suggests that attention to this form of campus sustainability is higher in 
Northeastern and Pacific Coast states but that this regional variable explains only about 
nine percent of the variation. Analyses of political and agricultural variables that might 
help explain this regional advantage were suggestive but inconclusive. The weakness of 
the statistical model is likely in part a function of the reality that institutions have 
multiple supply chain options available to them that can boost their LSFB scores. 
Limitations in available datasets meant that I was able to represent only a fraction of the 
diverse range of variables influencing regional advantage in the model. 
 Case study research (Barlett and Chase 2004, 2013; Brinkurst et al. 2011) and 
anecdotal evidence from AASHE conferences reveal a very wide variety of commitments 
and priorities among schools that choose to participate in the STARS ranking system. A 
quantitative model can show regional variation but cannot explain why administrators at 
a school located in a favorable geographic context may choose not to invest in local and 
sustainable food procurement at all, or why another, in a more challenging agricultural 
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context, may invest a great deal of resources to increase the LSFB score. Further, the 
processes by which staff, faculty, administrators, and students advocate and advance 
LSFB purchasing on college campuses are highly complex and not well suited to 
quantitative analysis. A quantitative approach to evaluate variation in scores cannot 
reveal process characteristics that might help institutions interested in taking steps to 
increase their LSFB scores. 
 It may be that a more sophisticated proxy for farm-to-institution infrastructure—
one that integrates participation within the conventional supply chain as well as a number 
of growing direct-marketing mechanisms—would reveal a stronger association between 
this contextual variable and LSFB scores. While technically possible to fashion, such a 
proxy would be difficult to assemble because it would require an analysis both of desired 
foods and beverages (meeting STARS criteria) produced within 250 miles of each 
campus along with the supply chains that influence the ease with which dining services 
can access them. The latter is mediated by the policies of regional distributors as well as 
emerging farm-to-institution infrastructure.  
 The results presented in this chapter support the selection of a mixed methods 
approach for investigating how and why colleges and universities have been making 
changes on campus with respect to food and beverage procurement. This quantitative 
analysis, along with published case studies and those available through AASHE 
conferences and resources, suggest that the factors influencing greater commitment to 
LSFB procurement at colleges and universities are highly varied and complex. The 
qualitative case study comparison and analysis that follows in chapters four and five 
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helps explain why the contextual variables examined only explain a small portion of the 
variation we see in LSFB advances.  
 Chapters four and five introduce and explain the role of an additional variable—
student activism—in advancing LSFB initiatives on campus.	The micro-scale, qualitative 
portion of this dissertation identified ways in which the variables explored in this 
quantitative analysis may be mediated by other factors. For example, the political context 
(measured by party affiliation in state government) of two of the cases examined in the 
qualitative study, UNC and UGA, are quite similar, and yet their influence on LSFB 







CHAPTER 4  
 
REAL FOOD CHALLENGE CAMPAIGNS: FOUR CASES 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the qualitative portion of the dissertation: the stories 
of Real Food Challenge student-led campaigns at University of Pittsburgh (Pitt), the Ohio 
State University (OSU), the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), and the 
University of Georgia (UGA). These accounts represent the synthesis of interview data 
from 55 participants, along with supporting information from university documents and 
media when available. The basis for the selection of these universities is described in 
chapter two, which also details the process used to select interviewees, the composition 
of interviewees at each university, and agreed upon conditions of anonymity. In this 
chapter I use footnotes to identify university and participant number for direct quotes; I 
do not cite synthesized references or those not directly quoted in order to maintain 
anonymity to the greatest degree possible. All direct quotes were pre-approved for 
inclusion by the interviewee.   
 The chapter that follows provides detailed accounts of each campaign, including a 
brief summary of reasons participants provided for the degree of progress made by the 
Real Food campus groups. Chapter five then provides a detailed analysis of the findings 
presented in this chapter. It provides additional detail regarding relevant variables, 
explores differences between the campaigns in depth, and presents my arguments for the 
most important variables that explain differences between campaigns and their outcomes.  
 As discussed in chapter two, the cases were selected to be as similar as possible, 
given the population of campuses that had hosted RFC campaigns that were sustained 
over several years. As Land Grant University status was an independent variable of 
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interest, the selection of two cases with that status and two without also was intentional. 
All four of the campaigns described here took place at large, public universities that are 
classified as doctoral universities with “highest research activity;” the undergraduate 
instructional programs are all described as “arts and sciences plus professions;” and all 
are considered to be “more selective” universities (United Stated Department of 
Education 2017). 
 
4.1 The University of Pittsburgh 
Of the four cases in this study, University of Pittsburgh (Pitt) was by far the shortest 
campaign, winning the RF commitment in less than two years. Pitt also was a relatively 
easy win, with the least amount of delays and opposition expressed by administrators. 
The description of the campaign at Pitt that follows is based on interviews with seven 
current or former students (at the time) and three staff members in administration 
(including dining services). No faculty interviews were pursued because this was the only 
campaign that had virtually no faculty involvement, outside of signing petitions. Figure 




Figure 4.1: Real Food Pitt Timeline 
 
4.1.1 Launch and early campaign 
 In the fall of 2013, Power Shift, a network that “mobilizes the collective power of 
young people to mitigate climate change and create a just, clean energy future and 
resilient, thriving communities for all” gathered in Pittsburgh for education and training, 
fellowship, and action (Power Shift 2018). A Pitt student who attended learned about the 
Real Food Challenge and decided to create an associated group at Pitt a few months later, 
called the Fair Food Cooperative Club. Jess McDonald, a senior majoring in 
environmental studies, and Steve Nicolet, a senior majoring in urban studies, co-founded 
the student club (Rosenblatt 2014). A number of students became involved with or, at 
least, aware of the Real Food group through their association with other environmental 
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at Market Square, Pitt’s main dining facility, by circulating statements of support to other 
environmental groups on campus, and by hosting Real Food week in March, 2014. Real 
Food week highlighted a different aspect of Real Food on different days at Market 
Central and hosted RFC regional organizer Jon Berger, who led two student workshops 
called “Real Food Challenge: Uniting Students for a Healthy, Just, Sustainable Food 
System” and “Social Justice in the Food System” (Rosenblatt 2014). 
 Like many student-led campaigns, an important part of the Pitt Real Food group’s 
early work was outreach, education, and recruitment, accomplished by staffing 
information tables on campus and sending emails to faculty members whose work 
intersected with food systems. Real Food students collected petition signatures and the 
endorsement of supportive student groups to help them demonstrate strong student and 
faculty support in future meetings with administrators. The Chancellor and Vice 
Chancellor demonstrated early on their availability and their openness to student input 
when a student leader happened to see Chancellor Gallagher and Vice Chancellor (VC) 
Reynolds (Renny) Clark walking to lunch while the student was tabling. The student 
reported having “kind of ambushed” them with “Hey! Can I talk to you about Real 
Food?” This student was immediately provided with the VC’s email address for an 
opportunity to follow up. While Real Food students did not begin meeting with the VC 
until they had gained the support of administrators working under him, and they never 
had a direct meeting with the Chancellor, both were consistently friendly and responsive 
when students approached them informally, walking on campus.  
 Once the RF Pitt group had collected enough signatures that they felt 
demonstrated strong student and faculty support, they began working their way up the 
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hierarchy of relevant administrators. They took this approach because they believed that 
the chancellor and VC would agree to sign the commitment if relevant staff members 
who would be involved in implementation thought it was a good idea and something that 
was feasible for the university. They met with the head of Dining Services, who was a 
Sodexo employee,28 and the VC for business, who was responsible for housing and 
dining. They also met with the dean of students and a staff person working for that dean. 
They found that their petitions demonstrating student support were important for getting 
the support of the dean of students, but that once they had her on board and were able to 
move up to the VC level, demonstrating student support no longer seemed to matter very 
much.  
 Pitt is a large, urban university with undergraduate programs in the liberal arts and 
sciences, engineering, nursing, and business, as well as a wide range of graduate and 
professional schools. The university’s heath sciences courses in nutrition are the closest 
connection any faculty members had to food studies relating to Real Food Challenge 
standards and principles. When RF Pitt students met with administrators and discussed 
problems with the conventional food system and ways in which the RF Commitment 
could help Pitt contribute to reform, they got the impression that these individuals had 
little familiarity with the agrifood movement or food system critiques. Some staff 
members were very open to listening to and learning from the students; one even watched 
the documentary Food, Inc. at home at the suggestion of a RF Pitt student. This 
administrator later expressed appreciation that the Real Food Pitt group’s initiative gave 
																																																								
28 Many colleges and universities contract with private companies to provide dining services on 
their campuses. Sodexo, Pitt’s contractor, and Aramark, UNC-CH’s vendor, are two of the larger 
providers in the U.S. 
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him the opportunity to learn about important issues surrounding food production in the 
U.S.  
 The students at Pitt put in a great deal of time and research to demonstrate to 
Pitt’s Dining Services leadership, and to administrators, that the 20 percent Commitment 
goal was feasible. For course credit, several students used the RFC calculator tool to 
evaluate the baseline for Real Food purchasing at Pitt. When the first calculator audit was 
completed in 2014, Pitt’s purchasing was at nine percent Real Food. Demonstrating that 
the university already had reached nine percent without any assistance from the RF Pitt 
team helped administrators feel confident that 20 percent by 2020 was an attainable goal. 
 While the process of gaining staff support was much easier at Pitt than at the other 
three universities, it was not always smooth sailing. When students first approached the 
head of dining services, the person in that position at the time was not open to allowing 
students access to invoices needed to use the calculator tool. This was in 2014, a year 
before the commitment was signed. With persistence, the students were able to get the 
invoices because of an agreement negotiated between Real Food Challenge and Sodexo’s 
corporate office that stated campus RF groups would be provided access to invoices, with 
stipulations about privacy and use of the data (Food Service Director 2013). When that 
dining services director was replaced through the promotion of a long-time Pitt dining 
employee, the new director, Abdu Cole, had a very different response to the campaign. 
Cole was fully behind the Real Food initiative and was willing to support the students’ 
calculator analysis and their efforts to determine how Pitt could increase the proportion of 
its food purchasing that was Real. This change in staffing likely supported the haste with 
which RF Pitt was able to make a strong case for feasibility to the VC and get the 
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Commitment signed. Administrators confirmed that hearing from dining services that 
meeting the commitment goal would be feasible was a very important consideration for 
the chancellor in his decision. 
 During peak activity, in fall 2014 and spring 2015, RF Pitt students met with the 
Assistant VC for Business, Jim Earle, who directs housing and dining, and VC Renny 
Clark every couple of weeks about the RF commitment and their plans for 
implementation. Students spent a great deal of time explaining all the facets of food 
system reform, the RFC vision and approach, and what the commitment would entail for 
Pitt. They addressed concerns about potential increases in pricing that product shifts 
might entail, and explained to administrative staff that the commitment would not require 
the university to drop long-time, local suppliers if they used ingredients that disqualified 
a product from being considered Real, such as high fructose corn syrup. As students 
responded to these concerns, they explained the four areas used in the Real Food 
Calculator to evaluate products and community-based businesses, helping staff 
understand the social aspects of food sustainability. Some students suspected that the fact 
that Pitt administrators and faculty had a limited understanding of food system issues and 
controversies helped their case. As one student stated, “I don’t know if they were coming 
from an informed enough place, at that point, to really challenge what the [Real Food] 
criteria said.”29 
 The biggest obstacle that RF Pitt faced in its campaign followed a meeting in late 
fall of 2014 with several administrators. For the first time in the process, these 
administrators asked a member of the university’s Board of Trustees to join their meeting 
with Real Food student leaders. One of the students present stated that this board member 
																																																								
29 Interviewee Pitt 1. 
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“kind of shut the whole thing down.” During the meeting, the two administrators and 
board member repeatedly interrupted the RF students as they tried to present their case. 
The primary objection they raised was whether the commitment would lead to legal 
liability for Pitt if the university failed to reach the 20 percent goal by 2020. The students 
had worked with RFC national staff to draft an addendum that made clear the 
commitment did not commit the university in a legal sense, but the students felt they were 
not being heard, perhaps (in their view) because the students were all young women, 
facing a group of older men across the table. As one student recalled, “that was a really, 
really frustrating meeting… The meeting that we set up after that, we were thinking about 
how to sort of get around that gender and age dynamic and actually get our point across, 
because basically we knew they would say ‘yes’ if they would just let us actually 
speak!”30  
 At the following meeting, the students prepared a PowerPoint presentation and 
used their presentation to maintain control of the discussion. They also recruited a male 
RFC staff person to attend, in order to have a male on their side of the table. At this 
follow-up meeting the student RF leaders were, as usual, very well prepared and had 
copies of the commitment, addendum, and a detailed case for the feasibility of the RF 
Commitment and how it could benefit Pitt, as it would make the university the largest 
urban, public university to sign the Commitment (a public relations opportunity). At that 
meeting, the VC told the students he thought that the chancellor would be willing to sign.  
Chancellor Gallagher signed the Real Food Challenge campus commitment on March 24, 
2015, during a Pitt Student Government Board meeting. At the time of signing, nine 
percent of food and beverages served in Pitt’s primary dining facility, Market Central, 
																																																								
30 Interviewee 1. 
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was Real, according to the analysis of student interns using the Real Food Calculator. By 
the summer of 2017 that number was 13 percent and dining services indicated it was on 
track to reach the 20 percent by 2020 goal (University of Pittsburgh 2018). 
 
4.1.2 Winning in record time 
 
 Pitt enjoyed a favorable context for the Real Food campaign in at least two ways: 
first, as described above, limited knowledge of food system issues and critiques, and an 
absence of direct ties to industrial agriculture interests, meant that administrators did not 
respond negatively to Real Food standards, outside of logistical concerns. As a result, 
administrators relied upon the judgment of dining services leaders, who (following a 
change in leadership) affirmed that the commitment was feasible. Second, Pitt’s campus 
culture around student initiatives is highly open and supportive of student initiatives. Real 
Food leaders did not have difficulty securing meetings with relevant administrative staff, 
even at the level of Vice Chancellor. Several administrators explained that they feel they 
have a responsibility to work with students who bring a serious proposal to their attention 
and are willing to do the work it will take to research and implement their idea. One 
administrator described his belief that mentoring students in how to negotiate the 
decision-making processes within the university is part of his responsibility as an 
administrator and an important part of student education at Pitt. This claim is consistent 
with the following statement that appears on the “Student Resources” web page of the 
Provost’s Office: 
We are committed to educating the whole student, determined that every 
graduate, regardless of degree earned, should leave the University with four 
key attributes: communications skills, a sense of motivation, a sense of 
responsibility, and a sense of self. Pitt students become perceptive, 
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reflective, contributing individuals within our diverse community of 
faculty, staff, administrators, and fellow students.31 
 
 Another factor that students felt supported the campaign was the strength of the 
student environmental network on campus at the time the RF campaign was launched, 
which included many experienced leaders who “knew how to get things done.” When RF 
Pitt was formed, environmental activism and sustainability initiatives on campus were 
largely student led. The university’s Pitt Serves program in the Office of Student Affairs 
had created a “hub” for student groups with some connection to sustainability called the 
Student Office of Sustainability.32 The leadership role previous students had taken on, 
their experience advancing sustainability initiatives with administrators, and the shared 
student space facilitated connections among a particularly capable group of student 
environmental leaders. As one student stated:  
We have very inspirational upper-class students who can teach the under-
classmen how to do things. Because reflecting personally on how I’ve gotten to 
where I am, you know, I’m considered a student leader in sustainability, and it 
wasn’t a professor—well, maybe Ward—it wasn’t an administrator, it wasn’t a 
boss that taught me everything I know. It’s upper-classmen who I had as TAs in a 
class called ‘sustainability’ where we had to make projects having to do with 
sustainability. Those TAs and those upper-classmen really guided me.33 
 
 Another factor that many people reported as important to RF Pitt’s success was 
the group’s strategic approach and the ways in which they benefitted by comparison to 
several other student campaigns going on at the same time. The students themselves and 
administrators who worked with them described their approach as highly “professional” 
																																																								
31 The University of Pittsburgh. Retrieved on February 27, 2018 (http://provost.pitt.edu/student-
resources). 
32 The Student Office of Sustainability “fosters environmental awareness throughout the Pitt 
community. The goal of the office is to infuse sustainability into the culture, values, and decision 
making process [at Pitt}.” University of Pittsburgh Student Affairs. Retrieved on June 7, 2018 
(https://www.studentaffairs.pitt.edu/pittserves/sustain/studentoffice/). 
33 Interviewee Pitt 6. 
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and collaborative. As one administrator stated, the students were “willing to collaborate 
and listen to feedback.”34 The students never engaged in contentious “actions” designed 
to demonstrate power through disruption; they never actually needed to do so. Students 
seemed to understand what would work best in Pitt’s context and they effectively utilized 
the decision-making processes at Pitt. As a student involved in RF implementation 
described: 
They didn’t have sit-ins, they didn’t have rallies; it was pretty much sitting down 
with the administration, sitting down with Sodexo employees, saying ‘this is 
something that would be good for our university,’ and working incrementally 
through each department so that by the time that they met with the chancellor, 
they already had everyone below them saying ‘yes.’ So, it wasn’t pushing the 
chancellor’s hand at all—it was an easy decision for him because he already had 
the support that he needed to sign off.35 
 
 While administrators at Pitt were more receptive to Real Food proposals than was 
the case at the other three universities in this study, Real Food students did experience 
and had to navigate several setbacks, first with dining staff and late in the process when a 
board member began participating in meetings, as described above. When delays or 
setbacks occurred, the students’ Real Food Challenge staff liaison interpreted those 
delays as stalling tactics and urged RF Pitt leaders to engage in “actions.” The Pitt 
students did not do as advised by RF staff and chose instead to continue engaging in a 
way they thought more likely to win the Commitment. As one student described, “we 
would hit like a minor setback and Real Food’s immediate answer was ‘you should just 
have an action against the administration.’ And we were like, ‘well, we’re not against the 
administration; we actually have a great working relationship with them, we just hit a 
																																																								
34 Interviewee Pitt 7. 
35 Interviewee Pitt 6. 
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minor snag.’”36 RF Pitt students felt the advice they received from RFC national was not 
well aligned with their context so they did not follow it; rather, they developed different 
strategies for responding to setbacks and their approach won them the Commitment. 
 Pitt students adopted an “insider” strategy, in their telling, largely because they 
felt it would be most effective. One student recalled VC Renny Clark, described as the 
group’s greatest supporter, specifically referring to the contrast between the 
“professional” approach of Real Food and the more confrontational tactics of other 
student groups: 
Whenever we would meet with Renny Clark, and we would just have a casual 
conversation with him, he brought [Pitt Divestment] up as a bad representative of 
getting something changed. What they would do is have big parades, and big 
actions, and he was like “yeah that’s never going to happen.” So, we saw what 
they were doing and we were like “yeah we don’t want that to happen to us.”37 
 
Another former student made a similar argument, saying that administrators were eager 
to say “yes” to a group pursuing a collegial approach because, at the same time, several 
student groups were engaged on campus in disruptive protest:  
…when you’ve got, kind of, a more active group and then one that takes a more 
kind of institution-friendly group, the institution is more likely to kind of listen to 
them and react positively to them… When you have spray painting on the 
cathedral, and campaigns, and rallies, and sit-ins, and then these nice Real Food 
kids come in? You can see how the administration is like, “yes, sure, we’ll do 
that—don’t riot.”38 
 
This student was describing what social movement scholars refer to as positive “radical 
flank effects” in which the presence of more extreme groups results in greater support for 
those viewed as more moderate (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996:14). 
 
																																																								
36 Interviewee Pitt 1. 
37 Interviewee Pitt 9. 
38 Interviewee Pitt 2. 
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4.1.3 Implementing the RFC Campus Commitment  
 Because students at Pitt won the RF Commitment so quickly, leaders of the 
original campaign were still on campus to participate in the early stages of RF 
Commitment implementation. In addition to the 20 percent Real Food goal, when 
universities sign they also agree to an implementation process that includes the formation 
of a Food Systems Working Group composed of faculty, staff, students, and community 
members. On many campuses, the campaigns to get the commitment signed may include 
more than one generation of student leaders, but at Pitt some of the campaign leaders 
were also able to lead the implementation phase, at least for a year or two.  
 Having such a fast success with the campaign also came with some drawbacks, as 
several students noted. Pitt’s RF student leaders worked very effectively with essential 
staff and administrators but put less time into student engagement and education. Pitt has 
institutionalized its Real Food Calculator work through two paid positions, several for-
credit internships, and a full-time staff person with Sodexo who is tasked with identifying 
and implementing product shifts to meet the 20 percent by 2020 goal. But, several 
students working on the implementation phase shared concerns that two years after the 
Chancellor signed the Commitment, most students on campus still did not know what 
Real Food meant. This characteristic of Real Food Pitt may also reflect the priorities of 
student leaders with respect to Real Food Challenge goals and principles. Compared to 
the other universities in this study, Pitt students were more focused on the benefits of 
product shifts, in order to contribute to the overall Campus Commitment campaign of 
shifting $1 billion in spending, than they were on the RFC principles such as building a 
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youth food justice movement and connecting with historically oppressed populations 
around food justice concerns. 
 
4.2 The Ohio State University 
 
 Located only a two-hour drive from as the University of Pittsburgh, The Ohio 
State University (OSU) Real Food group had very little in common with the Pitt 
campaign. OSU is Ohio’s Land Grant University, home to a large and influential College 
of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences that houses a great deal of expertise in both 
conventional and alternative agricultural production. OSU’s agricultural and corporate 
connections offered both opportunities and challenges for organizing around food system 
reform. Between fall semester 2013 and spring semester 2017, the OSU Real Food 
initiative evolved from promoting community and dining partnerships and educating 
students to assertive actions designed to force the president’s hand. The RF OSU group 
won a great deal of attention and important concessions, but ultimately made a decision 
that made winning the RFC Commitment all but impossible to achieve. Figure 4.2 





Figure 4.2: Real Food OSU Timeline 
 
 
4.2.1 Origins and early phase 
 
 What eventually became the Real Food group at OSU began as a locally defined 
organization embedded in a community nonprofit organization. Local Matters, a 
Columbus organization that seeks to “to create healthy communities through food 
education, access and advocacy,” welcomed individual OSU students as volunteers, in a 
variety of capacities (Local Matters 2018). In 2013 a very capable student who had been 
working with Local Matters on the Franklin County Local Food Council suggested the 
creation of a formal student group. Local Matters leaders agreed and created a formal 
program for OSU volunteers called Student Ambassadors in May 2013. Students 
involved in this early stage of campus food advocacy described the group’s role as 
“project-based” with a strong education focus. Early efforts included organizing campus 
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farmer’s markets and conferences, and collaboration with many community and campus 
partners. The Local Matters Student Ambassadors worked closely with OSU dining 
services and helped establish relationships with local producers, including an organic 
cooperative that resulted in new contracts with OSU dining. 
 When the Local Matters Student Ambassadors group was created in 2013, it 
included about seven or eight core members. Several leaders were pursuing their studies 
within the School of Environment and Natural Resources, with coursework including 
foods systems and sustainable agriculture studies. This common coursework provided a 
number of student leaders with opportunities to learn about food sustainability issues 
together, and to build relationships with faculty with experience relating to natural and 
social science aspects of food systems; a few even had the opportunity to explore Real 
Food Calculator metrics as part of a class. While other core members joined with 
different majors, all of the OSU student leaders had areas of study related to the work of 
Real Food, including nutrition and dietetics, environmental studies, and geography.  
 Continuing the community connection facilitated by Local Matters, the Student 
Ambassadors’ big kick-off event was held in the fall of 2013 at a neighborhood church, 
in collaboration with many community partners. Not long after, timed with National Food 
Day in October, the group organized a follow-up event at the same church. As one 
student described: 
We got together a couple of hundred community members and other food system 
stakeholders at a local church—the same one, actually—and cooked a giant, 
beautiful meal for everyone and really started to engage in this discussion of what 
it would look like to change the food system from the ground up, and what it 
would look like to do that here on a local scale, here in Columbus. And that was 
really powerful… I would say that was one of the bigger moments of getting the 
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campaign off the ground, because of the sheer number of people we got and the 
community we built in that moment.39 
 
At weekly meetings, students worked to educate other members of the OSU community 
about the Real Food movement and its goals. While the OSU students were not yet 
formally affiliated with RFC, an RFC regional field organizer began communicating with 
the students about the RFC Campus Commitment and how they might win it at OSU. 
Students learned about the RF Calculator and they began talking with staff in dining 
services about doing an audit of OSU food purchasing using that tool.  
 The OSU Local Matters group ended the 2013-14 academic year with a 
celebratory rally on OSU’s “Oval,” the school’s primary quadrangle bordered by stately 
buildings that include the main library and the president’s office. The students created 
skits, re-wrote lyrics to the school song, and created artwork celebrating the importance 
of Real Food, all with a positive tone focused on Real Food as an opportunity. As one 
student described: 
Our tone at the time…was celebratory–-like, President Drake! Come celebrate 
Real Food with us! [We were] seeking to bring people in from definitely a less 
radical perspective than what we have now. But at the time it was a really 
beautiful and I think useful tactic for bringing people together around food in an 
uplifting and not too intimidating way. We got a lot of people who might not have 
come to a different march or rally but came out for ours.40 
 
 Over the next two years that tone gradually shifted, as students faced what felt to 
them an uphill battle to gain cooperation from key university decision makers. Early in 
the 2014-15 academic year, students sought a meeting with “Dr. J” (Javaune Adams-
Gaston, Senior Vice President for Student Life). RF OSU leaders held several meetings 
with her in which they explained what food purchasing in support of systemic change in 
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agriculture could look like. As one student reported, Dr. J often responded by pointing to 
“project-based” initiatives that OSU already had in process, but that, in their view, did 
not go far enough toward fostering “true agricultural transformation.” They also 
requested a meeting with President Drake, who would be one of the two signatures 
required for a Real Food Commitment. During this time, the group also engaged in 
“actions” recommended by RFC organizers as ways to keep the issue in front of the 
president. These actions included the delivery, in February, of valentines that said “We 
love Real Food! We don’t love corporate consolidation!”  
 Utilizing the RFC calculator to audit food and beverage purchasing requires that 
students have ready access to invoices, and the RFC organization has helped facilitate 
cooperation from the major food services contractors with Real Food student leaders. 
However, OSU’s dining services is self-operated, which means that its staff can decide 
themselves whether to cooperate with RF students. After an initial “yes” from the director 
of dining regarding access to invoices during the 2014-2015 academic year, he changed 
his mind. Students suspected he had checked with administrators above him and been 
told not to cooperate. At that point, RF OSU student filed an open records request and 
eventually received some invoices containing significant redactions. 
 The OSU Local Matters Student Ambassadors wrapped up the 2014-15 academic 
year with a daylong conference called “Spring Into Real Food” on April 3, 2015. While 
the students’ formal affiliation at this time was still Local Matters, the language, 
speakers, and content of the event reflected their growing ties to Real Food Challenge, 
which several students had learned about through workshops and summits, and their 
interest in pursuing the RFC Commitment at OSU. Speakers included OSU faculty and 
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dining services staff; regional farmers and dairy producers; representatives of sustainable 
dining initiatives at other universities; and Real Food Challenge organizers (OSU School 
of Environment and Natural Resources 2018). As one student remembered, “[it] brought 
together two to three hundred stakeholders from the Ohio food system and even folks 
from neighboring states and schools to talk about logistics of how we would actually 
implement the Real Food commitment at Ohio State. So, this was really, really 
beautiful—we had workshops, we had breakout groups…”41 The head of dining services, 
Zia Ahmed, participated as a speaker and Dr. J attended as well, which led students to 
believe they were making headway in demonstrating to key administrators the feasibility 
and value of signing the RFC commitment. At the same time, at that event one student 
reported that Mr. Ahmed had said it was likely OSU would sign the commitment, and 
then a short time later Ahmed reportedly told a community ally at the conference that 
there was no way the university would sign (the ally reported the exchange to the RF 
OSU students), raising concerns about his sincerity.  
 In addition to making some headway in pleading their case with administrators, 
the Spring Into Real Food conference produced some concrete changes in campus food 
procurement. By working with an executive chef in dining, the students were 
instrumental in sparking a pilot program between OSU dining and local producers 
including Great River Organic cooperative and others—sustainable sourcing relationships 
still in place today. One regional producer described the significance of the students’ 
participation in the contract they had with OSU dining in this way: 
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Real Food at OSU is one of the reasons we have been granted a contract with 
Dining Services... Their participation and their voice was a big part of why we 
could work through this… They were a huge part.42 
 
 After about two years of education and outreach work, as one student explained 
“it was really fun and we learned a lot but we began thinking more broadly about the 
Ohio State food system and the Ohio food system and the greater national and global 
inequalities that are being reflected here, in our everyday life. And we felt like our little 
initiatives weren’t doing enough to create systemic change.”43 In addition, by spring 
semester 2015 staff members at Local Matters felt it was time for the student group to 
move its affiliation to a different organization because the process of checking in with the 
Local Matters board of directors regarding each planned activity of the student group had 
become cumbersome. As explained above, the Student Ambassadors had recently 
attended national Real Food Challenge meetings, were impressed by the group, and had 
developed ties with other Real Food leaders, so they decided to move their affiliation to 
RFC, creating Real Food OSU in the summer of 2015 (Real Food Challenge at OSU 
2015).  
 The students’ relationship with Local Matters continued informally, and 
throughout the following years some continued to seek advice from a Local Matters staff 
member with extensive community organizing experience. Local Matters’ continued 
involvement with RF OSU included accompanying students to an early meeting with 
“Dr. J” and attending RF OSU events and occasional strategy sessions. One Local 
Matters staff person continued to meet one-on-one with RF OSU student leaders seeking 
advice through 2017. 
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 While students were formally establishing the new group Real Food OSU in the 
summer of 2015, they hosted an RFC strategy meeting on campus that included 50-70 
Real Food student leaders from other schools and RFC field organizers. The national 
organization seemed to be interested in increasing its direct support for the OSU 
campaign, recognizing the importance of securing such a large, public university and also 
the challenges the campaign would entail, based upon the response of administrators so 
far. During that meeting, the group decided on an action in which they delivered a 
“party” to President Drake’s office, complete with balloons that spelled out “Real Food” 
and party hats. At this point in time the students described the campaign’s tone as still 
largely positive and optimistic, as in “Come celebrate Real Food with us!” 
 The first meeting RF OSU secured with President Drake took place at the 
beginning of the 2015-16 academic year. Students assumed that Dr. J had already filled in 
President Drake about the RF OSU group and its goals. RF OSU students had delivered 
copies of the RF Commitment, detailed information about RF standards, and their 
rationale for promoting the Commitment, to President Drake’s office on multiple 
occasions. They also had authored opinion editorials published in the OSU student 
newspaper, The Lantern, and had organized several rallies near the President’s Office. As 
a result, RF OSU students walked into the meeting with President Drake expecting him to 
be well informed about their request and about the Real Food commitment, and to be 
open to discussion. However, the meeting was brief—about 15 minutes—and President 
Drake did not seem well informed about their proposal. They perceived him to be 
friendly but non-committal about the RF commitment, while Dr. J, in the students’ view, 
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played the “bad cop” role, cautioning the students to move very slowly with their 
initiative.  
 Around the same time, during fall semester of 2015, RF OSU students met a 
number of times with Zia Ahmed, head of dining services, with whom they felt they had 
a good working relationship. It seemed that whenever they communicated with Dr. J she 
would re-direct the students back to Ahmed and suggest additional individuals they 
should meet with, rather than responding directly about signing the Campus 
Commitment, which they perceived to be a stalling tactic. Dining Services staff shared 
the students’ interest in tracking and evaluating food purchasing but realized they had a 
lot of work to do to increase transparency in their supply chain because of their reliance 
on large distributors that were not providing them with sourcing information. Staff in 
dining services identified transparency and potentially higher costs as the biggest barriers 
to using Real Food standards to move purchasing toward more sustainable sourcing at 
OSU. The RF students tried repeatedly to set up a follow-up meeting with President 
Drake, without success.  
 In February 2016, RF OSU again hosted a national RFC gathering. Students 
remember this marking a shift in the campaign’s strategic approach and tone. This 
gathering was focused on campaign tactics generally and how to “escalate” tactics in 
order to garner more attention. Students developed an idea for an action based on one of 
RFC’s messages: “There’s no time to lose for real food.” They made giant clocks and 
wore them around campus to engage people in the issues and solicit petition signatures 
for the RFC commitment. For the first time, the group planned not just to deliver 
something to President Drake’s office but also to refuse to leave until they got what they 
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wanted—a firm meeting scheduled with him. But, a police officer was called to the office 
and threatened the students with arrest if they did not leave, and they had not prepared for 
or discussed how to respond to possible arrest. They chose to leave, and the police 
presence contributed to a further shift in tone in their campaign. One student present 
remembered: 
It really shook everyone because that was such a shift in tone that the university 
would call the police to make us leave a public building when we’re trying to 
have a conversation about food. It just seems, in theory, so nonthreatening. That 
also made us realize that maybe we have more power than we were giving 
ourselves credit for. And that we struck a nerve, here—if we’re pushing the 
bounds of what corporate ag interests are comfortable with, then this is something 
important, something we need to keep pushing on.44 
 
 Some students also reported that training they engaged in with RFC on organizing 
theory and movement toward an emphasis on racial justice aspects of food justice also 
contributed to their shift in approach. They learned about Momentum theory,45 which 
suggested to them that positive frames (do this great thing with us) would be less 
effective than negative ones (e.g., change what’s wrong with OSU’s practices and the 
food system more broadly). The racial justice focus came both from a shift in priorities of 
RFC as an organization and what it highlighted through its training opportunities, and 
also through RF OSU students’ investigations into the history of OSU specifically and 
Land Grant Universities (LGUs) more generally. OSU Real Food students began 
investigating and discussing historic racial inequalities in access to OSU agricultural 
education and agricultural land in Ohio. They also began paying more attention to 
contemporary, local issues of inequality connected to gentrification that many believed 
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the university was driving through its policies and practices. As described above, the 
chosen majors and courses of RF OSU students facilitated their research into the history 
of OSU, as well as institutional food purchasing and sustainable food systems more 
generally.   
 While gradually shifting the group’s messaging and strategic plan toward a more 
confrontational posture, RF OSU continued to pursue campus support for the 
Commitment through formal channels. RF OSU included a Student Government 
Association (SGA) officer who submitted “A Resolution to Support the Signing and 
Implementation of the Real Food Campus Commitment”46 to SGA, which was voted on 
and approved in early 2016. With SGA support in hand but still no movement from the 
president’s office, RF OSU “…took some time to rap and process—what does it mean 
that we’re now drawing a police presence, that we’re now adapting and rearranging our 
narrative to reflect more of these local and regional issues?”47 As they were reflecting on 
next steps, in March 2016 they received a letter from President Drake’s office that they 
interpreted as a final “no” in response to their request for him to sign the RF 
commitment.  
 At this point, RF OSU student leaders felt that they had done due diligence and 
pursued their goal through all the appropriate channels, to no avail. For that reason, and 
because they were in communication with other progressive student groups that had 
experienced similar responses from OSU’s administrators, they decided to “escalate” the 
campaign through a coalition of groups that all felt they had not been given a fair hearing 
by the administration. In the view of one RF student, “pretty much every group 
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demanding social justice-related changes, every group had been shut down in a similar 
way.”48 
 Not all students involved in RF OSU interpreted the letter from President Drake 
as a hard “no,” or agreed with the decision to escalate tactics. In the words of a student 
who left the group, “From my point of view, the fact that they had received a letter was 
kind of legitimizing Real Food…It was promising, at least, and they could have 
continued without using grassroots tactics. But to them it signaled that they should really 
amp up their actions and make sure enough pressure was being put on the 
administration.”49 Some faculty and staff allies agreed with this student, and felt that the 
Real Food student group could have continued to make significant (albeit slow) progress 
toward Real Food purchasing by working with dining services. One faculty ally, 
however, agreed with the RF OSU leaders that the administration’s response was an 
effort to dilute or coopt their movement, channeling it into administrative structures that 
would likely result in very little reform. 
 There was no more direct communication between administrators and Real Food 
OSU following the March 2016 letter. As a result, RF OSU students were not aware that 
OSU leaders had recruited Brian Snyder, executive director of the Pennsylvania 
Association for Sustainable Agriculture, to a new post at OSU as director of InFact, short 
for Initiative for Food and Agricultural Transformation. This step was apparently what 
President Drake and Dr. J referred to in the letter to RF OSU in the following statement:  
While we support the [Real Food] initiative in spirit, we will continue to 
independently design goals and strategies that can be customized to the needs, 
challenges and opportunities of our institution and our local community… As we 
seek to achieve this aspiration, we will continue to engage students in a variety of 
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ways, including on work groups and research teams. Likewise, as is always a 
critically important component of efforts at the university, we will create an 
assessment plan to track and monitor progress toward our goals.  





 Following the March 2016 letter, RF OSU leaders planned a collaborative protest 
in coalition with United Students Against Sweatshops, OSU Coalition for Black Lives, 
Still We Rise, and International Socialist Organization. The event took place on April 6, 
2017 and began as a “Speak Out” on The Oval. The students involved named the 
coalition “Reclaim OSU,” referring to their desire to reestablish a voice for students in 
organizations like the ones represented there. An announcement advertising the event 
read “After a year of systematic silencing of our voices and demands, we are creating our 
own space for student and community voices to be heard” (Kington 2017). The concerns 
expressed included OSU’s delays in creating a Women’s Center on campus and 
implementing other steps that had been recommended to address sexual harassment and 
assault; the university’s role in gentrification in the surrounding area and its impact on 
Columbus residents; professors who had been “silenced” for various reasons; and the 
concerns of Real Food OSU.  
 At some point during the “Speak Out,” participants decided to move the activity 
indoors, into Bricker Hall, where President Drake’s office is located. At first, the activity 
inside Bricker was relatively low-key, and students reported that staff inside told them 
they could stay through the night, to which they responded “we plan to stay until 
President Drake will see us and address our concerns.” According to one of the students 
who was present, early on “people were speaking out, people were singing and dancing 
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traditional dances; it was a really beautiful space.”50 However, the climate shifted 
following a staff decision to lock the doors and not allow media or food inside, and an 
altercation occurred when someone tried to sneak some food in through a door. Police 
were guarding the door and, according to students, started shoving students and some 
were knocked to the ground, as was the food. Afterward, the situation settled down again 
and several administrators entered the building and said they were standing in for the 
president. The students had made a decision ahead of time that any negotiation with 
administrators would have to be with the entire group, as some had experience through 
past confrontations of individuals being singled out by administrators and, once isolated 
from the group, pressured to give in.  
 At some point in the early morning hours, one administrator told the students that 
he did not know when they would be kicked out of the building and that they might face 
expulsion or arrest. The police chief came into the building and tensions rose. One 
administrator in particular, according to the students, used rough language and suggested 
the police might throw them out, using force. Anxiety levels rose among the students; 
some had come prepared to be arrested, but many were seniors, very close to graduating, 
and were not prepared for expulsion. As a result, the students decided to leave the 
building, to avoid putting some in a position they were not prepared for. Outside of 
Bricker, supporters had gathered in an impromptu “tent city” which raised students’ 
spirits, but overall they were very discouraged by the administration’s response. One 
student remembered it this way: 
…we were forced out, and a lot of people were very upset, crying and grieving 
over the fact that instead of sending the president down to hear why people are so 
upset that they’re willing to occupy a building—why they feel so alarmed at 
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university policies--instead of caring about us as humans their response was ‘no 
and we’re going to arrest or expel anyone who dissents or brings up these issues.’ 
And I think that was the final nail in the coffin for a lot of people who for a long 
time had been on the fence about OSU or thought ‘well, I still like it here.’ No—
the university does not care for them and will not fight for them, or change any 
policies to make their lives better. So that was a very radicalizing moment I think 
for a lot of folks.51 
 
A video of the administrator referring to expulsion and arrest was posted on YouTube. 
Unflattering coverage in the Columbus Dispatch and a formal letter signed by more than 
400 faculty, staff, and graduate students criticizing the administration’s response to the 
sit-in put the university on the defensive (Edwards 2016; Huson 2016). The occupation of 
Bricker Hall in April 2016 was the last major event of RF OSU that academic year, and it 
was the only time the group worked closely in coalition with the other progressive groups 
on campus, although they continued, the following year, to stay in touch and provide 
some support for each other’s actions. 
 Shortly following the Bricker Hall occupation, two current and one former RF 
OSU students were invited to participate on a new committee created by the university in 
association with the InFact program area of focus on sustainable agriculture. The Food 
Sustainability Panel charge was drafted by the Provost, Dr. Bruce McPheron, and Vice 
President for Student Life, Dr. J, in April 2016 and delivered to people asked to be the 
first to serve on the panel, a group of about eight faculty and staff. In May 2016 the panel 
was expanded to about twenty, including additional staff and faculty as well as students, 
including the three students who were or had been involved with Real Food OSU (with 
student alternates, as well). One of these students had stopped participating in RF OSU 
following the decision to escalate the campaign in response to the March 2016 letter 
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explaining that OSU’s plan for advancing local and sustainable food that would not 
include signing the RF campus commitment. 
 The Food Sustainability Panel (FSP) was charged with the task of putting in place 
a process for implementing OSU’s stated sustainability goal that at least 40 percent of the 
food served in the dining halls will be local and sustainably sourced by 2025 (The Ohio 
State University 2016). One of the first items they turned their attention to was 
developing working definitions for “local” and “sustainable.” Early on the panel also 
committed to a goal of 100 percent transparency in food sourcing for the university, 
which is consistent with RFC’s promotion of regular auditing using its calculator tool. 
 RF UGA students and RFC staff members felt that the invitation of RF students 
onto this panel was the university’s response to the occupation of Bricker Hall. It is 
unclear whether or not that was the case; the occupation occurred shortly before the new 
staff person hired to lead InFact arrived on campus. OSU formally announced this new 
position in Food Sustainability on March 3, 2016, well in advance of the occupation. RF 
OSU students and RFC staff felt the students had won concessions through the 
occupation (expedited assembly of the FSP and three seats for RF OSU), but several 
faculty and staff members sympathetic to the student group felt that the hard feelings and 
tension between the students and the president’s office made the process of getting the 
panel off the ground more challenging. Setting aside how and why the panel was created, 
two RF student leaders, with two additional RF students identified as alternatives and a 
third student who had previously been part of the group, were included on the founding 
Food Sustainability Panel. Those roles became an important part of RF OSU’s work 
during fall semester of the 2016-17 academic year.  
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 RF OSU had a second major project during fall semester, 2016. The group 
received a $5,000 grant to participate in the “Plate of the Union” campaign leading up to 
the presidential election. Students organized an educational event on The Oval to connect 
issues surrounding food and the food system with electoral politics, and the heavy 
workload involved required much of the group’s energy that semester. RF students also 
pursued their objectives through academic routes at this time, working with the faculty 
member teaching Sociology of Food and Agriculture to focus the class project on 
institutional food purchasing. Several students in the class completed research projects 
directly related to efforts to introduce Real Food standards in OSU dining services and 
the process by which students advanced support for the Commitment on campus. 
 At the same time (fall 2016) the Food Sustainability panel began its work, 
meeting and discussing its charge and the need to develop metrics for what would count 
as “local” and “sustainable” for OSU. The RF OSU students on the panel advocated 
using the RF Calculator, arguing its status as the best available and nationally respected 
auditing tool, as evidenced by its use guiding the food and beverage purchasing 
guidelines for AASHE’s STARS reporting system. Panel leaders agreed it made sense to 
consider the calculator, along with other nationally recognized tools and metrics and best 
practices in Ohio’s agricultural region. As a result of the RF students’ advocacy and 
facilitated by a past professional connection between RFC’s executive director Anim 
Steel and Brian Snyder, FSP Co-Chair, the panel arranged and funded a visit from Steel 
so that he could make a presentation about the benefits of Real Food standards to the 
panel and a second presentation to a broader audience of interested parties.  
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 Accounts of Steel’s presentation and its effectiveness differ significantly between 
RF OSU students and staff, on the one hand, and other panel members (including both 
those sympathetic to RF goals and those who were less so), on the other. These 
differences in accounts of the presentations highlight contrasting perspectives between 
core RF OSU students and other supporters of sustainable food at OSU. RF students felt 
they and Steel had prepared extensively and presented a strong case for the use of Real 
Food’s standards as metrics for OSU purchasing. Other attendees, including several who 
considered themselves strong supporters of RF and said they had hoped Steel’s visit 
would lead to a panel decision to use the calculator, were disappointed by his 
presentation and felt he was poorly prepared for some key questions. These individuals 
said they had been expecting a clear description of RF criteria and its rationale; examples 
of how other, similar universities had used the calculator to advance local and sustainable 
purchasing goals; and a clear case for how the RFC criteria made sense for Ohio and its 
particular agricultural context. Instead, in their view, the presentation was short on 
evidence and specifics, and heavy on “political” perspectives, particularly regarding 
racial injustice. One panel member shared the following response: 
I remember being pretty disappointed because my gosh—imagine the enormity of 
this, seven or eight months after all of this trouble had gone down here on 
campus, that here we were with the panel that was established by the provost and 
the vice president for student life actually hosting the executive director of the 
RFC, and there had been plenty of lead time, up to this meeting, and so I was 
pretty disappointed… [His] presentation actually could have turned the whole 
thing around. But…he did not address some of the concerns that the panel had. He 
seemed focused more on making, frankly, the political arguments that stand 
behind RFC in this meeting. It was not a time to make political arguments. It was 
really a time to be completely forthcoming about the program and how it works.52 
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Following the dinner presentation with the panel on November 17, Steel gave his 
presentation a second time the following morning, to a broader audience in a 
multipurpose room of Thompson Library (OSU’s main library). Following the second 
presentation, the panel met and Real Food students pushed for a vote, which some panel 
members characterized as a “straw poll,” on the following question: will the panel 
recommend to President Drake that he sign the RF campus commitment as a way of 
meeting 20 percent of the 40 percent OSU goal? A number of panel members felt that 
taking this vote was premature, as the panel had not yet considered any other programs 
and their metrics—Real Food was the first national program it considered. Nonetheless, 
both FSP co-chairs voted “yes” and the poll narrowly missed its mark, by just one vote. 
Following that narrow loss, the two committed RF OSU students (and their alternates) 
decided to step down from the panel. 
4.2.3 Outcomes and competing perspectives 
 The Food Sustainability Panel was the forum through which RF OSU decided, in 
essence, to end its efforts to work “within the system” at OSU. As one student described, 
“This was another chance to try to do it the quote-unquote right way--the way that 
admins tell us to, the way that is socially, less-negatively sanctioned [laughs]. And to go 
through the channels that universities tend to go through.”53 RF students felt very 
frustrated that some of the other members of the panel, in their view, seemed to have a 
very limited understanding of food sourcing and food systems, and, as a result, were slow 
to recognize the importance of clearly defining terms like “local” and “sustainable.” They 
also were frustrated that a few members expressed concerns about including social 
																																																								
53 Interviewee OSU 1. 
	 134	
aspects of sustainability—particularly racial and worker justice issues—in sustainable 
food metrics. Finally, they were disheartened by what they perceived to be the slow pace 
of decision-making by the panel. Several faculty members felt that student impatience 
was fueled, in part, by the fact that they were seniors and eager to complete the work they 
had begun before graduating. The students explained the decision differently; in the 
words of one RF OSU leader: 
So we decided that we could either stay on this panel and do, at best, a really 
wishy-washy, abbreviated version of the commitment, because they wanted to 
pick and choose the parts that they liked and then do their own thing. Yeah, we 
could do some good—potentially, maybe. But the rate of change was so slow and 
the dedication to the things we deeply valued was not there. It felt like we were 
participating in the cooptation of a movement. It was just not what we wanted to 
be spending our time doing, and we would rather leave the panel than coopt the 
work that we were trying to do. Even if we’re not shifting the purchasing patterns, 
right now, directly, we’re building a culture of organizing and protest and 
activism on campus that is allowing a space for dissent--and then within that 
space, an ability for students to think about alternate ways of OSU existing…The 
consensus in our Real Food group was that that was much more valuable. Power’s 
always going to come from grassroots community organizing, from relationship 
building, from working with the people most directly affected by injustice. I know 
we gave away an opportunity to work with some of the top people at the 
university, but that wasn’t the work that we needed to be doing, to nourish our 
hearts and our souls, as well as our bodies. And that’s why we decided to leave.54 
 
 Faculty and staff who had been working with the students felt frustrated and 
disappointed when they stepped down from the panel. Some understood what they 
perceived to be “impatience” on the part of the students, acknowledging the slow pace of 
bureaucratic processes at OSU. One faculty member very familiar with but not serving on 
the panel also reported that a number of panel members had not made much effort at all 
to understand the Real Food standards, which seemed to be a significant contributor to 
the students’ conclusion that panel participation was not worth their time anymore. Some 
wondered if RFC national staff members had pressured the students, but none of the 
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student leaders themselves suggested this had been the case. A staff person on the panel 
remembered the students explaining that they felt they had to be true not just to RFC 
principles but also a broader social justice coalition they belonged to at OSU. However, 
some panel members supportive of the RFC campus commitment disagreed with the RF 
OSU students about where the panel stood following Steel’s presentations, as reflected in 
this statement: 
I’m confident it would have worked. Had the students not decided… I don’t know 
where the pressure was coming from. I didn’t sense that Anim [Steel] was 
applying the pressure, although some of my colleagues here were convinced that 
he was the source of the pressure, I don’t think he was. I do know that had he 
given a better presentation, we could have come out much better, and had the 
students not taken sort of a second hard line to force a vote--which, albeit, almost 
passed--if they had not forced that vote then, I’m pretty certain we could have 
achieved it.55  
 
One factor that RF students and faculty and staff agreed had contributed to their decision 
was a lack of trust on the part of the students that stakeholders outside of RF OSU were 
committed in the same way and to the same goals as they. One faculty member 
interpreted their decision in this way: 
They did not trust that progress would be made without actually having the signed 
commitment in place. I asked them, “what if you got everything you wanted 
except for the president signing the RFC Commitment? Would that be OK?” And 
they said “no.” They did not seem to trust that progress would be made without 
the signed commitment.56 
 
 What was the impact of the RF-OSU students’ decision to give up on an 
institutional process for advancing Real Food Standards? From the perspective of faculty 
and staff on the panel who were supportive of using Real Food standards, they believed 
that the decision meant President Drake likely would never sign the RFC Commitment 
and that the Real Food standards would not have as strong a role in shaping OSU’s plan 
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for meeting its 40 percent goal as it could have had. Faculty, staff, and at least one 
student on the panel (not affiliated with RF OSU) have noted that they have continued to 
refer to RF standards as they develop definitions for local and sustainable and criteria for 
food purchasing, and some argued they may even develop more rigorous standards, 
tailored to Ohio’s agricultural context. Some panel members were deeply disappointed 
that the RF OSU students chose not to continue with that process, as reflected in this 
statement: 
I think there’s very much a commitment to incorporate work from the Real Food 
Calculator [for example, among the panel members]. I feel it’s unfortunate that 
the students left… there is no chance [now] of the administration listening to them 
… the panel was created to move toward what they were asking for… [Making 
progress is] about creating new sets of relationships. The 40 percent goal is for the 
whole university--not just dining halls--so all those relationships take 
time.  Leaving the panel means [the Real Food – OSU students] will not be part of 
the work to build those relationships.57 
 
 Faculty and staff on the panel who were sympathetic to RFC’s vision and 
standards acknowledged that some panel members had problems with aspects of the Real 
Food standards, including exclusions relating to Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) and corporate consolidation. Some also said they anticipated pushback from 
administrators about these exclusions as well as the exclusion of products from confined 
animal feeding operations (CAFOs). However, these individuals also believed the 
challenges were not insurmountable, and that trusted staff and faculty on the panel could 
have brought President Drake around to signing the Real Food Campus Commitment to 
guide 20 percent of the 40 percent total goal for OSU.  
 All faculty, staff, and students who were interviewed felt that winning the RF 
Commitment was no longer an option following the decision of RF OSU students to 
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leave the panel. However, their exit did not mean that Real Food standards were no 
longer consulted by the FSP. As the Metrics Working Group of the panel began 
discussing criteria for OSU in 2017, RFC standards were consulted regularly. As one 
Panel member described: 
…essentially when we’re deciding what local and sustainable means, we’re still 
using a lot [from] RFC. So basically, as we’re deciding in our working group 
what do we want to count as local, it always comes up ‘RFC already did this; let’s 
make sure we use what they’ve done.’ In our working group meetings we have 
the RFC guidelines on our table—everyone on the panel has it in front of them... 
So it’s not like we’re disregarding RFC’s work--we’re just trying to work as much 
as we can within the confines of the Ohio food system.58 
 
Thus, RF OSU students succeeded in convincing panel members to carefully consider 
RFC standards. At the same time, some panel members worried they would need to 
downplay the presence of RF standards in the recommendations they develop, because of 
the history of the RF OSU campaign:  
The more stringent [the criteria] are, the less likely the board [of trustees] is going 
to be able to sign it. Especially because there’s already contention between the 
Real Food Challenge and the president of the university. So I’d imagine there’s 
going to be resistance to sign something that basically followed everything that 
RFC says.59 
 
Further, a faculty member on the panel noted that the process of getting everyone on the 
panel in agreement about priorities is really challenging: 
From my perspective, I think that everyone that is involved [in the FSP] is very 
much committed to the underlying principles of what the Real Food Challenge is 
about, but trying to mold something that might fit better with whatever the needs 
of OSU are or address some of the concerns that the administration had; kind of a 
retooled version specifically for OSU… [That said], one of the biggest challenges 
is that the most important parts of sustainability is different for different 
people...For example, some want to emphasize small Ohio farms while others 
care more about ecological or ethical issues. How you make these all work 
together is very challenging.60 
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 It is difficult to assess fully the impact of the four-year OSU Local Matters/Real 
Food campaign. One concrete outcome was the creation of purchasing contracts between 
some new local and organic producers and OSU. One producer interviewed was 
enthusiastic about the institutional relationship and eager to see it expand. The decision of 
RF students to leave the Food Sustainability Panel was concerning to at least one local 
producer, who had the impression that shorter distances might be prioritized over 
sustainable production methods, to the detriment of certified organic producers. An 
organic producer also expressed concern that panel members might adopt metrics for 
sustainable production that were vague and lacked meaning, as the term “sustainable” has 
become widely used by producers to encompass a very wide range of practices.  
 The full consequences of the decision students made to leave the Food 
Sustainability Panel will not be clear until the FSP completes its metrics and 
recommendations. Regardless of specific outcomes, one	faculty	member	whose	work	
intersects	Real	Food	goals	feels	that,	overall,	the	work	of	RF	OSU	helped	promote	
more	robust	discussion	of	sustainable	food	issues	on	campus:	 
What they have done has been very helpful. The students’ work brings awareness. 
There’s no denying the value of passion; when you have an abundance of passion 
on this topic, you can’t help but draw attention to it.61 
 
In addition, it is clear that in its support of the RF OSU campaign, RFC succeeded in 
advancing its movement-building objective. While a very small group, several students 
described their commitment to food justice and sustainability as work they would be 
pursuing “their whole lives.”  
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 The following semester, Spring 2017, RF OSU coordinated with two former OSU 
Real Food leaders who stayed in Columbus following graduation to continue advancing 
food justice work. A former RF OSU leader had begun working for the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers (CIW) in Columbus on a campaign to pressure Wendy’s to sign the 
Fair Food agreement,62 and the RF OSU seniors who had left the FSP felt it was a good 
time to embrace the worker rights aspect of Real Food. OSU was home to a Wendy’s 
restaurant in its medical center, and Real Food OSU, the Student Farmworker Alliance, 
and CIW collaborated on a series of actions in March and April 2017 designed to 
pressure OSU to cancel its contract with Wendy’s if it continued to refuse to sign the Fair 
Food agreement. A week long fast undertaken by 20 OSU students and an ongoing 
presence outside Bricker Hall produced a meeting with OSU administrators but no 
agreement to cut the Wendy’s contract. That weekend, about 200 activists from within 
and outside Columbus joined the students in a rainy march to protest Wendy’s continuing 
contract (Edwards 2017). 
 Real Food OSU’s decision to work in coalition with CIW and Student 
Farmworker Alliance was consistent with their earlier strategic decision to escalate 
confrontational tactics and prioritize partnerships with like groups over university 
relationships. An RF OSU student described participation in the Wendy’s contract actions 
in this way: 
It feels really beautiful and powerful in a way that we haven’t felt before, or as a 
different manifestation of that power, because here we are exploring what food 
means from a spiritual perspective and to put your body on the line for something 
you deeply believe in. And to respect the hunger and suffering of farmworkers as 
they are in the fields, often having to go to work hungry because they are paid 
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inhumane wages…So the least that we can do, and the most that we can do, here 
and now, is to be involved in this movement, and give it everything that we have. 
Because, I don’t know, why else are we doing this work?63 
 
 
4.3 The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 The campaign to win the RFC commitment at UNC Chapel Hill (UNC) consisted 
of two “waves,” the first led by a student group called Fair, Local, Organic (FLO), and 
the second managed by Real Food UNC, an outgrowth of FLO. Like the Real Food 
campaign at OSU, early efforts at UNC focused on making connections with local and 
sustainable growers and building relationships with dining services. After proposing the 
RFC Commitment to Chancellor Thorp in 2013 and receiving a tepid response, FLO 
members dropped the Commitment campaign and refocused their energy on supporting 
Carolina Dining’s efforts to identify and pursue product shifts toward locally based and 
more sustainably produced products. In 2016 a small group of students connected the 
campus group formally to RFC and made a second attempt to get the university to agree 
to RFC’s Campus Commitment, winning the campaign in May 2016 with the signature of 
a new Chancellor, Carol Folt. Figure 4.3 provides a timeline with key moments from the 
two campaign waves. 
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Figure 4.3: Real Food UNC Timeline 
 
4.3.1 Origins, launch, and first attempt 
 In 2007, a group of students at UNC in an environmental justice class taught by 
Anthropology Professor Flora Lu created a new student group called FLO (Fair, Local, 
Organic) Food in order to establish direct links with North Carolina farmers and help 
connect students to the regional food economy (Hannapel 2016). They had additional 
support from faculty members whose research and teaching intersected with food systems 
issues (mostly in anthropology/sociology and public health), and they worked closely 
with Carolina Dining, UNC’s dining services (contracted with Aramark). FLO hosted 
many local food-related events on campus and educated students about the food system 
and differences between the vendors they invited to campus and large-scale, corporate 
agriculture. One very popular event FLO Food hosted was called “People, Power, and 
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Pork,” which featured barbeque from locally, humanely, and sustainably raised hogs. The 
event directly challenged Smithfield Foods, one the world’s largest producers and 
processors of hogs raised in CAFOs. FLO students had learned that Carolina Dining was 
tracking the Smithfield pork purchased by UNC as “sustainable” because it originated 
less than 150 miles away, in Tar Heel (Philpott 2008). The event provided activists with 
opportunities to discuss worker and environmental concerns associated with commercial 
hog production in North Carolina (Hannapel 2016). 
 Beginning in 2009, several members of FLO connected with RFC through 
national and regional events and decided to use the RF calculator to evaluate the current 
status of Carolina Dining food and beverage purchasing. The creation of for-credit 
internship positions through Environmental Studies at UNC to support student work on 
the RFC calculator with Carolina Dining provided the labor for the tedious work of 
auditing endless stacks of invoices. Students worked with a social science faculty 
member to create the internship positions, very similar to the positions created at Pitt. 
While FLO members collaborated with RFC on the calculator audit and decided to 
pursue a commitment campaign, the students decided to maintain their own, local, 
identity, retaining the name “FLO” rather than changing it to Real Food UNC. In 
December 2010, two RFC calculator student interns presented their findings: nearly 13 
percent of the food and beverages sourced by Carolina Dining could be counted as Real  
(Hannapel 2016). 
 In 2011, RFC developed the Real Food Challenge Campus Commitment as a tool 
for campus campaigns to use to secure a firm commitment to ongoing progress from 
university administrators. Because UNC students had initiated advocacy for sustainable 
	 143	
sourcing around the same time that RFC was established, FLO Foods at UNC was in a 
good position to be one of the earliest schools to win the Commitment. With 
encouragement from RFC, FLO students began a letter-writing campaign and other 
actions, including “unconventional gifts,” to persuade then Chancellor Thorp to sign the 
RFC commitment. “Unconventional gifts,” sometimes referred to by campaigns as 
“inconvenient gifts,” were a series of actions developed by RFC that were designed to 
educate and keep pressure on the chancellor. Each week, a food item highlighting one of 
the four areas characterizing Real Food (community-based, fair, ecologically sound, and 
humane) was sent to the chancellor’s office with a letter explaining that aspect of Real 
Food and why UNC should support purchasing aligned with those values.  
 In March 2012 FLO students succeeded in securing a meeting with Chancellor 
Thorp and went in with high expectations, having completed many months of preparation 
and information sharing with his office. They were deeply disappointed to find that he 
did not seem to have read any of the information they had been sending, and expressed 
little enthusiasm for the prospect of committing to the RFC 20 percent goal, despite the 
fact that their calculator data indicated that UNC was already pretty close to reaching it 
and their arguments that the Commitment could make the university a regional leader on 
this issue, with potential public relations benefits. As a result of the meeting, FLO 
students felt it was very unlikely that Thorp would agree to sign the Commitment. FLO 
student leaders considered taking additional steps to attempt to change the chancellor’s 
mind. However, they decided they could accomplish more by continuing to work closely 
with Carolina Dining, with whom they had a very good working relationship—in 
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essence, working toward 20 percent Real Food without a formal commitment from the 
administration.  
 In February 2013, several FLO students attended a national RFC summit that kept 
group members aware of and connected to the growing RFC network of campaigns, but 
at that time FLO leaders still did not feel that formally aligning with RFC made sense for 
their group. They were concerned they would have difficulty maintaining the local 
character of their group if it became part of a national movement. However, the 
continued, active presence of FLO at UNC provided the continuity through which a 
second wave of students decided, in 2015, to make a second to secure the RFC 
Commitment.  
4.3.2 Movement toward RFC and a second campaign 
 In 2012 the first generation of FLO students were graduating, but the group had a 
strong presence on campus that facilitated engagement of incoming students each year. 
North Carolina’s Farm to Fork initiative, supported by the Center for Environmental 
Farming Systems (CEFS), a partnership between North Carolina’s two land grant 
universities and the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 
provided a context in which FLO could maintain momentum. CEFS is a national leader 
in sustainable agriculture and community-based food systems research and education 
(CEFS 2009). Reflecting these statewide trends and the strength of the FLO group, UNC 
selected “Food for All” as its 2015-18 university-wide academic theme, which created a 
significant opportunity for students to further advance Real Food objectives. In this 
context it was relatively easy for professors and students to justify continuation of UNC 
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student internships to run the RFC Calculator and devote attention to a range of social 
and environmental issues associated with food production. 
  During the 2014-15 academic year, one of the UNC students working as a 
Calculator intern with Carolina Dining established regular communications with RFC 
staff members in order to sort out difficulties using the tool. This student came to 
understand RFC as a grassroots network with shared leadership, managed by young 
people very much like the students running FLO: “I realized that I was just as much RFC 
as the executive director of RFC.”64 A close friendship with an RFC regional organizer 
also supported this student’s growing relationship with RFC. Another factor that helped 
convince UNC students to formally affiliate with RFC and pursue the Commitment a 
second time was the potential for that network to amplify food sustainability wins at 
UNC on a regional, and even national, level. This new wave of student leaders became 
convinced that the RFC network was important because of the ways it could leverage 
progress at UNC as a model for other large, public universities in the Southeast. Further, 
in 2013 a new chancellor, Carol Folt,65 was installed at UNC and she seemed more 
interested in engagement with student initiatives than had Chancellor Thorp. 
 A stronger connection between UNC students and RFC, along with a growing 
sense that institutionalizing progress through the Commitment was needed, led UNC 
students to agree to host a regional RFC summit in February 2016. The summit included 
a march inviting Chancellor Folt to “Come to the table” and sign the Commitment. A 
vice chancellor with responsibility for auxiliary services attended the march, signaling the 
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65 Chancellor Carol Folt earned her PhD in Ecology at the University of California at Davis. None 
of the interviewees at UNC pointed to Dr. Folt’s academic training as a factor in her support for 
the Real Food Commitment, but it is reasonable to expect that it would have supported her 
understanding of the ecological health aspect of Real Food standards. 
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new chancellor’s openness to considering the Commitment. During the summit, the UNC 
Real Food student team developed a campaign strategy for securing the Commitment, 
and leaders focused on expanding the group of committed students.  
 Immediately following the summit, Real Food UNC implemented a series of 
actions developed by the national organization as way for students to “escalate” campus 
campaigns. Like the campaign at OSU and FLO students during the first Commitment 
campaign, Real Food UNC leaders sent “unconventional gifts” to the chancellor’s office 
comprised of a basket with a food item associated with one aspect of Real Food standards 
and a letter from the group explaining the food’s origin and why Carolina Dining should 
consider it a priority. Students adopted this tactic both to keep their “ask” in front of 
Chancellor Folt and also to provide further details justifying the importance and 
legitimacy of the RF Campus Commitment. However, in one student’s words, the gift 
baskets “were not received in the way they were intended.”66 One staff member in 
particular expressed frustration that students had sent the baskets and letters directly to 
the chancellor, feeling that taking this step without consulting with the group of 
administrative staff members who had been meeting with them was disrespectful. This 
individual perceived the basket deliveries to be aggressive and inappropriate—a form of 
“protest.” He also felt they were unnecessary, given that high-level staff already were 
negotiating with students about signing the Commitment. Some administrators at UNC, 
like their counterparts at Pitt, felt that teaching students how to negotiate in order to win 
the initiatives and commitments they wanted--without engaging in “activist” tactics--was 
part of their responsibility for educating the young people on campus. 
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 As described above, at UNC many faculty members were connected to food 
systems issues in some way, and the “Food for All” academic theme brought these 
faculty members, along with interested students and staff, together on a regular basis. 
This organizational structure and strong food system expertise among supportive faculty 
members at UNC supported student efforts to educate and advocate for Real Food 
standards in university food purchasing. In addition, several faculty members served in an 
advisory capacity to the Real Food UNC group in a way that was absent at the other three 
universities in this study. At least one faculty member attended meetings with 
administrative staff about the Real Food Commitment, alongside students. As one student 
put it, referring to a faculty mentor and ally, he “always backed us up.”67 In addition to 
providing expertise and moral support, faculty members also sometimes served as 
“buffers” when tension developed between the campaign leaders and an administrator. 
Faculty members were able to guide students in their response to difficult situations 
because the student leaders took their advice and feedback seriously.  
 In addition to consulting with and accepting suggestions from faculty allies, 
student leaders at UNC also shared examples of strategic choices they made on their own 
that they believe facilitated their success. For example, seeking to build stronger 
relationships directly with administrative staff persons, one student leader chose to do 
homework regularly sitting just outside the main dining hall. This was a strategic decision 
with the purpose of “bumping into” dining services and auxiliary services staff informally 
in order to have the opportunity to establish better rapport, and the student felt that the 
tactic accomplished that objective. 
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 Faculty members also worked with administrators and national RFC staff to 
negotiate modest changes in the Commitment document itself in order to address 
concerns about the steps that would follow after signing the Commitment. On April 26, 
2016, Chancellor Folt signed the Real Food Challenge Campus Commitment on behalf of 
UNC. At the signing ceremony, Folt noted that the university was a National Grand Prize 
winner for campus sustainability according to the National Association of College and 
University Food Services (Wakeman 2016). Thus, Chancellor Folt seemed to agree with 
the students that leadership in food sustainability could bring favorable attention to the 
university. 
4.3.3 A favorable environment and persistent campaign 
 
 What explains the successful outcome of the second wave with respect to the 
Campus Commitment, where the first wave had failed? Student leaders and closely 
involved faculty and staff pointed to many of the same key elements but placed different 
relative importance on them. All agreed that the student campaign and student leaders’ 
flexibility, faculty and administrative support, and an academic environment that 
provided opportunities for advocating food system reform all contributed to the positive 
outcome. In addition, UNC’s efforts were supported by broader statewide initiatives at 
the time that provided significant political and economic opportunities for the campaign. 
Outside the university these included strong state investment in advancing farm-to-
institution purchasing and relative flexibility for the administration to pursue 
sustainability commitments. Inside the university, a supportive group of people at 
Aramark (the Carolina Dining contractor) and a generally progressive student population 
contributed.to the favorable environment for advancing Real Food. 
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 As described above, at the time that FLO was created at UNC, in 2007, North 
Carolina’s land grant universities were investing in a large-scale effort to advance “farm-
to-fork” initiatives and sustainable agriculture through the Center for Environmental 
Farming Systems. Military bases in North Carolina were advancing similar programs, 
with an eye to farmland preservation around the bases as well as base carbon emissions 
reduction goals. Several staff and faculty members and a farmer in the sustainable 
agriculture community all indicated that these political and economic opportunities, along 
with strong student and faculty interest and engagement, explained why UNC already 
was close to reaching the 20 percent mark for Real Food at the time that the winning 
campaign was launched. 
 North Carolina’s highly conservative political context did not seem to 
significantly influence its consideration of the Campus Commitment.68 The Real Food 
Campus Commitment was modeled after the American College and University 
Presidents’ Climate Commitment, and UNC was a charter signatory of that Commitment. 
That step signaled UNC’s relative independence from the state’s political context, as well 
as its willingness to participate in formal commitments similar to the Real Food 
Commitment. As one staff person described, UNC seemed to have the ability to 
implement progressive programs as long as it could do so without significant budgetary 
effects and without attracting the attention of the legislature. 
 One obvious difference between FLO’s first attempt at the Commitment and the 
later campaign was the change in chancellor. Several staff and faculty members 
																																																								
68 In May 2016, when Chancellor Folt signed the RFC Campus Commitment, North Carolina had 
a Republican Governor and its State House and Senate were both Republican-controlled (NCSL 
“2016 State and Legislative Partisan Composition,” Retrieved March 6, 2018: 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/elections/Legis_Control_2016.pdf).  
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interviewed felt that Chancellor Folt was eager to sign the Commitment and that she 
viewed it as advantageous for the university. One recalled hearing that UNC auxiliary 
representatives (presumably with the chancellor’s support) had communicated to 
Aramark representatives a willingness to incur modest increased costs, if needed, in 
association with the RFC Commitment. While Real Food student leaders never met 
directly with Chancellor Folt, some noted they had noticed a difference in 
communication styles between the two chancellors. For example, in contrast to Thorp, 
Folt initiated regular email communication with the campus community soon after 
arriving on campus. 
 While the FLO group that met with Chancellor Thorp in March 2012 did not get 
his support for the RFC Commitment, they were not discouraged and they continued 
auditing purchases and providing product shift recommendations to Carolina Dining 
Services staff. Their work certainly laid the groundwork for the strong support from 
dining staff that the later Real Food leaders enjoyed. As was the case at Pitt, auxiliary 
services at UNC wanted clear assurances that the Commitment was feasible and that 
Carolina Dining staff members were confident that the goal of 20 percent by 2020 could 
be reached. 
 
4.4 The University of Georgia 
The Real Food group at the University of Georgia (UGA) began around the same time 
that the OSU group got underway, in 2010. Like RF groups at OSU and UNC, Real Food 
UGA began with a focus on local farmers and finding ways to connect them and their 
produce with the campus, through events and through dining services, while mobilizing 
and educating students about the benefits of Real Food. Unlike OSU and UNC, the UGA 
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group was part of the RFC network from the beginning, inspired by campaigns at other 
schools. UGA, like OSU, is a Land Grant University that houses the state’s largest 
College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences. This aspect of the UGA campaign’s 
context had a powerful influence on its trajectory. Figure 4.4 summarizes the progression 
of Real Food UGA. 
 
Figure 4.4: Real Food UGA Timeline 
 
4.4.1 Launch and early campaign 
 UGA students formed the Real Food group at a time when there was a great deal 
of student activity on campus surrounding environment and sustainability. In 2010, UGA 
created its first Office of Sustainability following a student-led campaign that resulted in 
a successful referendum for a Green Fee to fund the office (University of Georgia 2015a). 
Leaders of that campaign had created an umbrella organization, the Go Green Alliance, 
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to facilitate coordination between UGA’s many small, environmentally oriented student 
groups.69 In the fall of 2010 UGA student Kate Klein learned about RFC through student 
Rachel Spencer at a Go Green Alliance meeting. Rachel invited her to go to a regional 
training event for RFC at UNC and they traveled to it together. There were about 30 
students at that event, which was focused on community organizing skills. It included a 
history of student movements and student activism, opportunities to practice organizing 
techniques, and opportunities for networking with students at other schools. 
 In early 2011, Klein and Spencer helped coordinate the third annual Southeast 
Youth Food Activist Summit at UGA. The summit brought about 250 students from 
across the Southeast, and UGA students were energized as they learned about examples 
of initiatives to promote fair, local, and sustainable food on other campuses. Following 
that summit, toward the end of spring semester 2011, these two students and Sara Black, 
another UGA student who attended the summit, held a meeting for UGA students 
interested in food systems issues. At that meeting, the three initial leaders decided they 
would form Real Food UGA (RF UGA).  
 Thus, RF UGA was launched in 2011 in the context of a great deal of activity and 
some optimism regarding student-led environmental initiatives at UGA, and with a 
structure on campus—the Go Green Alliance—that facilitated the connections among 
students with overlapping interests. However, one of the early leaders of RF UGA 
described coordination among groups within the Go Green Alliance as somewhat tense, 
because member groups varied quite a bit in their goals and preferred tactics. Real Food 
																																																								
69 A list of organizations affiliated with Go Green Alliance was not available at the time of 
writing, but UGA’s Office of Sustainability lists 21 student groups related to sustainability, 
including Real Food UGA. Retrieved on June 13, 2018 (https://sustainability.uga.edu/get-
involved/student-organizations/).  
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leaders leaned toward the “radical” end of the spectrum and often were members of other 
progressive groups on campus, including the Beyond Coal campaign that sought to 
pressure the administration to close down UGA’s coal-fired boiler. These students were 
comfortable engaging in confrontational tactics, including marches and rallies, and they 
published several strongly worded opinion editorials that challenged UGA’s 
administration when it failed to act. Other UGA groups, such as Students for 
Environmental Action (SEA), preferred to work through formal channels, in 
collaboration with administrators, and were not in favor of direct action. 
 Early RF UGA leaders struggled to determine the best course of action to advance 
Real Food’s goals. They learned that the newly created UGA Sustainability Plan included 
a goal of 35 percent local and sustainable food purchasing, without metrics, so one option 
was to focus on influencing those metrics, which could be based on the Real Food 
Calculator (University of Georgia 2015b). Doing so would require building relationships 
with Dining Services staff, while also building support among students for what they 
would propose. As a result, the students spent much of their time in the first two years of 
Real Food UGA developing those relationships, while figuring out a plan of action for 
advancing RFC objectives. In one student’s words, “…that first year we focused a lot on 
figuring out a plan of action, getting to know the system, putting on events, trying to 
cultivate a student mentality around the fact that sustainable food should not just be about 
organic—it should be about labor, it should be about scale, it should be about 
economics…”70 Similar to OSU and UNC, RF UGA’s earliest events included farmer’s 
markets on campus and dinners highlighting local food. For example, in its first year, RF-
UGA organized a 100-seat dinner at the UGArden, an educational farm that seeks to 
																																																								
70 Interviewee UGA 11. 
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“build a community of students centered on a sustainable food system” (The University 
of Georgia CAES 2018).  
 For early RF UGA student leaders with experience in activism at UGA, this 
process of developing a plan and thinking through what would work at UGA was 
strongly influenced by their experience with other campus campaigns, particularly the 
Beyond Coal campaign, which had not made much progress despite, in the students’ 
view, a relatively low-cost “ask” supported by a great deal of research. One early RF 
student leader described UGA’s context in this way: 
I was confident we could not pull off some kind of mass energy uprising, the way 
that RFC talked about the campaign, because students at UGA are really apathetic 
and conservative, for the most part. And so I don’t think it would have worked if 
we had tried to run a campaign with student outrage over the food system…71 
 
In other words, the early leadership of RF UGA included students experienced in and 
comfortable engaging in disruptive forms of protest, including rallies and marches, but 
they were skeptical that a confrontational approach was an effective one for advancing 
Real Food purchasing at UGA.  
 Some student leaders also were mindful of the potential for negative 
consequences for students who directed critical statements at the university. Many RF 
UGA leaders were part of prestigious cohorts at UGA including the Honors and 
Foundation Fellows programs; some were also selected as Udall Scholars (a national 
award), Truman Fellows, and Blue Key Honor Society members. As students who were 
academic leaders, many RF UGA students worked to take advantage of their connections 
to administrators to advance the campaign. However, this proximity to administrators 
also sometimes made them feel more vulnerable to negative feedback from their targets. 
																																																								
71 Interviewee UGA 11. 
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One student pointed to an incident in 2013 in which a student activist argued strongly, in 
a student newspaper opinion piece, that her views on UGA’s aging coal-fired boiler and 
its poor record on energy issues had been censored in university publications 
(Hatzenbuhler 2013). Following the student’s public criticism, the director of UGA’s 
honors program, David Williams, spoke harshly about this student to one of the RF UGA 
leaders, saying that if others chose to behave in that way, they could expect to lose the 
support and respect of administrators.  
 All RF UGA students interviewed described UGA as a challenging environment 
for progressive organizing. In addition to their experience that confrontational tactics did 
not seem to produce results at UGA, some students also were feeling “burned out” from 
failed efforts that had required many hours of hard work. In response to the hostile 
climate, they formed what began as a loose coalition with other progressive 
organizations, which they jokingly referred to as “Dumbledore’s Army.”72 UGA students 
later named this network the Progressive Action Coalition (PAC). More broadly, another 
contextual factor that some felt undermined student support for confrontational tactics in 
the early stages of RF UGA was a shift among progressives after President Obama won 
the presidency in 2008. With a progressive in power, generally supportive of 
environmental protections, it seemed harder to drum up outrage. As one student put it, “it 
was the Obama years and people didn’t know how to have a sustained sense of emotional 
urgency.”73 Degree of threat, as well as opportunities, has been important for 
																																																								
72 “Dumbledore’s Army” is a reference from J.K. Rowling’s (2003) Harry Potter and the Order 
of the Phoenix, in which Harry leads a group of student wizards in an underground effort to learn 
how to defend themselves after the leadership of their school is taken over by people allied with 
“dark forces.” The choice of this reference by UGA progressive student activists reflects their 
feeling that they were operating in a very hostile environment. 
73 Interviewee UGA 11. 
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mobilization in environmental movements (see, for example, McAdam et al. 2001); an 
early UGA Real Food leader felt the return to a presidential administration supportive of 
environmental protection and progressive issues more broadly undermined threat-based 
mobilizing frames.  
 All of the factors described above resulted in the early RF UGA leadership 
choosing a variety of educational and relational strategies to advance progress toward 
Real Food purchasing in the dining halls, rejecting many of the “actions” recommended 
by the national RFC organization. However, while UGA’s unfavorable environment for 
progressive activism influenced the early leaders’ decision to refrain from confrontational 
tactics, it did not lead them to frame their messaging in ways that might be more 
palatable to administrators. UGA’s early RF student leaders embraced the broad food 
system reform goals of RFC, in addition to the campaign objective of getting the 
Commitment signed, and their educational outreach and conversations with university 
staff reflected that orientation. Further, RF UGA students were not always aware of or 
fully considered the implications of the political context of agriculture in Georgia, which 
is heavily commodity-based, as they evaluated what frames and strategic approach would 
be most likely to win the RFC Campus Commitment. For example, in 2012, RF UGA 
hosted Will Harris, owner of White Oak Pastures, the largest regenerative meat-
producing farm in Georgia, to promote the possibility of serving White Oak pastured 
chicken in UGA dining halls. White Oak chickens74 are pasture-raised and cost four to 
five times the price of conventional poultry. At the time of this event, students indicated 
they had not yet considered and discussed the best strategy for messaging about poultry, 
																																																								
74 White Oak chickens and turkeys are Step 5+ rated by the Global Animal partnership and are 
Certified Humane, exceeding RFC calculator standards (White Oak Pastures 2018). 
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given the power of the Georgia poultry industry--an industry built upon the kind of 
poultry production that RFC standards explicitly disallow in Real Food calculations. 
Conventional poultry is Georgia’s largest agricultural commodity, and it represents 
billions of dollars annually to the state’s economy (Georgia Department of Agriculture 
2018).75 In other words, RF UGA students began challenging Georgia’s largest (in 
dollars) industry, consistent with RFC principles and Real Food standards, before having 
fully considered how that aspect of Georgia’s political and agricultural environment 
might influence their campaign.   
 RF UGA’s early relationship with dining services was challenging. When the 
students first contacted dining at Real Food in 2011, Jeanne Fry was the director and she 
was not at all open to the kinds of changes that the students suggested. Students who met 
with her reported uniformly negative responses, some logistical and cost-oriented but also 
just a sense that UGA dining was doing quite well—winning national awards and 
keeping students happy—and so they had no need to take on a new initiative. In addition, 
Fry stated to students on tours of the dining facilities that about 20 percent of the food 
served was local or sustainable. That number apparently reflected the inclusion of 
conventionally produced Georgia broilers (chickens raised for meat). Thus, although no 
formal metric had been created for the university goal of 35 percent “local or sustainable 
food” in the dining halls, staff in dining services had informally adopted metrics for 
reporting their local and sustainable purchasing practices that were quite different from 
RFC standards. Despite Fry’s attitude, several students were able to work with the 
purchasing manager to get access to purchasing data. During the 2014-15 academic year, 
																																																								
75 In 2012, the year that Will Harris was invited to speak at UGA, Georgia’s poultry and eggs 
farm gate value was more than $5.7 billion. Retrieved June 13, 2018 
(http://caes2.caes.uga.edu/center/caed/documents/CAEDFarmGateValueReportfor2012B.pdf). 
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three students (as volunteers) tried to make sense of the information available and found 
it highly challenging, as the paperwork provided to them often did not contain enough 
information about the sources for students to be able to determine what food qualified as 
Real using RFC’s calculator. In addition, in 2015 RF UGA hosted a group from the 
Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), an organization that has successfully advanced a 
“Fair Food Program” that “ensures humane wages and working conditions for the 
workers who pick fruits and vegetables on participating farms” (Fair Food Program 
N.d.:para. 1). 
 
4.4.2 New leaders and the second wave 
 
 With the graduation of several early leaders of RF-UGA in 2014, several students 
reported that the group went through a sort of “identity crisis,” trying to figure out the 
next course of action. Cathy Micali, a nutrition and dietetics major, and Rachel Usher, an 
ecology major, stepped up to provide leadership. Another emerging leader in the second 
wave, Elizabeth Wilkes, knew about Real Food before deciding to attend UGA; as an 
invited Foundation Fellow, she was “recruited” by Sara Black, an early RF leader who 
also had been a Foundation Fellow and who wanted to ensure the continuity of RF at 
UGA. In addition, both Black and Wilkes were ecology majors—one graduating, one 
entering. Because of this connection, Wilkes got involved in RF UGA immediately, in 
her freshman year.  
 The second group of RF UGA leaders shared in common with early leaders a 
strong commitment to the full RFC vision and reluctance to compromise their messaging 
in order to work effectively with administrators. However, most of the first group of 
leaders, while comfortable with confrontational tactics personally, were convinced that 
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that approach would backfire at UGA. In contrast, some (but not all) in the second set of 
leaders embraced RFC guidance to “escalate” the campaign, hopeful that getting “louder” 
would demonstrate power to the president’s office and convince him to sign the 
commitment. 
 The second group of RF UGA leaders described the work of the early team as a 
process of laying groundwork, building a relationship with food services, and educating 
and engaging the community through food-oriented events. Toward the end of fall 
semester, 2014, Jeanne Fry left her position in dining services and was replaced by Bryan 
Varin as Interim Director (then later, Director), who was much more experienced with 
sustainable food system issues and more open to working with RF UGA students than 
Fry. At this point, the RF student leaders felt they were really beginning to make progress 
with dining services, identifying steps they could take to slowly increase the amount of 
Real Food served. Several RF students met regularly with Varin, who expressed interest 
in advancing more vegetarian, nutritious, and sustainable options in dining halls. In 
addition, after Varin replaced Fry, students were able to gain access to more detailed 
invoices in order to “run” the Real Food Calculator. He worked with the Real Food 
students to create a paid student internship position for fall 2016 to complete the 
calculator work. Through that position, an RF student leader completed UGA’s first RF 
calculator analysis at the end of the fall 2016 term, concluding that less than one percent 
of UGA’s purchasing was “real” by RFC standards.  
 The low number produced by the Calculator review surprised the Dining Services 
Director. RF students thought that surprise likely resulted from the differences between 
Real Food standards and what UGA had been considering to be “local.” One area of 
	 160	
difference was distance; RFC’s community-based criteria uses 250 miles as the limit, 
whereas UGA had considered anything from a neighboring state to be “local.” Perhaps 
more significant was the difference in how animal products were handled. RFC standards 
exclude products that originate in Confined Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) 
because of concerns about environmental, worker, and environmental justice impacts of 
this kind of operation. As described above, the 20 percent figure Fry quoted regularly 
appeared to include conventional poultry, disallowed by RFC standards. 
 While the first comprehensive RFC calculator analysis was underway, other 
students were working to engage the support of UGA deans and to secure meetings with 
the Office of President Morehead and Provost Whitten, who would be the two signatories 
on the RFC commitment if the students could persuade them to participate. As described 
above, many RF UGA leaders were outstanding students, and they hoped to leverage 
their personal and academic connections to gain the support of academic deans, including 
the Dean of Franklin College of Arts and Sciences, the Dean of Health and Consumer 
Science, and the Dean of Odum School of Ecology. Most gave noncommittal responses, 
making clear that they had no authority with respect food purchasing decisions or the 
decision regarding signing the RFC commitment. At the same time, RF UGA students 
continued soliciting petition signatures from students and faculty members in relevant 
fields to demonstrate strong campus support when meeting with administrators. The 
group also continued educating the campus community about their vision of Real Food, 
particularly the social justice aspects of it. They felt that most people still understood 
sustainable food to be about organic certification and environment issues but not about 
labor, land distribution, and the effects of corporate consolidation.  
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 Like students at UNC and OSU, most RF UGA students took courses exploring 
various aspects of food systems and sustainable agriculture, and many were pursuing 
majors including ecology, environmental sciences, geography, social sciences, and 
environmental health sciences that connected with Real Food’s objectives and concerns. 
Along with workshops sponsored by the national RFC organization, students reported 
that these UGA courses and faculty expertise were important to their ability to understand 
complex food system issues and develop a strong case for the RFC Commitment in 
preparation for their meetings with administrators. In addition, at least two faculty 
members collaborated with RF students on educational events, including film 
screenings.76  
 While some UGA faculty members were very helpful to the education of students, 
RF UGA students did not view any faculty members as “active allies,” or individuals 
who might actively support their campaign. From the students’ perspective, the faculty 
members who were supportive of their goals felt their campaign goal, getting the 
Commitment signed, while worthy, was unlikely to be successful. Some students also 
sensed, on the part of faculty, concerns about being associated with the campaign for fear 
of reprisals; some felt this concern so strongly that they hesitated to identify sympathetic 
faculty members in their interviews. Several faculty members interviewed shared that 
they did, indeed, believe there could be serious consequences for speaking critically 
about conventional agribusiness at UGA, and that people were afraid to be associated 
with an initiative like RF UGA. Another connected this sentiment to a broader sense that, 
at that time, faculty members had to be very careful to avoid being perceived to be 
																																																								
76 The documentary films shared by RF UGA through educational events included Food Chains 
and Under Contract. 
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“liberal” and steering students toward activism. Thus, in addition to a fear of 
repercussions some of the early RF UGA students felt about challenging UGA 
administrators, faculty and dean allies also felt constrained with respect to the ways in 
which they felt they could endorse RF UGA and its campaign. One student put it this 
way: 
They know what we’re trying to do, but they would just…it was just depressing-- 
they kind of gave a sense of ‘well, good luck with that!!’ I thought maybe they 
could be advocates for us, but these are really complicated politics, and, I don’t 
know if it’s like their jobs are on the line… I definitely was instructed to not 
repeat some things.77 
 
 A few faculty members remembered sharing advice with students relevant to the 
agricultural and political context shaping UGA priorities, but students did not refer to that 
advice in their accounts. The second wave of RF UGA leaders felt they had a powerful 
case, and they were energized by RFC’s principles and the solidarity they felt with other 
food justice activists. Student and faculty petitions in hand, RF UGA leaders pursued 
meetings with administrative staff with great persistence. The process was frustrating and 
slow, as described by one student: 
They did kind of offer us a little bit and then kind of take it back or ignore us. We 
[were] offered meetings and then they would just keep pushing the date or saying 
‘this week isn’t good, try us in two weeks.’ Essentially they were just completely 
stalling us. So, there would be moments when we felt like we were moving 
forward, and then we would just totally hit a wall.78 
 
After months of work to set it up, students finally met with Arthur Tripp, Assistant to 
President Morehead, for the first time in late fall, 2015. One student recalled his response 
as being generally favorable until the specifics of signing the Commitment were 
described; the student perceived that Tripp viewed the formal Commitment as 
																																																								
77 Interviewee UGA 9. 
78 Interviewee UGA 9. 
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problematic. Another student interpreted Tripp’s response throughout as that of a highly 
skilled “spin doctor,” listening but unwilling to provide a clear response.  
 During spring semester 2016 several RF UGA students secured a second meeting 
with Tripp. In this meeting, students shared a map of colleges and universities that had 
signed the Commitment and a map of farms near UGA that would meet Real Food 
standards. The students felt they made a very well researched pitch and that Tripp’s 
response, encouraging them to do further research, was a stalling tactic. Around the same 
time, RF UGA student Rachel Usher, a presidential scholar in the Odum School of 
Ecology, used her position as a top scholar to secure a meeting with Provost Whitten. The 
group prepared a pitch highlighting the dietary benefits of their proposal to appeal to 
Whitten’s training as a public health scientist. According to the students who attended, 
she raised two primary objections in the meeting: first, that the Commitment would 
legally bind UGA to a promise it might not be able to keep, which is a common objection 
to RFC campaigns; and second, that the RFC Commitment might be a problem for the 
Board of Regents, the governing body of the University System of Georgia. This was one 
of the first indicators to students that administrators had concerns about how RFC would 
be perceived by external stakeholders important to the university. The students also felt 
she was dismissive and did not take them seriously; they felt very frustrated because of 
all the research and preparation they had put into the materials they provided Provost 
Whitten and Arthur Tripp. As one student remembered it, “I guess I was just really 
disappointed in our university, that these are your top performing undergrads, who are 
coming to you, with the brains you helped to train, and you are just saying ‘This is adult 
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land, you need to go play in your sandbox.’ Which was the general gist of all the big 
meetings we had.”79 
 Another objection that Tripp and Whitten raised in their meetings with RF UGA 
students was that the RFC Commitment was unnecessary because UGA already had 
committed to a goal of reaching 35 percent local and sustainable food by 2020. Like 
students at OSU, the RF UGA group felt that the pre-existing “local and sustainable 
food” commitment at UGA was used as an excuse to reject the RFC commitment. As one 
student described: 
At first it felt like a win—like wow, the university is already interested in this. 
But I feel like it came back to really haunt us, in our meetings, with people like 
Provost Whitten and Arthur Tripp just because it didn’t make sense to them, like 
‘you want something that we’re already doing.’ But that wasn’t true—we wanted 
them to do an addendum or be more specific about the criteria. They just kept 
going back to ‘oh we’re already doing this.’80 
 
 At this point in the campaign, with no clear indication from the president’s office 
that any amount of research was going to move their case further, one student reported 
pressure from RFC staff to “escalate” tactics along the lines of the OSU campaign and 
occupy President Morehead’s office. RFC organizers made this recommendation in the 
context of planning a farmer’s market event in April 2016. During this event, students 
displayed a large canvas version of the RFC commitment for attendees to see and sign, 
and sent an invitation to the president’s office. The visual banner was a compromise—an 
alternative to “sitting-in”-- because the UGA students did not think that occupying the 
																																																								
79 Interviewee UGA 8. Note: Provost Whitten and Arthur Tripp ignored repeated attempts to 
communicate with them about RF UGA, including multiple emails and in-person requests made 
at their offices. After multiple attempts to reach him, Associate Vice Provost and Director of the 
Honors Program David Williams responded to my interview requests by responding that he was 
unable to participate. The dean of Odum School of Ecology also failed to respond to repeated 
email, phone, and in-person requests for an interview. 
80 Interviewee UGA 8. 
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president’s office would help their cause. At least some felt they had received a “soft no” 
but not a “hard no” from the president’s office, and that such a confrontational approach 
would undermine the campaign. While no one from President Morehead’s office attended 
the event in an official capacity, one office staff member attended out of personal interest, 
making clear she did not represent the president.  
 An additional avenue that RF UGA pursued to demonstrate strong campus 
support was securing a Student Government Association (SGA) resolution to support the 
RFC Commitment. David Williams recommended this approach to students, saying he 
felt that President Morehead would take SGA support seriously. Many campus RFC 
campaigns pursue an SGA resolution as a demonstration of student body support for the 
initiative, and RF UGA students had seen this tactic used effectively at other universities. 
RF UGA’s relationship with SGA began with cooperation and then changed abruptly. In 
March 2016, students took their proposal to the SGA and the vote approving the 
resolution was almost unanimous. The resolution (28-27 of the 2015-2016 academic 
year) supported the request of RF UGA that President Morehead and Provost Whitten 
sign the RFC Campus Commitment (Huller 2016). When RF UGA leaders reached out to 
the SGA president after the vote to ask about next steps and when the resolution would 
reach President Morehead’s desk, he responded that he had to check in with several 
offices first, including Arthur Tripp’s. About two weeks later, the SGA president tried to 
veto the resolution but was unable to do so because the window for a veto (one week) had 
closed. RF UGA students believed the abrupt change of position of the SGA president 
was the result of communication with Tripp, who, they assumed, had told him that 
President Morehead was not in favor of the RFC Commitment. The SGA president wrote, 
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in an email to RF UGA students, that he had decided to veto the resolution because UGA 
already had a more ambitious local and sustainable food commitment in its sustainability 
plan—the same response students had received, at times, from Whitten and Tripp. Real 
Food UGA students were unsure whether the SGA president honestly misunderstood the 
difference between Real Food standards and the UGA commitment (with no metrics 
attached), or whether he was simply stating the position he had heard from the 
administrators with whom he consulted. 
 At the beginning of fall semester 2016, RF UGA students continued pursuing 
several avenues. One, they followed up with SGA, which now had new leadership and 
membership. They had a signed resolution from March 2016 but were again met with 
resistance from the SGA president, who, in one student’s view, basically indicated there 
was no way President Morehead would sign the RFC Commitment, even though the 
previous year’s SGA had formally endorsed it. Second, RF UGA students also were busy 
working with RFC staff to plan its national summit, to be held at UGA in September. The 
plan was to use the summit and the opportunity for greater student numbers it provided to 
increase pressure on President Morehead to meet with the students, who by that time 
were having difficulty getting another meeting with Arthur Tripp. The summit took place 
the weekend of September 23, 2016, and connected RF UGA with progressive groups in 
Athens, RFC staff, and other RF student leaders throughout the United States. The 
summit gave the UGA group an opportunity to demonstrate greater numbers, and the 
weekend included the march described on the opening page of this dissertation, calling on 
President Morehead to “come take a seat at the table!” Students carried chairs over their 
heads that were painted with words and images representing different facets of Real Food 
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Challenge principles, including worker rights and humane treatment of animals. Chants 
included “Up, up, with the Real Food nation; Down, down, with the exploitation!” One of 
many tweets originating at the summit read “Where there is the greatest opposition, the 
greatest resistance,” referring, presumably, to the resistance of UGA’s leadership to the 
RFC Commitment.81  
 At least one faculty member, who had previously worked with students on film 
screenings, attended some of the summit activities and was impressed by the group’s 
diversity and its commitment to “making the issue less white.”82 Like many RF students 
at OSU and UNC, students at UGA reported feeling energized and inspired by RFC 
summits. In the words of a UGA participant at the September, 2016 national summit in 
Athens, “We’re all like souls. We eat a lot of really good food when we do the summits 
and cook together and we have tea at nighttime and its just really nice to be able to have 
that when we work so hard, and face all this money and power and people who don’t 
really want to talk to us.”83 
 Following the summit, RF UGA increased pressure on administrators in the same 
way that the campaigns at OSU and UNC had done—sending “unconventional gifts” 
weekly to the president’s office. Arthur Tripp’s office returned the baskets with a note 
indicating that the office could not accept gifts. Students also followed up on suggestions 
made about additional contacts in their meetings with Tripp and Whitten, including 
meeting with the new Dean of the College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, 
Sam Pardue. A single student held an initial meeting with Dean Pardue in November, 
																																																								
81 Real Food Challenge staff person Katie Leblanc’s Twitter feed, accessed March 22, 2018, 
https://twitter.com/katieleblancrfc/status/779789589343068160. 
82 Interviewee UGA 5. 
83 Interviewee UGA 6. 
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2016, and he seemed open to the group’s ideas and proposals. At the end of this initial 
meeting he made a commitment to raise the issue of the RFC commitment in his next 
meeting with Provost Whitten, scheduled for December 2016.  
 In October 2016, as the RF UGA students continued to try to secure more 
meetings with administrators, two students took advantage of an opportunity to connect 
with them informally through an award ceremony to which one of the students, along 
with a guest, had been invited. Also present were friends who were not affiliated with RF 
UGA. At the event, David Williams approached the two RF UGA students, with whom 
he was well acquainted, and began asking questions about Real Food in a way that 
suggested concern. These students later heard from a friend who was seated at President 
Morehead’s table that during the dinner, other people seated at the table asked questions 
of the president about a student group on campus that wanted to ban “GMO chicken” 
(presumably RF UGA). The student reported that President Morehead’s response 
included the fact that one of the group’s leaders was a Foundation Fellow (presumably 
referring to Elizabeth Wilkes) and that he had expressed concerns about this to the head 
of that program, David Williams. He shared this not realizing that a friend of Elizabeth’s 
was seated at the table. Upon hearing about this exchange, the students attributed 
Williams’ unusual behavior earlier that evening to having heard concerns from President 
Morehead about Foundation Fellows participating in RF UGA. Several RF UGA students 
described this event as a “clarifying moment” when they came to believe that powerful 
people were pressuring the president’s office to quell the RFC campaign. RF students 
reported that shortly after this event, Dr. Williams, who previously had supported RF 
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UGA’s efforts to get an SGA resolution passed, suggested that they stop pursuing that 
route and that they “change their tone.” 
 In December 2016, as students had secured a tepid agreement from the new SGA 
leadership to provide some support for their efforts to engage more students in Real Food 
issues, they followed up with Dean Pardue to see how his conversation with Provost 
Whitten had gone and to let him know they had SGA support. His response was less 
favorable than it had been initially. The primary objection he shared was that the 
reporting requirements of the Commitment required resources UGA dining services did 
not have, and he urged the students to continue working informally with dining services. 
Students were very frustrated by his response because they already had provided free 
labor and done the legwork to create a position in Dining Services specifically to ensure 
it would have the required capacity for auditing and reporting on its food purchasing. 
 Soon thereafter, during spring semester 2017, students experienced another, 
related disappointment—this one originating with Dining Services. As described above, 
an RF UGA student completed the baseline RFC calculator audit during fall 2016, 
through a paid position that RF UGA students were largely responsible for creating. That 
student, Lori Hanna was studying overseas spring semester 2017 so two other RF UGA 
students applied for the position. There was a long delay in filling the position and neither 
RF student was considered, which baffled the students, as they both had a strong 
understanding of the regional food system as well as the RFC calculator. It appeared that 
the Dining Services Director decided to broaden the role of the position and not tie it 
specifically to the RFC calculator, but he did not give RF UGA students any explanation 
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of why the change was made or why the two RF UGA students were not invited to 
interview for the position. 
4.4.3 Progress, outcomes, and perspectives 
 By the beginning of spring semester 2017, RF UGA students felt they had 
received a “soft no” from the president’s office. As RF UGA tried to figure out next steps 
with Dining Services and how to win the Commitment, given the level of opposition it 
seemed to face, they significantly expanded their community coalition partners. On 
campus, they worked on a Points of Unity document with the Progressive Action 
Coalition (PAC). Some students felt that this coalitional work not only was consistent 
with their commitment to social justice more broadly, but also that it would build their 
visibility and power with the UGA administration because RF UGA itself was a very 
small group. Real Food OSU had collaborated with other progressive groups for marches 
and sit-ins, in part, also to increase their numbers. However, at UGA the PAC did not 
escalate tactics to the level of occupying the president’s building, as did students at OSU. 
 First and second wave RF UGA leaders held a variety of perspectives on past and 
future tactics and what strategic approaches would be most likely to win changes in food 
procurement. Further, different students held different priorities. Some felt that, absent 
getting President Morehead to sign the RFC Commitment, students should work behind 
the scenes to make changes in collaboration with dining services. Other students cared 
most passionately about the broader vision of RFC—systemic change in agricultural 
production related to food justice issues. One student leader described that priority in a 
way very similar to core leaders at OSU: 
What I feel called to do and what I’m currently doing with Real Food national is, 
y’all need to take this stuff seriously (poultry contract farming); this is the 
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epitome of corporate farming…If we’re really going to win food system 
transformation, this is what’s up… I think until we name, until we render this 
visible…—these abuses, these anti-competitive practices—that can’t happen 
unless we’re talking about it. …You have to name what the bad is. And some 
people may disagree but that’s what I’ve been feeling really hugely lately.84 
 
 Real Food student leaders at UGA worked to advance Real Food issues and the 
Campus Commitment in the least hospitable environment of the four campuses examined 
in this study. UGA had a limited history and contemporary presence of progressive 
student activism; administrative staff were unwilling to explore the Commitment in 
detail, despite a supportive Dining Services director and SGA support; students, faculty, 
and members of the sustainable agriculture community in Georgia all reported a strong 
affiliation between UGA and conventional agribusiness; and the power of conventional 
agricultural interests resulted in an atmosphere in which some faculty members felt they 
could not openly express support for Real Food goals and principles. In sum, as one 
faculty member put it, “It is really hard to convince this institution that money is well 
spent toward the direction of sustainable agriculture initiative, at all.”85 Certainly, any 
RFC student campaign would have experienced difficulty advancing its objective in this 
environment. 
 Most RF UGA students attributed their difficulty in making progress to UGA’s 
connections to conventional agriculture. Some students also shared their experience that 
UGA, generally speaking, seemed to have a culture that was not particularly open to 
progressive, student-led initiatives, and several students reported hearing similar 
frustrations from faculty and staff. Many students in RF UGA also pointed to UGA as a 
																																																								
84 Interviewee UGA 9. 
85 Interviewee UGA 13. 
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campus that tended to be challenging for any group trying to mobilize students around a 
progressive issue. 
 Several UGA faculty members interviewed agreed with students about the 
influence of the conflict between UGA’s connections to agribusiness and Real Food 
standards on their campaign. In addition to the perceived influence of agribusiness at 
UGA, a few faculty members also noted a general conservatism in the culture of UGA’s 
leadership; as one stated: “In general, UGA tries to keep a low profile—it doesn’t want to 
draw fire.”86 Many faculty members and students assumed that the administration’s 
reluctance to sign onto any kind of progressive, external commitment, including carbon 
reduction targets or the Real Food Commitment, was in part a result of concerns that 
these steps would, in fact, “draw fire” from members of the Board of Regents or 
Georgia’s elected officials, who influence appropriations and other forms of control over 
the university. 
 In addition to the politically challenging context at UGA, the Real Food 
Commitment may also have been perceived negatively because reaching the 20 percent 
benchmark by 2020 would have been extremely challenging. Once students succeeded in 
gaining access to dining invoices and completed an assessment using the Real Food 
calculator, UGA’s baseline finding of less than 1 percent Real Food certainly did not help 
their case, particularly when the university’s 2015 sustainability plan had set out a near-
term goal to “purchase 35% of food items served on campus through local and 
sustainable sources” (The University of Georgia 2015b:18). Clearly, if UGA were to use 
RFC’s standards for evaluating “local” and “sustainable” food, the university would have 
a very difficult time meeting the RFC target, let alone its own, higher 2020 goal. 
																																																								
86 Interviewee UGA 12. 
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 In contrast to Pitt, where RFC goals were not perceived as threatening, and UNC, 
where the Food for All initiative and state-supported farm-to-institution initiatives 
provided political and economic opportunities, Real Food UGA students struggled to 
decide what they would prioritize and consider to be “success” and how best to advance 
their objectives. Several students wondered if the campaign’s moderate “escalation” in 
2016 undermined the progress students had made with dining services, because a student 
not affiliated with RF UGA was chosen over two RF UGA students to replace Lori 
Hanna. Students really struggled to figure out what kind of strategic approach and tactics 
would be most likely to win the Commitment, given their perception that powerful 
agribusiness interests were at least part of the resistance from UGA administrators. As 
one described:  
How do we fight something like that? How do we organize around that? Because 
there’s so much money involved and as unfortunate as that is, money talks, and 
we don’t have resources like that to fight that. So that’s where we are right now—
trying to figure out how we can build power around us, instead of looking to the 
people above us—looking to them for power.87 
 
 By the 2016-17 academic year, a number of UGA leaders, like students at OSU, 
were developing a stronger commitment to social justice goals and related coalition 
partners on campus in their community. If they could not successfully fight the UGA 
administration, they could work in solidarity with a variety of people in Athens who 
shared their desire to raise awareness about connections between food justice and racial 
justice and to expose the negative consequences for contract farmers and other workers of 
Georgia’s conventional poultry industry, as well as related concerns surrounding 
corporate consolidation in agribusiness.  
																																																								
87 Interviewee UGA 6. 
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 Some students from the “first wave” who have since graduated pointed to 
different strategic directions that might have proven more effective in advancing the 
Commitment campaign. Several noted that some of the RF UGA leaders had connections 
with families that had some clout with the UGA administration as donors, and wondered 
if engaging progressive UGA donors as allies would have been more effective than 
student “actions.” Two others thought that RF UGA needed to engage students who eat in 
the dining halls, getting the actual clients to demand more Real Food, and do so in a more 
strategic way. For example, rather than engaging a group of dining hall customers in a 
rally clearly organized by RF UGA, the group could facilitate individual and regular 
“comment cards” submitted to dining services by students, each requesting different 
kinds of Real Food.88  
 Faculty who supported RF UGA goals and members of the sustainable agriculture 
community in Georgia agreed that the decision, implicit or explicit, to simultaneously 
challenge conventional agribusiness—particularly conventional poultry—and seek to 
gain administrative support for the Commitment was destined to fail. Based upon their 
experiences advancing sustainable agriculture in Georgia, they felt that the students could 
work with Dining Services to make incremental, steady increases in Real Food 
purchasing, OR they could educate and raise awareness about the problem with 
conventional poultry production in Georgia, but they could not do both simultaneously. 
Two faculty members made very similar statement along these lines: 
I don’t think that UGA’s unmovable. I really don’t. I just keep coming back to, 
we are embedded in a particular political context, that it behooves us to recognize. 
And so how do we push that envelope, recognizing the context that we’re in.89 
																																																								
88 None of the eight students interviewed with RF UGA were (at the time) using UGA’s dining 
services. 
89 Interviewee UGA 13. 
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The people who are successful at this [kind of initiative] are able to walk the line 
and present it in a way that [administrators] can digest. And I don’t think students 
necessarily understand that. And you’re young, you’re idealistic, everyone should 
be thinking like-minded, and this is not the case.90 
 
 
4.5 Summary of Cases 
 
 At all four universities, at least some interviewees pointed to contextual factors 
they felt supported or impeded the RF campaign on their campus. Pitt was the only 
campaign in which student leaders decided not to try many of the actions recommended 
by RFC, including “unconventional gifts” and rallies, although UNC and UGA leaders 
also held back from the most confrontational actions that were recommended. At UNC, 
OSU, and UGA, many of the same tactics were employed, but with different results. OSU 
used the most contentious tactics, escalating their demands to the level of a sit-in, which 
may have won some concessions. UGA students adopted many tactics recommended by 
RFC, judged that further escalation would backfire, and made little progress. At UNC, 
the second Commitment campaign adopted the same tactics as UGA leaders but softened 
their stance when administrators responded negatively, benefitted from strong faculty 
involvement, and enjoyed a much more favorable context. 
 In each case, no single variable was responsible for winning, or failing to win, the 
RFC Commitment campaign. In chapter five, which follows, I analyze the findings in 
reference to the theoretical framework described in chapter two. I briefly discuss all 
elements that had some effect on outcomes, describe additional variables I had not 
predicted would be as significant as they appear to have been, and highlight the variables 
I argue best explain the differences in campaigns and outcomes described in this chapter. 
																																																								




EXPLAINING OUTCOMES: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF FOUR REAL 
 
 FOOD CHALLENGE CAMPAIGNS 
 
 
 On a rainy morning in Athens, Georgia, as I set up my digital recorder and 
notebook to begin an interview, I was asked if I would remind the interviewee which 
universities were included in my study and what my primary research question was. The 
immediate response was, in essence, “well, two of those are land grant universities and 
two are not. Of course the land grant universities are going to push back on this.” The 
explanation that emerged from my research was much more complex, but this retired 
faculty member’s intuition pointed to one significant contextual variable. To what extent 
did Land Grant University (LGU) status and the characteristics, connections, and 
commitments associated with that status influence the ability of Real Food student 
leaders to advance their campaigns? How much did this aspect of university context 
matter, in comparison to other aspects of university context, campaign organization, and 
the many strategic decisions the student activists made? What was the role of the national 
SMO Real Food Challenge in those strategic decisions?  
 At all four universities in this study, highly committed and capable students, with 
similar RFC training and access to the same organizing “toolkit,” pursued campaigns that 
had a lot in common but also included clear differences in strategic choices. This chapter 
highlights key differences in the opportunity structures of the universities, in the 
organizational and cultural context of the campaigns, and in the strategic decisions taken 
by student leaders that influenced campaign outcomes. In this chapter I also discuss how 
several variables not predicted in my theoretical model--campaign identity and culture, 
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and particular ways in which RFC influenced them--also help explain the differences in 
outcomes described in chapter four. The final section in the chapter summarizes the key 
variables that, I argue, best explain this variation. 
 
5.1 University Context 
 
 Slaughter (1997) has noted a gap in research examining the role of external 
groups, including foundations, government agencies, and corporations, in departmental 
re-structuring and other university policies that influence curricular change. In fact, 
scholarship examining the relationships between either external or internal aspects of 
campus context and student campaign outcomes is highly limited. Arthur’s 
“organizational mediation model” is an exception; it predicts how alignment between two 
contextual variables--administrative openness/flexibility and university mission—with 
framing and tactics influences outcomes (Arthur 2011). This study adopted a broad view 
of “opportunity structure” for the RFC campaigns that included multiple layers of 
variables, both internal and external to the campus environment. External factors 
expected to influence the campaigns included regional agricultural context, political 
context, and commitment to conventional agribusiness (associated with LGU status). 
Campus culture, administrative openness, dining services support, relevant academic 
programs, and availability of allies were internal aspects of the campaign environments 
expected to influence RFC campaign outcomes. In this section I first provide a brief 
overview of contextual variables that emerged in interview data; the sections that follow 
provide more detailed discussions of each aspect of university context examined. 
 Administrative openness to student-led initiatives, generally, appeared to 
influence the responses of administrators to RFC campaigns at all four universities. The 
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effect of this variable was influenced by a contextual factor that concerns the orientation 
of the university to a particular set of influential stakeholders: university commitment to 
conventional agribusiness. The effects of campus culture on campaign progress were 
highlighted most strongly at OSU and UGA, where RF leaders felt that conservatism and 
a limited presence of student activism constrained their opportunities and effectiveness. 
Similarly, some participants reported that a general atmosphere of progressivism 
supported mobilization and progress at Pitt and UNC. Degree of support from dining 
services influenced the rate of progress of the campaigns completing Real Food 
Calculator baseline studies but that support, on its own, was less important to campaign 
outcomes than the orientation of administrators toward the campaigns.   
 Interviewees pointed to two additional internal contextual variables that might 
have influenced campaign dynamics: the administration’s orientation toward national 
commitments, generally, and the presence of a pre-existing university commitment to 
local and sustainable food (LSFB) procurement. The former was mediated by 
commitment to conventional agribusiness; targets at OSU and UGA used the latter to re-
frame and undermine the legitimacy of the RF campaigns’ arguments. 
 University commitment to conventional agribusiness also mediated the 
availability and influence of faculty and staff allies on campus at OSU and UGA. On the 
two campuses with low or moderate commitment to conventional agribusiness, one had 
university academic programs related to food systems and the other did not, but in both 
cases--presence (UNC) and absence (Pitt)—RF students felt that this factor supported 
their campaign, just in different ways. On the two campuses with strong commitment to 
conventional agribusiness, those commitments impeded student utilization of staff and 
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faculty allies, most clearly at UGA. In addition, strong commitment to youth leadership, 
promoted by RFC, and students’ evaluation that faculty had little power to influence the 
president/chancellor, also influenced the way in which students at UGA and OSU utilized 
potential faculty allies. As a result, while relevant academic programs supported student 
knowledge and ability to present relevant arguments in support of the RFC, whether or 
not the presence of those programs supported the advancement of the Commitment 
campaigns depended upon other aspects of the university context, as well as strategic 
choices. 
 Finally, while in each case some interviewees discussed constraints and 
opportunities associated with the university’s agricultural context, this variable, on its 
own, had little effect on campaign outcomes. Given the flexibility in RFC standards and 
the many alternatives for reaching the 20 percent target, agricultural context and its 
relationship to the feasibility of increasing Real Food purchasing was more likely a 
strategic response made by targets resistant to the Commitment than a significant 
logistical barrier. In an otherwise supportive context, a promising Calculator audit 
supported the campaign; in an unfavorable environment, a low audit number served to 
highlight the conflict with the university’s commitment to conventional agribusiness and 
RFC standards. This finding is consistent with the quantitative results discussed in 
chapter 3. Because it is possible to meet the 20 percent target in a variety of ways, 
agricultural context influencing availability of Real Food is not one of the most 
significant factors influencing LSFB scores or Real Food commitment. 
 Table 5.1 provides an overview of variation in the four cases for the contextual 
variables examined in this study. In the sections that follow, I provide a more detailed 
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discussion of the results for external aspects of opportunity structure, followed by 
internal. It is important to note that there is no clear line of division between these two 
broad categories, particularly where governance boards are concerned. Further, there is 
overlap and interaction between categories. Finally, as noted above, none of these 
contextual variables influenced the campaigns in isolation; in other words, other variables 
mediated their effects. Where those interactions occurred among contextual variables, I 
discuss them in the sections that follow. In cases where strategic variables interacted with 
contextual factors, I defer discussion of those interactions to sections 5.3 and 5.4.  
	
Table 5.1:  Variation Among Contextual Variables Across Universities. 
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5.1.1 External factors 
 
 Because Real Food initiatives may be more feasible in regions where products 
meeting RFC standards are more readily available, I expected agricultural context to 
influence the level of difficulty and opposition faced by RF campaigns. As discussed in 
chapter three, a quantitative, national analysis of LSFB scores demonstrated regional 
variation but failed to clearly tie that variation to farm-to-institution infrastructure. One of 
the potential reasons I proposed for this finding was that colleges and universities can 
increase their Real Food purchasing in many different ways, including through 
conventional distributors that have responded to interest in LSFB purchasing by creating 
“Buy Local” or third party certified sourcing options that are available in any region. 
Similarly, the comparative study of RFC campaigns showed that a perceived supportive 
agricultural context may have modestly influenced target responses (both positively and 
negatively) but was not strongly associated with Real Food Commitment Campaign 
(RFCC) outcomes. 
 In addition to agricultural context, I predicted that the extent to which each 
administration viewed the RF campaign as a threat to their interests would influence 
target response and campaign outcomes. Social movements that seek to “displace” their 
targets or whose goals are highly threatening are less likely to be successful (Ash 1972; 
Gamson 1975; Steedly and Foley 1979; Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Toffolon-Weiss and 
Roberts 2005). RFC Commitment campaigns do not, of course, seek to displace 
university leaders. However, they do challenge powerful agribusiness interests. As a 
result, leaders of universities with a commitment to those interests are likely to view 
cooperation with Real Food as risky. Perceived threat is likely to be influenced both by 
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the views of external stakeholders and the extent to which the administration must be 
responsive to their concerns. In this section I describe the importance of the university’s 
commitment to conventional agribusiness to RF campaign progress, and present a more 
complex view of political influence than state party dominance alone. Figure 5.1 
summarizes the findings for two key external contextual variables. These variables 




Figure 5.1: Comparison of Cases with Respect to Two External Contextual Variables 
 
 
5.1.1.1 Agricultural context 
 
 At all four universities in this study, dining services staff raised logistical and cost 










RFC standards. Faculty, staff, and students at UNC pointed to robust support for farm-to-
institution initiatives in North Carolina as very helpful to the FLO and Real Food 
progress there. However, this variable clearly was not of greatest importance, on its own, 
for shaping opportunity structure, because Pitt students were able to advance Real Food 
in an urban environment with limited regional agricultural production. Pitt’s outcome 
demonstrates that agricultural context is not necessarily a limiting variable for winning 
Real Food Commitments.  
 At OSU, the early successes that the Local Matters Student Ambassadors won, 
facilitating new purchasing contracts between central Ohio organic producers and OSU, 
demonstrated to students and to dining services staff that OSU had opportunities to 
expand Real Food purchasing. Further, OSU’s 2015 target of 40 percent locally and 
sustainably sourced food, discussed below, suggests that decision-makers at OSU were 
optimistic about opportunities for expanding this kind of sourcing, albeit without having 
defined those labels. Thus, at OSU the agricultural context, on its own, also was not a 
strong factor shaping the target’s response or campaign outcomes. 
  At UNC, several interviewees noted that the process of expanding Real Food 
purchasing became easier when dining services identified distributors or aggregators 
selling products that met RFC community-based standards without disqualifiers. As the 
quantitative portion of this study demonstrates (see chapter three), it is difficult to assess 
this aspect of university context with available datasets. However, among the four states 
represented in the comparative study, North Carolina is at a clear advantage with respect 
to a supportive context for LSFB purchasing as a result of its Center for Environmental 
Farming Systems (CEFS). CEFS is a partnership of North Carolina’s two LGUs (N. C. 
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State and N.C. Agricultural & Technical State University) along with the state’s 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. CEFS is a national leader in 
education, research, and extension in sustainable agriculture and community-based food 
systems (CEFS 2016). Faculty and community farming interviewees at UNC pointed to 
CEFS and its Farm-to-Fork initiative to demonstrate the importance of North Carolina’s 
agricultural context to Carolina Dining and FLO Foods’ success with advancing Real 
Food purchasing. A faculty member close to the RF campaign felt that this context, and 
the Food for All UNC theme it helped facilitated, were one of the most significant factors 
influencing Chancellor Folt’s decision to the sign the RFC Commitment (RFCC).  
 While Georgia also has a “Georgia Grown” initiative to promote the state’s 
agricultural products, its agricultural sector is heavily focused on commodity and 
conventional poultry production.91 A growing number of small farmers using humane and 
sustainable production methods in Georgia tend to sell directly to consumers and 
restaurants able to pay a high premium for local and sustainable production—prices far 
higher than what UGA would be able to pay. For example, a staff person in dining 
services reported hearing from Athens area organic and small-scale producers that they 
were selling 100 percent of their crop at top farmer’s market prices, so it would not make 
any sense for them to negotiate institutional sales with UGA.  
 While there are demonstrated logistical hurdles to expanding Real Food 
purchasing, community-based Real Food can originate as far away as 250 miles from 
campus, and Georgia has a very active k-12 Farm to School initiative managed by a 
partnership including The Georgia Department of Education, the Georgia Department of 
																																																								
91 In 2012, the area cultivated for vegetables, fruits, nuts, and greenhouse plants accounted for just 4.3% of 
the total harvested cropland in Georgia (USDA 2012a). North Carolina’s portion is almost twice that 
proportion, at 7.4% (USDA 2012b). 
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Agriculture, Georgia Organics, Georgia Department of Public Health, and the 
Cooperative Extension Service (Georgia Department of Education N.d.). In addition, in 
recent years a number of public and private organizations have expanded Georgia’s “food 
hubs” which connect small and medium-sized produce farmers to storage and distribution 
centers, facilitating farm-to-institution options.92 This program demonstrates that many 
informed stakeholders see opportunities for schools—and, presumably, universities—in 
Georgia to expand their purchasing of Georgia grown produce in a cost effective manner. 
Interview data suggests that a more significant obstacle to the RFCC in Georgia was the 
sharp contrast between Georgia Grown and Georgia Farm-to-School programs, which do 
not constrain products beyond geography, and the RFC standards, which exclude some of 
Georgia’s largest vegetable producers and all of its conventionally produced poultry and 
eggs. Most interviewees at UGA and in Georgia’s sustainable agriculture community 
believed strongly it was this difference, rather than logistical hurdles, that influenced the 
administration’s response. The fact that dining services, following a change in leadership, 
was open to the Commitment also supports RF UGA students’ assertion that the 20 





92 For example, in 2016 the Food Bank of Northeast Georgia opened a $6.4 million food hub in 
Rabun County (Food Bank of NE Georgia 2018), and The Common Market expanded its local 
food distribution service to Georgia (The Common Market N.d.). 
93 UGA students reported that Dining Services staff persons made clear to them that they could 
help push for the Commitment with President Morehead but if the students were able to 
accomplish they would be fully on board with implementation. This is no way suggests that 
implementation would have been easy, and there were stakeholders very supportive of Real Food 
principles who pointed to the logistical challenges of Georgia Grown purchasing. One example 
provided was a failed attempt to identify a way to purchase Georgia blueberries for UGA. 
Ironically, Georgia blueberry farms large enough to supply UGA flash freeze and package their 
berries in units too large for the university to feasibly store. 
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5.1.1.2 University commitment to conventional agribusiness 
 
 This chapter opened with a retired professor’s intuitive response to this question: 
why did RF Commitment campaigns win at Pitt and UNC but not at OSU and UGA? 
Most study participants in Georgia agreed with this individual’s assessment, sharing their 
belief that UGA’s strong commitment to conventional agribusiness influenced the 
administration’s opposition to the Real Food Commitment campaign. The administrative 
leaders who were involved in RF campaigns at OSU and UGA were unwilling to 
participate in this study, and the formal response to Real Food’s petition at OSU does not 
point to any disagreement with RFC’s standards. However, almost all campaign leaders 
and allies at UGA and a portion at OSU pointed to conflicts between the content of 
RFC’s mission and the Calculator standards and conventional agricultural interests as a 
significant factor in the universities’ responses. The campaigns at Pitt and UNC faced 
obstacles, but they did not appear to be related to opposition to RFC standards. 
 At Pitt, where the only academic connections to food systems were in dietetics, 
administrators did not appear to believe that RFC standards were at all controversial or 
potentially risky. Western Pennsylvania is not a major agricultural region and Pitt is a 
highly urban university located in the heart of Pittsburgh. While this setting made it 
challenging for RF students to demonstrate the feasibility of the 20 percent Commitment 
goal for Pitt, they felt the complete absence of an agricultural presence on campus 
worked in their favor. Pitt did not appear to have external stakeholders who might be 
threatened by Real Food’s message and mission, contributing to a supportive opportunity 
structure for the RF campaign.  
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 One way to examine the ways in which the specific objectives and framing of the 
RF campaigns influenced target response is by comparing them to other student 
campaigns on the same campus. A former student activist at Pitt noted the difference 
between advocating divestment from fossil fuels and advocating Real Food in Western 
Pennsylvania. While conventional agribusiness does not have a strong presence in the 
region, the fossil fuel industry does, and the natural gas industry has been a high profile 
“valued corporate sponsor” to Pitt athletics.94 Students believed that the fossil fuel 
industry had power through Pitt’s Board of Trustees and as a major employer and donor 
in the state, and that the industry’s influence had made Pitt’s Divestment campaign a 
harder sell than was Real Food. Chancellor Gallagher has met with Pitt Divestment 
leaders about their campaign and has encouraged them in their efforts to address the 
Board with their concerns, but the final decision about changes in investments lies with 
the Board of Trustees, which has not yet agreed to any divestment (Burgman 2017). 
 At OSU, faculty and staff working in areas relating to sustainable food systems 
acknowledged tension between conventional and sustainable agriculture at OSU but felt 
the Real Food Commitment was feasible, if very challenging, to secure. The Food 
Sustainability Panel (FSP) described in chapter four included students, staff, and faculty 
who openly discussed all aspects of RFC standards, and a number of supportive staff and 
faculty members felt that adoption of metrics very similar to RFC standards was (and still 
is) a strong possibility there.  
  OSU’s board of trustees in 2017 included the managing partner of a major 
commercial grain and beef producer and Chairman of the Board of the J.M. Smucker 
																																																								




Company, a large food corporation (The Ohio State University 2018a). However, OSU 
also has received significant donor resources for its research and teaching in sustainable 
agriculture. In 1996, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation (WKKF) awarded OSU a $1.575 
million grant to establish an Endowed Chair in Ecological Agriculture and Sustainable 
Management (WKKF 2018). The Foundation’s selection of OSU as home for one of its 
first investments of this kind “was driven both by readiness (partnership with community, 
providing matching funds) and past relationships.”95 Thus, while OSU remains closely 
connected to conventional agribusiness, it also has attracted significant donor investment 
by demonstrating a commitment to expanding its sustainable agriculture program. 
 North Carolina is home to several powerful conventional agriculture corporations, 
but this presence did not seem to have significant influence with UNC administrators or 
faculty. Despite the presence of one of the world’s largest conventional pork producers 
(Smithfield), administrators at UNC did not appear to be concerned about perceptions 
that embracing the RFC Commitment would invite criticism from conventional 
agribusiness representatives. Further, faculty never expressed concerns about working 
closely with FLO and the Real Food campaign or about critiquing conventional food 
production. Faculty, staff, and students at UNC all felt free to criticize conventional 
agribusiness at UNC.  
 UNC’s characterization of the work of the late epidemiology professor Steve 
Wing, whose research and activism directly criticized North Carolina’s large hog farm 
operators, provides an example of the university’s independence from conventional 
agribusiness. A tribute article published on UNC’s Gillings School of Global Public 
Health web site described Dr. Wing as a “hero” who “trained his students to be 
																																																								
95 Linda Jo Doctor, WKKF, e-mail message to author, May 9, 2018. 
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thoughtful, respectful, committed community activists and scientists” (UNC 2016). The 
Food For All academic theme, discussed below, provided further examples of UNC’s 
open embrace of scholars whose research and teaching includes environmental and social 
justice concerns associated with conventional agricultural production and trade.  
 In contrast to UNC, where faculty as well as students felt free to challenge 
conventional animal production, at UGA, faculty members and community sustainable 
agriculture allies felt strongly that criticizing Georgia’s conventional agriculture industry 
was highly politically sensitive and a sure way to shut down communication with UGA’s 
leadership. While OSU students received a formal response from administrators and won 
participation on an advisory body, UGA students were unable to secure a process for 
engaging openly about RFC standards and never received a formal response to their 
proposal from administrators. Many interviewees felt this was, at least in part, due to the 
high degree of sensitivity of UGA’s administration to Georgia’s conventional agriculture 
stakeholders. As described in chapter 4, several faculty members reported that they would 
be uncomfortable openly criticizing Georgia’s conventional agricultural sector and could 
face sanctions for doing so.  
 RF students and faculty allies felt that the importance of conventional 
agribusiness to UGA and it influence on UGA’s leadership significantly constrained the 
ability of a food system reform campaign to make progress there. In contrast to the 
endowed chair related to sustainable agriculture at OSU and the faculty members’ open 
support of Real Food principles and willingness to challenge conventional agriculture at 
UNC, at UGA students and faculty described an atmosphere in which it was unsafe for 
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faculty members and deans to openly question aspects of conventional agricultural 
production. One faculty member close to UGA’s work in agriculture put it this way: 
The dominant philosophy [in CAES] is we’ve got to increase food production and 
the only way we can do it is more chemicals and more GMOs, and anything that 
deviates from that is open to criticism.96 
 
 As discussed in chapter four, several RF UGA students heard from a friend about 
a conversation between President Morehead and a powerful stakeholder about “GMO 
chicken” and complaints that UGA Foundation Fellows would engage in an initiative that 
calls into question Georgia poultry production. While the student’s account is impossible 
to corroborate, it is consistent with the context described by both students and faculty at 
UGA. Most faculty members were careful to close their office door before our interviews 
began. One shared several specific stories illustrating an environment unfriendly to 
advancing sustainable agricultural interests, and then indicated I could not use them in the 
dissertation, as there was a possibility they could be traced back to their source. This 
faculty member described having gotten into hot water in the past for critical statements 
about conventional agribusiness. In reference to making statements at UGA that might 
not be well-received by “Big Ag,” another faculty member remarked “people here are 
scared to death.”97  
 As stated above, UGA administrators were unwilling to participate in this study 
and have not openly shared their views on RFC standards. However, a related UGA 
student campaign produced some public statements that demonstrates the support of 
UGA’s College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences (CAES) and the dining 
service director’s preference for conventional battery cage egg production. In 2015, the 
																																																								
96 Interviewee UGA 17. 
97 Interviewee UGA 13. 
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UGA affiliate of a student group called “Speak Out for Species” launched a campaign to 
pressure UGA’s dining services to switch to cage-free eggs. In the UGA student 
newspaper, the dining services director confined his discussion to cost concerns but 
poultry science professor Bruce Webster argued that raising hens in battery cages is 
preferable to cage-free production with respect to both health and environmental impact 
(Wong 2015). No staff or faculty members interviewed for the article expressed support 
for the students’ proposal. The group’s faculty advisors both work in UGA libraries, 
which may suggest that UGA staff/faculty further removed from CAES and food system 
research may have felt freer to openly support students challenging conventional 
agribusiness.98 
 At UGA, a single dean was the only administrator at UGA willing to participate 
in this study who had actually met with RF students. For this reason and because 
President Morehead’s office never responded formally to the RF Commitment proposal, 
it is difficult to provide direct evidence for the reasoning behind the UGA 
administration’s responses to Real Food UGA. However, a publicly documented conflict 
at Virginia Institute of Technology illustrates the dynamic that faculty and students at 
UGA believe shaped President Morehead’s response to the RF Commitment campaign. 
In March 2009, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) published a press 
release commending Andy Sarjahani, Virginia Tech’s sustainability coordinator for 
dining services, for purchasing cage-free whole eggs from a local provider in Virginia. 
The Virginia Farm Bureau saw the announcement, was concerned, and immediately 
requested a meeting with Virginia Tech officials about what their representatives 
believed to be a move toward a 100 percent cage-free policy at the university. A Virginia 
																																																								
98 See the web page for Athens & UGA Speak Out for Species: http://sos.uga.edu/local.html. 
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Farm Bureau spokesperson was quoted as saying that a cage-free policy would be 
“condemning conventional agriculture” (Sutton 2009: Para. 12). Farm Bureau officials 
had misinterpreted the HSUS press release, which was later removed from the HSUS web 
site, to suggest that Virginia Tech was moving toward 100 percent cage-free egg 
products. In fact, Sarjahani had committed to purchasing 100 percent of dining services’ 
whole eggs from a cage-free, local source, but whole eggs comprised just 10 percent of 
total egg product purchased, with 90 percent sourced from conventional, liquid egg 
product (Sutton 2009). The Virginia Farm Bureau’s swift response to the HSUS press 
release and its access to top officials at Virginia Tech demonstrates the kind of influence 
that UGA Real Food advocates and allies believe conventional agribusiness interests in 
Georgia hold with UGA. 
 Compared to OSU and UNC, UGA also has a more modest presence of 
sustainable agriculture and alternative perspectives in food studies. In comparison to 
OSU, UGA’s CAES offers fewer majors, minors, and courses in sustainable agriculture 
for undergraduates; organic gardening in the horticulture department and at the UGArden 
are notable exceptions. As stated above, OSU has attracted donor support for an endowed 
chair in sustainable agriculture; UGA does not have a similar position. A comparison of 
integrative programs in food systems also demonstrates lower commitment to sustainable 
agriculture at UGA than at the other two universities with research and teaching related to 
food systems. As described above, UNC adopted food systems inquiry as its “university-
wide academic theme” for 2015-18 (UNC 2018:Para.1); similarly, in addition to its 
Endowed Chair position in Sustainable Agriculture OSU’s Institute for Food and 
Agricultural Transformation (InFact) is a university-wide “Discovery theme” (The Ohio 
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State University 2018b). UGA’s Sustainable Food Systems Initiative (SSFS) also seeks to 
integrate research, teaching, and outreach associated with sustainable food systems (UGA 
CAES 2018). However, UGA’s SSFS, located within the College of Agricultural and 
Environmental Sciences (CAES), is an informal initiative, rather than a university-wide 
theme or institute. 
5.1.1.3 Political Context 
 
 Because the four universities in this study are all high profile or “flagship” public 
institutions, I expected the political context in which each university is embedded to 
influence the willingness of administrators to openly support a commitment that most 
observers would view as “progressive.” State elected officials and members of Boards of 
Regents influence policies and practices of public universities and may even sanction 
faculty members and administrators when they take issue with their statements or actions 
(Kezar 2006; deBoer 2016). A comparison of the four cases examined here suggests that 
the relationship between political context and university response to Real food campaigns 
reflected not just political party dominance but also the relative strength of the influence 
that political actors and governing boards exert on the institution’s leadership and 
policies. Further, related to the orientation toward conventional agribusiness discussed 
above, “political sensitivity” of the agrifood movement in that state significantly 
influenced opposition to the Real Food campaigns. 
 During the time period of the four RF campaigns in this study (2007-2017 or a 
portion thereof), the political leadership of each of the four states was majority 
Republican, with the exception of Pennsylvania, where a Democrat won the governor’s 
office a few months before the RF Pitt students won their campaign (see Table 5.2 for 
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state representation in 2015). While all four universities were located in states with 
Republican majority legislatures, they varied with respect to their ability to pursue 
initiatives and make a formal commitment viewed to be “progressive” without provoking 
criticism from external stakeholders. In addition, as discussed above, the particular form 
of “progressive” initiative—in this case, one promoting food system transformation—
significantly influenced the political sensitivity surrounding the campaigns.  
 As discussed in chapter three, the results of a national, quantitative analysis 
suggested a weak, negative association between conservative political context and LSFB 
purchasing scores. The comparison of RFC cases suggests that the weakness of that result 
might be explained, in part, by two mediating factors: the relationship of the university to 
the state’s political leadership structures, and its commitment to agribusiness. The small 
number of LGUs in the quantitative sample and a lack of data on institutional 
relationships with state politics impeded quantitative analysis of these additional factors, 
but the qualitative study points to their relevance. 
 
Table 5.2: Political Party Leadership in the Home States of the Four Universities, 2015  
 
 Governor  State House  State Senate 
Pennsylvania Republican/Democrati 59% Republican 60% Republican 
Ohio Republican 66% Republican 70% Republican 
North Carolina Republicanii 62% Republican 68% Republican 
Georgia Republican 67% Republican 68% Republican 
 
Source: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 2015.  
 
i. Democrat Tom Wolf took office in January 2015 (two months before Pitt leadership signed the 
RFC Campus Commitment) 
ii. Democrat Roy Cooper took office in January 2017 (nine months after UNC Chapel Hill leaders 




 Pitt was sensitive to concerns of board members, but an absence of concerns 
about RFC standards and effective strategic choices by students prevented their influence 
from impeding the campaign’s success. As described in chapter four, Pitt administrators 
invited a member of the board of trustees to meetings with the RF student leaders once 
the leadership had fully vetted their proposal. At this point in the campaign, the RF 
students felt that senior administrators were close to a decision in favor of signing the 
Commitment. The board member raised concerns about potential legal liability if Pitt 
were to miss the 20 percent mark, and the students effectively addressed that concern 
with an addendum prepared in collaboration with RFC representatives. Thus, 
administrators at Pitt appeared to be sensitive to how the RF Commitment would be 
viewed by the University of Pittsburgh Board of Trustees, 12 of whose members are 
selected by Pennsylvania’s political leadership (see Table 5.3). Once students addressed 
his concerns, the board member acquiesced. He never raised concerns about the content 
of the Commitment or RFC standards, suggesting that, consistent with student 
interpretation, Pitt leaders did not see food reform as politically sensitive in their context. 
 At OSU, several faculty and staff members were open about their assessment that 
the CAFO and GMO exclusions in the RFC standards would almost certainly raise 
concerns by university leadership, although they did not specifically refer to The Ohio 
State University Board of Trustees or forms of political influence on the President’s 
Office. While there was some reticence on the part of a few faculty members to speak 
openly about their views on the RFC campaign, others were comfortable openly 
discussing sustainable agriculture, food reform, and the slow pace of change to build a 
stronger sustainable agriculture presence at OSU in interviews. Several expressed their 
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feeling that promoting alternatives to conventional agriculture was a slow and 
incremental process at OSU, and that food production was a politically sensitive issue in 
Ohio. As one faculty member stated, “Like healthcare, food is uber-political-- because it 
is about something fundamental.”99 That said, they pointed to InFact, the Food 
Sustainability Panel, and a growing number of faculty members working in sustainable 
agriculture as signs that change toward Real Food objectives was possible at OSU. 
 UNC appeared to be the least vulnerable of the four universities to external 
scrutiny of its consideration of the RF Commitment. While one staff person pointed out 
that UNC had to be careful to avoid attracting attention from North Carolina’s 
conservative legislature that might reinforce its image as a “hotbed of liberalism,” 
interview data and corroborating evidence suggested that the leadership and faculty of 
UNC felt a great deal of independence from North Carolina’s political environment. One 
administrator stated that they had to be careful about dining plan costs, as rising tuition or 
fees would attract attention, but that, if justification were needed, UNC leaders could 
effectively pitch the RFC initiative as good for North Carolina’s rural economy. 
 At UGA, students and faculty members shared stories that they felt reflected a 
strong influence of the state’s political conservatism on campus. Within the classroom, 
one student reported that a professor in an environmental health class relating to food 
systems would not allow her to make a brief announcement about a Real Food 
educational event because the professor did not think that something “political” should be 
announced in class. When asked whether UGA’s leadership would consider the RFC 
Commitment, not a single faculty member thought it possible as a result of university 
stakeholders who would oppose it. In reference to UGA administrators generally, one 
																																																								
99 Interviewee OSU 11. 
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remarked “[They] never want to take stands that they think will alienate the Board of 
Regents or legislators…They don’t want to rock the boat.”100 
 Thus, while all four of the RFC campaigns were conducted at high-profile public 
universities in states with conservative political leadership, the sensitivity to that external 
context for university administrators in general, and the likelihood of attracting 
unwelcome criticism for an initiative that might be viewed as “progressive,” varied quite 
a bit, and seemed to be associated with the particular relationship of each university with 
political institutions, as well as the agribusiness connections discussed above. This 
variable is very difficult to characterize because it is rare for a university president or any 
administrators to speak openly, on record, about political influences on their decision-
making processes. At the same time, in Georgia the unusually close relationship between 
the legislature and UGA is something of an “open secret,” even if hard to document or 
fully characterize. At UNC the freedom of administrators to sign environmentally 
progressive commitments and both public and private statements demonstrated a much 
higher degree of autonomy from its conservative political context, at least for 
sustainability-related decision-making. Pitt was sensitive to potential concerns of board 
members, and at OSU a few staff/faculty members spoke openly about the need to 
address RFC’s GMO and CAFO exclusions with important stakeholders.  
 These findings suggest that variation in public university governance can be an 
important aspect of the opportunity structure influencing the outcomes of student 
activism. Fully characterizing the relationship between university decision-making and 
political context is highly challenging and beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one 
possible contributing factor to variance is governance structure. A comparison of 
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governance structures is provided, below, in Table 5.3. UGA is the only case examined 
here in which a state-wide Board of Regents, whose members are all appointed by the 
Governor, both oversees the institution and is responsible for selecting its president. Pitt 
appears to have the weakest formal relationship between its board and state politics; in 
Ohio the governor appoints OSU’s board members; and at UNC the governor and the 
legislature share that role.  
Table 5.3:  Characteristics of the Four Universities 
 
 State Higher Education Institution University Governance 
Pitt Pennsylvania’s State System of Higher 
Education, with a Board of Governors and 
chancellor, establishes system-wide policies 
(such as tuition and fees) for 14 institutions.i  
Pitt has its own Board of Trustees, with 36 voting 
members; 12 board members are appointed by 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania officials.ii 
Pitt’s Board of Trustees was responsible for 
electing Chancellor Gallagher (University of 
Pittsburgh 2014). 
OSU Ohio Department of Higher Education, led 
by a chancellor and advised by a small 
Board of Regents. Ohio’s governor appoints 
the department’s chancellor (Farkas 2018). 
OSU has its own Board of Trustees. The Ohio 
governor appoints all 17 members, including 2 
student members “with advice and consent of the 
senate.”iii  
The OSU Board of Trustees selected President 
Drake (Binkley 2014). 
UNC The 17-campus University of North 
Carolina system is led by a Board of 
Governors, with 28 voting members all 
selected by the North Carolina General 
Assembly.  
UNC at Chapel Hill has its own 13 member Board 
of Trustees. The governor appoints 4 members, the 
system Board of Governors appoints 8, and the 
final member is the SGA president.  
The UNC system Board of Governors selects the 
chancellor of UNC at Chapel Hill. 
UGA University System of Georgia, governed by 
Board of Regents (BOR), oversees . 
The Governor of Georgia selects all Board 
members. 
The University System of Georgia, led by a 
chancellor who is selected by the governor, and its 
Board of Regents (BOR), oversees all state 
institutions. UGA does not have an independent 
Board of Trustees.  
Georgia’s BOR appoints the UGA president. 
 
i. Pennsylvania’s State System of Higher Education. Retrieved on July 17, 2018 
 (http://www.passhe.edu/Pages/default.aspx). 
ii. University of Pittsburgh Office of the Chancellor. Retrieved on July 17, 2018 
 (https://www.chancellor.pitt.edu/governance/board-trustees). 
iii. Ohio State University. Board of Trustees. Officers and Committees of the Board. Retrieved on 
 July 17, 2018 (https://trustees.osu.edu/rules/bylaws-of-the-board-of-trustees/ru-1-02/). 
 
 Finally, a comparison of earned media between campaigns suggests that the 
general openness of off-campus news outlets to progressive organizing may be an 
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important element of external context to consider, but a full analysis of earned media and 
its effects is beyond the scope of this study. The limited extent of earned media outside 
campus newspapers and social media by the campaigns precludes an in-depth analysis, 
but the difference between OSU and UGA is suggestive. Campaigns at OSU and UGA 
both utilized resources from RFC to generate press releases and solicit coverage for Real 
Food events on campus, and the OSU group was consistently much more successful in 
earning media in the Columbus paper and on local public radio. Even in the UGA student 
newspaper, The Red and Black, the only coverage provided for the 200-person “Come to 
the Table” march in 2016 was a series of photos (no written story), and there was no local 
coverage, despite wide circulation of press releases. Some of these differences may be 
associated with differential success cultivating relationships with local media, but they 
may also reflect differences in the orientation of local media. These differences are 
important to consider because of the significant role of media in shaping movement 
framing and public perception (Gamson 2007).   
 In summary, at UGA a strong commitment to the state’s conventional 
agribusiness sector combined with an unusually strong sensitivity to the state’s political 
institutions contributed to a highly unfavorable organizing context for the RF UGA 
campaign. At OSU, there were (unspecified) external stakeholders with concerns about 
aspects of RFC standards but their perceived influence was not as great as the perceived 
influence of opponents to agrifood reform at UGA. At Pitt, the lack of political sensitivity 
regarding agrifood reform made the political context less important, and at UNC 
administrators seemed to have a great deal of freedom to take positions that might be 
unpopular with political leaders and agribusiness. 
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5.1.2 Internal factors 
 
 As described above, the four universities selected for comparison in this study 
shared many institutional characteristics: all are “flagship” public institutions (considered 
top choices among public options in their states); all are very large, with undergraduate 
populations ranging from around 19,000 at Pitt and UNC to about 38,000 at OSU; and all 
are governed through highly hierarchical and bureaucratic administrative structures. 
However, despite many similarities in administrative structures, like all universities they 
differ with respect to organizational history, culture, and decision-making processes, in 
addition to the differences in political and agribusiness influences discussed above. Some 
of these differences influenced the relative difficulty students faced in their campaigns to 
advance the Real Food Commitment. 
 Interview data suggested that administrative openness to student input and 
initiatives and relevant academic programs influenced outcomes in all four cases. The 
influence of campus culture, specifically student political orientation and orientation 
toward activism, was more strongly suggestive for OSU and UGA than for Pitt and UNC 
but was difficult to clearly demonstrate. Figure 5.2, below, describes differences among 
the four cases with respect to administrative openness and one aspect of campus culture: 
student political affiliation.  
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of Cases with Respect to Two Internal Contextual Variables  
 
 
 The influence of relevant academic programs and potential faculty allies was not 
consistent across cases: at three of the four universities relevant coursework supported RF 
campaign progress in a variety of ways, but its influence on winning the Commitment 
was mediated by commitment to conventional agribusiness. Dining services support was 
a prerequisite to advancing Calculator work and gaining administrative consideration of 
the Commitment, but it did not help advance campaigns in contexts that were otherwise 
unfavorable. For each of these variables, strategic factors also mediated their influence; 
those influences are discussed in section 5.3. The role of allies also is discussed in greater 












5.1.2.1 Campus culture: student political orientation and activism 
 
 “Campus culture” is a broad concept that is not clearly defined or well understood 
(Peterson 1990). Characteristics of campus culture may include an institution’s mission, 
primary areas of academic emphasis, political and values orientation of the student body 
and the faculty, communication and decision-making norms, and student life on campus, 
including the prevalence of Greek life and student activism (Tierney 1988). Campuses 
that have hosted activism in past are more likely to be sites of activism in future, and the 
campus’ political and organizing culture may help explain why student activism occurs 
on some campuses more than others (Van Dyke 1998). If aspects of campus culture 
influence the emergence of activism, it may also influence the ability of student leaders to 
mobilize effectively, which may influence outcomes. The results of this study suggest 
that the universities’ perceived political and organizing cultures influenced mobilization 
and outcomes in the RFC campaigns to differing degrees, and those effects were 
mediated by strategic factors.  
 According to perceptions reported by recent graduates and compiled by an online 
college planning service, on a scale of 0-100 where 100 is “most liberal,” UNC was rated 
71.4, Pitt scored 60.4, OSU scored 53.3, and UGA was rated 39.101 RF students at the 
more conservative universities (OSU and UGA) were more likely to point to political and 
organizing culture as influential to their campaigns than were the RF leaders on the more 
liberal and politically active campuses (Pitt and UNC). Movement framing that aligns 
																																																								
101 Source: MyPlan/Undergraduate Rankings/Political affiliation of the students. Retrieved on 
May 20, 2018 
(https://www.myplan.com/education/colleges/college_rankings_14.php?sort=1&offset=0). The 
scores reflect survey data collected from students who attended the university in question; the 
higher the score, the more liberal the study body is reported to be. 
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well with a community’s widely held beliefs can help activists succeed (McCammon et 
al. 2001). OSU and UGA students struggled to match RFC frames with the “widely held 
beliefs” on their campuses, which tended to be more conservative than at the other two 
universities. It may be that students at Pitt and UNC, where Real Food principles and 
objectives resonated readily with the student body, did not point to student culture as an 
important contributor because they took it for granted. 
 At Pitt, as described in chapter four, a small group of students won the RF 
Commitment very rapidly and they adopted a highly assimilative approach. While a 
liberal-leaning student body may have been helpful to the campaign and the response it 
received from administrators, many interviewees highlighted administrative openness and 
mobilizing structures (described below) but none pointed specifically to a progressive-
leaning student body as important. However, as discussed in chapter four, the presence at 
Pitt of more contentious forms of advocacy that included prominent graffiti and rallies 
may have supported the RFC campaign indirectly, by underscoring the “professional” 
manner of the RFC leaders to administrators. UNC also had a generally progressive 
student body, but assertive forms of protest were not a common occurrence on campus. 
The most likely way in which campus culture supported the RFC campaign at UNC was 
in facilitating student interest and support. However, it was difficult to gauge the impact 
of this variable because interviewees seemed to take this aspect of UNC’s culture for 
granted, and did not reflect upon its influence (or not) on the RF Commitment campaign. 
 While campus culture was rarely cited as a significant influence on Real Food 
campaigns at Pitt and UNC, students at OSU and UGA students discussed the importance 
of this variable extensively. At both, RF leaders felt they faced a more difficult task 
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mobilizing others and winning support for the RF Commitment as a result of a student 
body that (in their view, and as measured by MyPlan, above) leaned politically 
conservative. I expected the student body’s general orientation toward progressive causes 
to facilitate RFC mobilization but not necessarily influence outcomes, because LSFB 
initiatives may be framed in a wide variety of ways, including in relation to regional 
economic development. Students at OSU and at UGA framed Real Food in ways that 
aligned well with other progressive groups on campus but sometimes alienated students 
interested in a more conventional view of food sustainability (see framing discussion in 
section 5.3).  
 In addition to their perception that the political bias of the student body influenced 
their campaigns negatively, RF leaders at UGA also felt that the limited “culture of 
activism” on campus made their campaign more difficult to win. As one early RF student 
leader summarized: “There is not a lot of organizing, generally speaking, at UGA.”102 As 
described in chapter four, some UGA students felt they were part of a tiny minority on 
campus, surrounded by a more conservative student population and leadership. One 
student spoke of the demoralizing experience of activists participating in an “Occupy” 
tent city in late 2011. The tents were vandalized so thoroughly one night—slashed with 
knives—that the demonstration site at UGA’s iconic “Arch” was abandoned. 
 Perception of a hostile environment can have a negative impact on mobilization 
and the ability to sustain a campaign if it undermines students’ sense of efficacy—their 
sense that change is possible and that their participation matters (Piven and Cloward 
1977; McAdam 1982; Winston 2013; Brown 2017). However, despite a campus culture 
most strongly described by students as unfavorable to RFC organizing, UGA was able to 
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sustain an active campaign for 10 years. Students at UGA also were able to identify other 
progressive groups with which to partner and, at times, collaborate as well as 
commiserate. Further, at both UGA and OSU RF leaders secured SGA resolutions in 
favor of their initiatives. But the RF groups at OSU and UGA had difficulty growing their 
membership, which led them to liaise with other progressive groups on campus. Campus 
culture influenced some of the strategic choices of the campaigns, which influenced 
outcomes (see section 5.3).  
 The campaign leaders at the four universities interviewed for this study were not 
able to provide numbers for student or faculty petitions—how many support signatures 
they had generated—which makes it difficult to compare levels of student support and 
whether they are consistent with political affiliation. However, another way in which 
student political culture may have influenced outcomes is through target response. Along 
with administrative openness, discussed below, did the general campus political and 
organizing cultures influence the pressure administrators felt—or did not feel—to 
respond favorably to the RF Commitment? The results of this study do not provide a 
clear answer, but the data do support the importance of administrative openness, more 
generally, which I turn to next. 
5.1.2.2 Administrative openness 
 
 As discussed in chapter two, the emergence and dynamics of social movements 
within organizations, like those aimed at states or corporations, are influenced by the 
“openness” of target institutions--part of the opportunity structure that shapes movement 
activity. For campaigns targeting a university administration, its openness, generally, to 
student petitioners is likely to influence target response and campaign progress. Arthur 
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(2011) operationalized college administrative openness and flexibility using two factors: 
one, willingness to consider input from students and faculty, through participation on key 
committees as well as informal channels; and two, flexibility toward organizational 
change. Because RFC prioritizes student leadership, in this study the aspect of 
administrative openness of interest was openness to student input and initiatives, and it 
was operationalized as: student representation in university governance; commitment to 
student leadership in university life; and responses of administrators to the RFC 
campaigns (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4: Administrative Openness to Student Input and Initiatives  
 






Pitt “We are committed to educating 
the whole student…Pitt students 
become perceptive, reflective, 
contributing individuals within 
our diverse community of 
faculty, staff, administrators, 
and fellow students.”i 
Students hold positions 
in the University Senate 
through the Senate 
Council (number 
unavailable). 
Highly open to well-
researched student 
proposals; response varies 
based on perceived 
feasibility. 
View student proposals as 
opportunities to mentor 
students in administrative 
processes and negotiation. 
 
OSU  “Our departments and the 
programs within them foster 
student learning and development, 
enhance the educational experience 
and prepare students for citizenship 
in a diverse global society.”ii 
Students hold 41 of 137 
seats in the University 
Senate. 
Since 1988, the Board of 
Trustees has included 
two non-voting student 
members. 
Openness to meeting with 
students (including 
president) but slow to 
respond. 
Administrators channel 
student proposals into formal 












Table 5.4 (continued) 
 






UNC “Our mission is to serve as a center 
for research, scholarship, and 
creativity and to teach a diverse 
community of undergraduate, 
graduate, and professional students 
to become the next generation of 
leaders.”iii 




between faculty council 
and administration. SGA 
is the only connection 
between students and 
administration. 
Highly contingent upon 
chancellor. 






“Together we commit: To inspire 
students to engage meaningfully, 
grow intellectually, and build 




includes Ex Officio 
positions for SGA 
president and vice 
president and student 
seats elected by each 
school and college 
(number unavailable).  
 
Open to meetings at provost 
and dean levels (with long 
delays) but not president. 
Response to some SGA-
supported proposals but 
others ignored (no formal 
response).  
 
i. University of Pittsburgh Office of the Provost. 2018. “Student Resources.” Retrieved on 
 February 5, 2018 (https://provost.pitt.edu/student-resources) 
ii. The Ohio State University Office of Student Life. 2018. “The Office of Student Life: Creating 
 the Extraordinary Student Experience.” Retrieved on February 5, 2018 
 (https://studentlife.osu.edu/about/). 
iii. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2018. “Mission.” Retrieved on February 5, 
 2018 (http://www.unc.edu/about/mission/). 
ix. University of Georgia Student Affairs. 2018. “Committed to Inspiring Students.” Retrieved on 
 February 5, 2018 (https://studentaffairs.uga.edu/annual_report/2017/) 
 
 As described in Table 5.4, Pitt was the only university of the four that specifically 
referenced student contributions to the campus community in formal statements; 
comparable statements about student growth at the other three refer to contributions 
students will make following graduation. Of course, formal statements such as these are 
not necessarily representative of the experiences that students have on campus. However, 
in Pitt’s case the experiences reported by RF Pitt leaders and the administrative staff who 
met with them about the RF Commitment were consistent with the university’s formal 
statement. Two administrative staff people interviewed highlighted Pitt’s commitment to 
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mentor students through the process of advocating organizational change. They viewed 
helping students learn how to advocate their interests in a “professional and reasonable” 
manner to be part of their responsibility as administrators. As discussed in chapter four, 
administrators at Pitt spoke favorably about students who adopted an assimilative, 
cooperative approach to advocacy, and expressed disapproval of more contentious tactics.  
 Pitt administration’s openness and Pitt students’ direct representation in the 
university senate may be a result, at least in part, of demands made by student 
movements in the 1960s. One Pitt administrator attributed the openness of Pitt leaders to 
student ideas and initiatives to the occupation of the computer lab in 1969 by 30 black 
students demanding the university create an Africana Studies department and create more 
opportunities for black students. He felt that the university’s leadership had learned from 
that episode that it was preferable to keep students in negotiation through formal 
channels, in order to avoid contentious student protests and demonstrations. During the 
1969 computer lab lock-in, which was peaceful and “orderly,” then-Chancellor Wesley 
Posvar met with black students and agreed to the demands that they had been discussing 
with him over the previous year (Koenig 2016). Administrative staff at Pitt pointed to this 
“culture of shared governance” as one of the reasons that RF Pitt was able to make its 
case successfully through negotiation. 
 In addition to interview data and formal statements of the university, Pitt 
publications openly acknowledged and seemed to celebrate student leadership related to 
sustainability. In August 2016 the Pitt Chronicle, a newspaper published by the university 
(not a student newspaper), published an article that described students as “key” to 
expanding sustainability at Pitt. The piece detailed five successful initiatives developed 
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and managed entirely by students, including Real Food Pitt (Reger 2016). While hard to 
pin down with precision, a variety of sources, print and personal, all agreed that Pitt 
provided strong support for student initiatives, as long as they felt they were feasible. 
Even with more controversial campaigns, such as fossil fuel divestment, which the VC 
complained about to Real Food students, university administrators have been in regular 
communication with the student coalition advancing this objective (Burgman 2017). 
Further, as described in chapter four, Pitt administrators also demonstrated a willingness 
to learn from the RF students that was not apparent at any of the other universities in the 
study. 
 At OSU, students also are directly represented in the university senate, which may 
also be a legacy of the 1960s student movement.103 RF OSU students were able to secure 
multiple meetings with the senior vice president for student life, “Dr. J,” and eventually 
secured a meeting with President Drake. These administrators responded to two years of 
RF OSU advocacy with a formal letter addressed to the student group that explained the 
university’s reason for choosing not to sign the RFCC and providing a general 
description of its plans to address the goals and objectives of RFC through OSU-specific 
initiatives and programs. As described in chapter four, several RF students were given 
seats on a new panel tasked with developing definitions, metrics, and an implementation 
plan for meeting OSU’s goal of 40 percent local and sustainable food purchasing. 
 In general, openness to student initiatives and proposals, as indicated by access to 
administrators, should support the ability of RF campaign leaders to advance their 
arguments. However, this assumption is complicated by the question of cooptation. Did 
																																																								
103 OSU had an active chapter of Students for a Democratic Society and experienced student 
unrest in 1970 that closed the university for two weeks (Backderf 2015). 
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the response of OSU’s administration to the RF campaign reflect relative openness to 
student input and initiatives, or an effort to “coopt” and dilute the Real Food objectives?  
Interviewees disagreed about opportunities to advance the RFCC through the Food 
Sustainability Panel (FSP).  
 The Real Food Campus Commitment itself explicitly calls for institutionalization 
of its program and the creation of a Food Systems Working Group to oversee 
implementation. As discussed in chapter four, some members of OSU’s FSP felt that this 
group had a strong chance of adopting RFC standards and perhaps even persuading 
President Drake to sign the Commitment, given more time to complete a thorough 
investigation of alternative metrics and progress toward establishing a comprehensive 
picture of OSU’s current Real Food purchasing. In contrast, RF student leaders and RFC 
staff believed that the Panel was very likely to coopt RFC standards and objectives, 
perhaps reflecting RFC goals superficially but ultimately failing to reflect their full intent. 
One faculty member who has advised a number of progressive student campaigns at OSU 
supported that concern based upon personal experience at OSU. This interviewee felt that 
institutionalization risked “death by committee,” citing an example in which the 
administration responded to protests following racist graffiti in 2012 by creating a “No 
Place for Hate” initiative that failed, in this individual’s view, to make progress toward 
meeting student demands.   
 In contrast to the other three cases, at UNC students appear to have no formal 
representation in university governance outside of SGA leadership. UNC also was the 
only one of the four cases in which a change in top leadership (chancellor) provided an 
opportunity to examine the influence of that individual on administrative openness to 
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RFC. When the first group of FLO leaders decided to advance the RFC Commitment as 
part of its work to expand local and sustainable purchasing by Carolina Dining, Holden 
Thorp was serving as chancellor and had been in that position since 2008, the year after 
FLO was formed. As described in chapter four, FLO students were deeply disappointed 
in his unenthusiastic response when they met with him in 2012. Carol Folt followed 
Thorp as chancellor, and FLO students described her as someone who was more open 
with the university community, including students. While Chancellor Folt never actually 
met with the student leaders advancing Real Food, staff members familiar with the 
Commitment campaign indicated she had been very open to the students’ proposal. Thus, 
in the case of UNC leadership seemed to have a significant influence on administrative 
openness and response to Real Food.  
 Chancellor Folt’s public statements point to a positive orientation toward 
advancing the university’s sustainability portfolio and also toward the role of students in 
that work. In the university’s finance and operations post about signing the Commitment, 
Folt was quoted as saying “It’s really important because [sustainability initiatives] not 
only suit our desire to make things better for the planet, they’re economically better for 
us, they create better habitats, and the students are involved with faculty and staff” (The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2016). 
 The structure for shared governance at UGA parallels that of Pitt and OSU, with 
student seats on the University Council in addition to SGA representation. However, the 
experience of RF UGA students was not at all consistent with a culture of shared 
governance. Many UGA students, in both waves of the campaign, reported that they did 
not feel respected or taken seriously in their meetings with administrative staff, despite 
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extensive preparation for the meetings and (in their view) a professional manner. The fact 
that most of the RF UGA leaders were top scholars whose academic work was celebrated 
in UGA publications deepened their frustration with what they perceived as 
unwillingness on the part of UGA’s leadership to seriously examine and consider their 
proposal. Many students expressed sadness and anger at the response they had 
experienced from Provost Whitten and Arthur Tripp. In the words of one RF UGA leader, 
“I was just amazed at the dismissiveness of the undergraduate population here. We give a 
lot of money to the school, and you can’t listen to the kids who are rising to the top of 
their studies? And give them an open ear? So I find that really discouraging.”104 
 In addition to a general sense that they were not taken seriously, UGA was the 
only case where RF students reported concerns about the independence of the Student 
Government Association (SGA). As described in chapter four, RF UGA students 
believed that President Morehead’s office influenced the position of the SGA president 
regarding their resolution. After checking in with a number of university offices, the SGA 
president informed RF UGA students that he intended to veto the Real Food Challenge 
resolution, despite its almost unanimous support by SGA.105 Thus, while the formal 
governance structure at UGA gives students representation, the RF UGA students did not 
find that voice to be independent of UGA’s administrative leadership. 
 In contrast to OSU, the other campaign that did not secure a Commitment, RF 
UGA never received a formal response from university leadership about its proposal, 
despite formal endorsement by the SGA. At OSU, the administration clearly believed it 
needed to at least signal to the RF students, and perhaps to the campus community, that it 
																																																								
104 Interviewee UGA 8. 
105 RF UGA students corroborated this series of events with emails exchanged with the SGA 
president. 
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had listened to the students and had taken their proposal seriously. At UGA, 
administrators gave no indication they felt they needed to respond to the student 
campaign at all. One faculty member felt this response at UGA was strategic, intended to 
make it difficult for students to wage a campaign by withholding a “hard no:”  
The administration does not take a confrontational approach with students… This 
may create obstacles for RF to create a narrative to mobilize people who are 
pissed off. It also makes it hard for the students to know where they stand.106 
 
RF UGA students did, in fact, express a great deal of uncertainty about next steps after 
receiving a number of vague signals and statements, in late 2016 and early 2017, that 
suggested the UGA administration was unlikely to support their proposal. An 
administrator that some had described as a mentor, David Williams, had shifted from an 
encouraging to a discouraging tone. After he met with Provost Whitten to discuss the 
RFC proposal, the Dean of CAES also shifted from a cautiously optimistic tone to 
advising students to work on incremental progress with Dining Services, and they were 
subsequently unable to secure additional meetings with the president’s assistant. Thus, at 
UGA the RF campaign operated in the least favorable environment with respect to 
openness to student initiatives (see Figure 5.2). 
 Finally, the difference that UNC students experienced across two different 
chancellors with respect to Real Food raises an additional factor to consider, briefly 
mentioned in chapter two: how the chancellor’s response to the campaign might have 
been influenced by the organizational decision-making environment at that particular 
moment in time (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). FLO students met with Chancellor 
Thorp during Spring 2012. At that time, he was “engulfed” by a major athletics scandal 
that consumed an enormous amount of his time and energy (Nocera 2013). Thorp 
																																																								
106 Interviewee UGA 5. 
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announced he had accepted a position at Washington University in Saint Louis, Missouri 
the following academic year. Did the highly challenging task of leading UNC through a 
major ethics investigation, coach firings and NCAA penalties influence his lack of 
interest in Real Food? While not very satisfying to either scholars or activists, it is worth 
considering that sometimes campaigns may lose—or, at least, stall—for reasons that have 
very little to do with the campaign itself.    
5.1.2.3 Academic programs and allies 
 














and	Statham	1999).	In	this	study,	the presence of academic programs related to food 
systems on campus had positive effects in some cases and negative effects in others 
	 215	
because they were mediated by another variable—commitment to conventional 
agribusiness. Interview results suggested that faculty allies were unnecessary/irrelevant at 
Pitt; they had a positive effect on the outcome at UNC; and they were present but 
constrained and underutilized at OSU and UGA. Commitment to conventional 
agribusiness--as well strategic factors—mediated the influence of potential faculty allies 
on campaign outcomes at the LGUs. 
 Table 5.5 summarizes relevant academic programs and faculty participation at the 
four universities. The discussion that follows highlights ways in which presence and 
absence of programs and allies influenced RF campaign outcomes. 
 
Table 5.5: Academics and Availability of Allies 
 Academics Aligned with 








in RF campaign 
Pitt Limited: (Environmental Studies and Dietetics) Yes Not Applicable No presence 
OSU 
Strong: 
School of Environment & 
Natural Resources 














Food for All theme 
Public Health 




Several faculty members 
within CAES 
Public Health 
Yes Very high Weak presence 
 
 At Pitt, campaign leaders won the Commitment in a context with little relevant 
academic expertise and almost no participation of faculty. Some Pitt students felt that the 
absence of food system expertise actually helped them in that university leaders had such 
	 216	
limited familiarity with controversial aspects of RFC standards that they were unable or 
unlikely to raise specific objections to Real Food. RF leaders heard very few, if any, 
concerns about RFC standards and their rationale in their meetings with administrators. 
One student characterized meetings with administrators in this way: 
A lot of it was just sort of clarifying stuff for them, and it never felt like there was 
anything—I might be remembering wrong—but I don’t remember them finding 
anything really wrong with the criteria, and I think the reason is that they’re just 
not—the administrators were just not—coming from a super-informed place on 
food and food production.107 
 
One exception to the generally favorable response was concerns raised by faculty 
members about the Calculator’s GMO exclusion. This objection did not influence the 
Commitment campaign because it occurred after Chancellor Gallagher had already 
signed it, but it could have created problems for implementation. Several nutrition and 
dietetics professors expressed concern that a GMO exclusion could contribute to negative 
perceptions that might undermine support for nutritionally beneficial GMO crops such as 
vitamin-enriched rice. RF Pitt students responded by organizing panel presentations and 
discussions on GMOs to advance understanding.  
 At OSU, many Real Food students were in majors directly related to sustainable 
food systems, and the readings and research they completed through those courses 
supported their understanding of the issues of central concern to RFC. Several OSU 
faculty members noted that the College of Food, Agricultural, and Environmental 
Sciences (CFAES) has been slowly expanding the proportion of its faculty engaged in 
sustainable agriculture, although conventional approaches still dominate. The School of 
Environment and Natural Resources, housed within CFAES, includes a recently created 
sustainable agriculture specialization within the Natural Resource Management major, 
																																																								
107 Interviewee Pitt 1. 
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which several Real Food OSU students pursued. However, as noted above, students felt 
that faculty members were somewhat constrained in their ability to openly support RFC 
because the frames they adopted were highly critical of the conventional agriculture 
approaches still prevalent at OSU. 
 At UNC, the presence of related academic programs supported the Real Food 
Commitment campaign. A number of faculty members in several different departments 
held both relevant expertise and a strong commitment to critical analysis of conventional 
food systems. In addition to their contribution to a robust mobilizing structure (see 
section 5.2), scholars with expertise in food systems within the social sciences and public 
health supported student learning and facilitated the creation of the Real Food Calculator 
student internships. The engagement of these faculty members reflected a close 
connection between the mission of Real Food Challenge and their chosen areas of 
specialization in research and teaching. As described in chapter 4, an environmental 
justice class gave birth to FLO Food in 2007. The presence and strength of faculty and 
courses relating to food systems along with the supportive statewide farm-to-institution 
initiatives, discussed above, provided a strong discursive opportunity structure for the RF 
campaign at UNC. The Food For All theme reflected strong faculty and student interest 
in advancing food-related coursework and research at UNC. It also enabled RF student 
leaders to highlight the relevance and appeal of Real Food to the UNC community. As 
one student stated, “I	used	my	involvement	in	Food	For	All	to	advance	Real	Food.”108 
 At UGA, as at OSU and UNC the Real Food students benefitted from 
opportunities to take relevant courses that helped them understand the food system issues 
																																																								
108 Interviewee UNC 1. 
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RFC works to reform. In addition, at UGA, as at UNC and OSU, students occasionally 
received strategic advice from supportive faculty members or staff. Interestingly, students 
were less likely to include mention of this advice than were the faculty members with 
whom they had met; students were more likely to refer to advice received from RFC 
staff. The strategic advice offered by faculty members at UGA did not appear to have 
influenced students’ strategic decisions.  
 UGA students described a robust effort to reach out, through email, to all 
professors who might have an interest in Real Food and they gathered names and brief 
statements of support to use in meetings with administrators. However, they did not feel 
that faculty held any power with administrators. As described in chapter 4, RF UGA 
leaders consulted with David Williams in the Honors Program and with several deans for 
strategic advice, but they did not report receiving active support from them that aided the 
campaign. Several students felt that faculty members and deans were constrained by 
UGA’s negative response to their campaign, which they attributed to the university’s 
commitment to conventional agribusiness. One student interpreted the limited support 
from deans and faculty members in this way: 
I think deans and professors are afraid to stick out their necks, because it’s hard to 
get a job as a tenured professor or as a dean; they don’t want that coming down on 
their heads. It was never explicitly said to me, but just sort implied from things I 
heard…I get it, you know? It would be hard to stick your neck out after you get a 
great job… There were some who would definitely talk to us about what we were 
doing—but I don’t think ever wanted to stick their neck out far, like…I don’t 
know if we could have gotten a professor to go with us to meet with Provost 
Whitten.109 
 
 While students at UGA believed that faculty would not have felt comfortable 
openly supporting their campaign or attending meetings with them, they did collaborate 
																																																								
109 Interviewee UGA 8. 
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with faculty members who had related research and teaching interests on educational 
events, usually speakers or films followed by discussion. In addition, while some faculty 
members in environmental health were uncomfortable allowing students to promote RF 
UGA events in their classes, several faculty members in social sciences did allow these 
classroom promotions when they were related to the subject of the class. 
 At both OSU and UGA, the negative influence of commitment to conventional 
agribusiness appeared to mitigate the potential positive effects of the presence of many 
faculty members with expertise relating to Real Food perspectives—potential allies. This 
negative effect seemed to be much stronger at UGA than at OSU. In addition, 
prioritization of youth leadership and partnerships with justice groups over faculty and 
staff allies on campus also constrained utilization of this potential resource at OSU and 
UGA (discussed below in section 5.3). 
5.1.2.4 Dining services support 
 
 Interviewees noted several aspects of dining services at the universities that 
influenced the process of advocating the RF Campus Commitment. Notably, contrary to 
the prediction of RFC staff and student leaders, having a self-operated structure instead of 
a contracted system did not facilitate student access or influence; it may even have had a 
negative influence. Pitt’s dining services contract was with Sodexo and UNC’s was with 
Aramark. In both cases, the management corporation was less influential in shaping 
cooperation and support from dining services than was the particular individuals in 
charge. These results were consistent with a pilot version of the quantitative analysis of 
LSFB scores presented in chapter 3. Statistical analysis of more than 200 institutions 
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found no relationship between dining services management (e.g., self-operated or the 
corporate vendor) and LSFB score.  
 In both campaigns that won the Commitment the university administrators 
responsible for overseeing dining services contracts were very supportive and helpful, as 
reported by student interviewees. UNC students enjoyed a positive working relationship 
with Carolina Dining staff throughout both waves; Pitt students enjoyed greater support 
after a change in leadership in the head of campus dining. At OSU, students worked 
steadily to build a relationship of trust with the head of dining services and felt they made 
significant progress. Their work produced new relationships between dining and regional 
growers, but OSU dining services was initially unwilling to participate in evaluating 
invoices using the Calculator. After the Food Sustainability Panel was formed (which 
included the Director of Dining Services), it agreed on a goal of 100 percent transparency 
in sourcing. When the RF students decided to leave the institutional progress for creating 
Real Food metrics by stepping down from the Food Sustainability Panel, they 
compromised their working relationship with dining services. At UGA, leadership also 
was important, as students were able to create an internship position to support RFC 
calculator work after a more supportive director came on board. However, that 
relationship was constrained by the UGA administration’s negative response to the RF 
campaign.  
 Calculator results also may have influenced campaigns, but in association with 
other factors. At Pitt and UNC the favorable calculator results supported students’ 
arguments that the 20 percent Commitment was feasible. However, had there been 
opposition to RFC at either university, the Calculator result could just have easily been 
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used to justify not signing—“we do not need the Commitment.” In contrast, UGA’s 
extremely weak calculator result may have further strengthened opposition to the 
Commitment. With only one percent of UGA’s food and beverage purchasing qualifying 
as Real, the calculator results underscored one of the primary conflicts between RFC 
standards and UGA’s interests—conventionally produced poultry and eggs. The low 
number may have further strengthened the administration’s already negative view of the 
RFC proposal, as it highlighted the large gap between the criteria that UGA’s dining 
services had been using informally to promote its “Georgia Grown” offerings and the 
standards associated with Real Food. Thus, at UGA supportive leadership in dining 
services aided efforts to complete the initial Calculator work but, ultimately, that audit 
likely had a negative influence on the campaign’s ability to win the Commitment. 
 In summary, at all four universities supportive dining services staff facilitated 
Calculator work because of the need for access to invoices and support for identifying 
Real Food providers. However, this factor alone was less important than the 
administration’s orientation toward the campaign’s and the Real Food Commitment. 
Opposition associated with university commitment to conventional agribusiness was 
more influential than supportive dining services for UGA. 
 
5.1.2.5 Public commitments to sustainability 
 
 Two contextual variables that I had not included in the theoretical model emerged 
from interview data: pre-existing local/sustainable food purchasing targets, and general 
willingness to participate in national “sign-on” opportunities for university presidents. 
The two universities that signed the RFCC had not previously set specific targets for 
LSFB purchasing, and the two with campaigns that did not win the Commitment did 
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already have LSFB targets in their sustainability plans. With respect to willingness to 
participate in national programs, however, the results were mixed: in the two 
Southeastern universities, the results suggested the possibility that a general willingness 
or unwillingness to “sign on” to external programs may have had some influence, but at 
the Midwestern universities, the evidence is reversed: Pitt had not signed the Presidents’ 
Climate Leadership Commitment (but did sign the RFCC), and the reverse was true at 
OSU (see Table 5.6, below). The results at Pitt and OSU may be associated with 
difference in the political sensitivity of food systems versus fossil fuels, as discussed in 
section 5.1.1.2, above. Willingness to sign commitments in general, and willingness that 
depended on the topic, was likely associated with the political and conventional 
agribusiness variables discussed above. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Prior Formal Commitments 
 
 Presidents Climate Leadership 
Commitment 
Internal Target for Local & Sustainable 
Food Purchasing 
Pitt Not signed  No target prior to RFCC 
OSU Signed 2008i 40% set in 2015iii 
UNC Signed 2007ii No target prior to RFCC 
UGA Not signed 35% set in 2015iv 
 
i. Second Nature, retrieved on April 11, 2018 
 (http://reporting.secondnature.org/institution/detail!3097/##3097) 
ii. Second Nature, Retrieved on April 11, 2018 
 (http://reporting.secondnature.org/institution/detail!2417/##2417) 
iii. Ohio State University, The. Panel on Food Sustainability. 2016. “Purchase of Local and 
 Sustainable Food by 2025.” Retrieved September 10, 2017 
 (https://www.osu.edu/assets/downloads/SustainableFoodReport09152016_508.pd
 f). 
iv. University of Georgia. 2015b. “Campus Sustainability Plan.” Retrieved March 9, 2018 
 (http://sustainability.uga.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/UGA-Sustainability-Plan-Fall-
 2015.pdf).  
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 Students at OSU and at UGA reported that when they first learned their 
universities already had set targets for local and sustainable food purchasing, they were 
encouraged and felt that was a positive sign for the RF campaign. However, their sense of 
its impact changed when administrators used those university targets to argue that the 
Real Food Commitment was unnecessary. Similarly, at OSU the pre-existing 40 percent 
goal complicated RF OSU’s messaging about committing to 20 percent Real Food. To 
the students involved in the campaign, the difference between the university target and 
the RFCC was very clear; Real Food set out very specific criteria and a detailed process 
for implementing auditing, reporting, and continual progress. OSU’s target was just 
that—a target, with no definition for local or sustainable associated with it. Students felt 
that administrators used OSU’s pre-existing target to support their argument that 
developing the university’s own plan for advancing local and sustainable food purchasing 
was actually more ambitious than adopting the RFC approach through the Commitment. 
One of the faculty members interviewed also felt that the vague 40 percent objective 
undermined the students’ messaging. 
 RF OSU students articulated the differences between OSU’s 40 percent goal and 
the RFC Commitment in an article in The Lantern about OSU’s decision not to 
participate in RFC and in a letter to the editor after deciding to step down from the Food 
Sustainability Panel (Herbener 2016; Real Food OSU 2017). The January, 2017 letter 
included the following statement: 
…the Real Food Campus Commitment’s finely tuned, meticulously researched 
standards would create a system that is not only socially and environmentally just, 
but also transparent. The commitment creates a structure in which students — not 
simply Dining Services or administrators — work alongside frontline 
communities, food-movement leaders and producers to hold the university 
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accountable, preventing the abuses and “greenwashing” that too often comes with 
self-reporting. 
 
Indicators of such greenwashing include exaggeration, vagueness and weak 
verification, according to University of Oregon’s Greenwashing Index. So how 
does OSU stack up? A goal of 40 percent local and sustainable food purchasing 
by 2025, all without clear definitions of those words and no established method of 
verification? Check, check and check. The combination of ambitious goals with 
loose metrics, not to mention the exceedingly long timeline, set the stage for a 
weak circle of accountability, at the very least. (Real Food OSU 2017:Para. 7-8) 
 
As indicated by the above quote, after several months of meetings and narrowly losing 
the vote to get Panel support for endorsing the RFC Commitment for meeting 20 percent 
of the 40 percent target, the RF students had concluded that the Panel was more intent on 
“greenwashing” than committing to the kinds of standards reflected in the RFC 
Calculator tool. However, as discussed in chapter 4, a number of staff, faculty, and other 
students had more confidence in the process and future outcomes of the Panel, and did 
not assume, as the RF students had, that “greenwashing” would necessarily be the result 
if the Commitment were not signed. 
 It is difficult to assess the impact of pre-existing local and sustainable food 
purchasing criteria on the OSU and UGA campaigns. Certainly, the students were 
frustrated by the way in which administrators used them to downplay the value of the 
RFC Commitment. Students at OSU and UGA had opportunities to meet and share 
stories about their campaigns, and through that communication they realized that the two 
campaigns shared this particular challenge. However, none of the students reported 
learning about other campuses that had effectively managed this target response (“we 
already are doing this; we do not need RFC”). In section 5.3.2, below, I discuss how 
greater strategic capacity might have supported this kind of problem solving. 
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5.1.3 Summary: Opportunity structures and campaign outcomes 
 
 The results of this RFC campaign comparison suggested that the context or 
opportunity structures of the four universities significantly influenced campaign progress 
and explains, in part, the difference in outcomes between the two “winning” campaigns 
and the two that did not secure the Commitment. The two most significant external 
variables were political influence and commitment to conventional agribusiness, with 
interaction between the two, which influenced level of opposition to the campaigns. 
Political and agribusiness context also influenced outcomes through their effects on ally 
availability, most significantly at UGA. As strategic decisions and cultural factors also 
shaped the role of allies in the campaigns, that variable is discussed further in section 5.3, 
below. In addition to ally availability, the internal contextual variable with the greatest 
impact on campaign outcomes was openness of administrators to student initiatives. The 
orientation of the student body toward progressive activism influenced students’ 
perceptions of campaign difficulty but its effects on outcomes were difficult to assess 
from the results of this study. Finally, prior established LSFB commitments at OSU and 
UGA negatively influenced the effectiveness of RF framing there by providing a 
discursive opportunity for targets opposed to the Commitment; they reframed the 
students’ petition as unnecessary and even as less ambitious than RFC.  
 On the basis of these contextual factors alone, Pitt clearly had the most favorable 
context for an RFC campaign; UNC’s was generally favorable, and more so after a 
change in chancellor; OSU’s was challenging; and UGA’s was the most challenging or 
least favorable. Thus, as expected, opportunity structures significantly influenced 
outcomes. However, the strategic actions and culture of the campaigns mattered, as well; 
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success was not assured by Pitt and UNC’s contexts, and OSU won an administrative 
response and the opportunity to shape LSFB metrics, despite its challenging context. The 
following sections examine the ways in which mobilizing structures, strategic variables, 
and campaign culture interacted with the opportunity structures, providing a more 
complex and complete explanation of outcomes. 
 





tenure	of	a	single	cohort	of	students	(Chang	2004).	As predicted, at all four 
universities both academic and student network mobilizing structures were important for 
advancing the campaigns, but the extent to which they supported progress toward 
winning the Campus Commitment varied in association with other factors. In the 
campaigns that won the Commitment, academic mobilizing structures were most 
significant at UNC, whereas student extracurricular networks were more important at 
Pitt. At both UGA and OSU RF students expanded their groups’ reach through 
progressive student coalitions; these networks supported solidarity and mobilization of 
greater numbers at rallies and other actions, helping win concessions at OSU but not at 
UGA.  
5.2.1 Academic, student, and community networks 
 
 At the two universities where the RF Commitment was signed, students had 
access to networks that they felt significantly supported their campaigns. At OSU and 
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UGA, students also were able to create student groups and to work in coalition with other 
progressive groups, including a few community organizations as well as student groups. 
While students at all four universities considered these mobilizing structures important to 
their advocacy efforts, their influence alone was less important than contextual and 
strategic factors. Below I describe the role and influence of the networks utilized by RF 
leaders at each campus.  
 At Pitt, RF student leaders felt that the robust network of student sustainability 
leaders facilitated Real Food Pitt’s progress both through mobilization—drawing students 
in from other, related groups—and by facilitating knowledge and skill sharing between 
veteran student leaders and Real Food regarding how to advance an initiative with Pitt 
administrators. As one student described: 
…students have run and have come up with every single sustainability initiative 
that exists at this campus, and we have very impressive students because of this. 
We have students who know how to navigate a bureaucracy; we have students 
who know how to look at stakeholders, know how to look at decision makers, 
know how to look at financial ties…We have very inspirational upper-class 
students who can teach the under-classmen how to do things.110 
	
Supporting this network was a physical hub space, as described in chapter four—the 
Student Office of Sustainability, which resembles a small business start-up space with an 
open floor plan. Students used that space to connect formally and informally about the 
progress and strategic planning for a wide variety of environmental and sustainability 
initiatives including Engineers for a Sustainable World, Free the Planet, Real Food Pitt, 
Students for Sustainability, and Pitt Bicycle Collective (University of Pittsburgh 2017).  
	 In addition to a network of sustainability-related student groups, several student 
interviewees described relationships with other progressive organizations on campus, 
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including the “Fight for Fifteen” campaign for a living wage for university workers and 
United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). A number of progressive student 
organizations regularly supported each other’s efforts through petitions and 
endorsements, to help each other demonstrate strong student commitment when leaders 
took their case to administrators. Students participating in a variety of campaigns often 
shared experiences and brainstormed strategy together in this space. For Real Food Pitt, 
this community was more important for strategic capacity than the RFC network, which 
also offered opportunities to learn from other student organizers, because Real Food Pitt 
leaders did not feel that RFC’s strategic guidance was appropriate for their context. 
 At OSU, as described in chapter four, a community-based organization, Local 
Matters, was key to launching the original group that later became Real Food OSU. After 
the student group decided to affiliate with RFC, they sometimes collaborated with other 
progressive organizations to increase mobilization for events, as in the spring 2016 
occupation of President Bricker’s office. In 2017, after RF OSU decided to break with the 
Food Sustainability Panel, it maintained loose ties to other progressive campus groups 
and strengthened ties to campus and community fair food groups. While these coalition 
partners enabled RF OSU to mobilize larger groups of people when they held rallies and 
marches, their numbers were still relatively modest. In contrast to Pitt, where students 
reported that the network of student organizations facilitated their ability to successfully 
navigate decision-making processes, at OSU the progressive network supported 
mobilization more than strategic capacity (discussed further in 5.3.3).  
 UNC was the only university of the four where an academic program served a key 
role as a mobilizing structure. The university’s Food for All theme, in place from 2015 to 
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2018, helped RF student leaders build key relationships with faculty and staff and make 
the case for the RFC Commitment. As one student recalled “[Food For All showed me 
that] change can happen within the system, but it is dependent on relationships.”111 
Students leveraged these relationships in negotiations with administrators about the 
Commitment, and also benefitted from their strategic guidance when negotiations became 
tense. 
 At UGA, the Go Green Alliance, an umbrella organization for UGA student 
groups relating to environment and sustainability, connected the early leaders who 
formed Real Food UGA. This umbrella group helped interested students identify the new 
opportunity in food advocacy on campus when Real Food UGA was established in 2011. 
As leaders became more invested in social justice aspects of Real Food, RF leaders 
helped form UGA’s Progressive Action Coalition. When student commitment to the 
social justice aspects of Real Food became more important, the UGA RF leaders also 
began connecting more regularly with community organizations including Athens for 
Everyone, a “left-progressive political organization” engaged in community organizing 
for societal transformation at the local and state levels (Athens for Everyone 2018). Like 
Real Food OSU, the UGA group’s networks have supported mobilization for events and 
rallies, but have not supported the group’s ability to win the RFC Commitment. 
5.2.2 Opportunities for institutionalizing RFC Calculator labor 
 
 The Campus Commitment requires signatory colleges and universities to 
regularly track all food and beverage purchasing in order to calculate the percentage of 
those purchases that qualifies as Real and to identify opportunities to increase that 
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percentage to 20 percent by 2020. This is a highly labor intensive task; Real Food 
Challenge staff estimated it takes, on average, two student interns working about 10 
hours per week to successfully manage the Calculator workload. Many RFC campaigns 
prioritized this work and estimating the baseline Real Food percentage in their 
campaigns, because that information can help students make the case to dining staff and 
administrators that the Commitment target is feasible. Thus, as described in section 
5.1.2.4 above, campaigns where students have support creating for-credit or paid student 
internships to support the calculator work may have an easier time managing that process. 
 At UNC, faculty whose work intersected with Real Food Challenge concerns 
created an RFC Calculator internship within Environmental Studies and they have put in 
a good deal of time and energy to build and maintain that opportunity. That internship, in 
one faculty member’s view, also helped Real Food – UNC and its campaign by ensuring 
continuity—at least in the calculator aspect of the campaign. Pitt took an additional step 
of creating paid student positions associated with Real Food, one focused on 
communications and the other tasked with undertaking the annual Calculator work. At 
both UNC and Pitt, administrators, faculty, and students noted the importance of these 
positions for institutionalizing Real Food and ensuring continuity because of regular 
student turnover. 
 At OSU, one faculty member whose work closely intersected the mission of Real 
Food said there were plans to create for credit student internships in dining services there, 
and that the slow process for creating and gaining approval for new courses explained the 
delay in providing that institutional support. None of the RF OSU students referred to this 
plan so it is unclear whether they were involved in that process. At UGA, as described in 
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chapter four, Real Food students played a leading role in creating a paid internship in 
dining, but after one semester in which an RF UGA student held the position and 
completed the initial Calculator evaluation, the job description was broadened to 
encompass sustainability in dining more generally. In addition, the student hired was not 
closely connected to RF UGA and as of fall 2017 it was unclear whether dining would 
continue using the Calculator and continue working with Real Food UGA. 
 Thus, the function and impact of mobilizing structures was strongly influenced by 
the campus context and the openness of targets to the RFC Commitment. At Pitt and 
UNC, different forms of mobilizing structures provided the labor and knowledge and 
skills needed to win the campaigns, and supportive environments contributed to their 
ability to create infrastructure for the Calculator work. At OSU and UGA, students also 
created student networks that extended beyond Real Food members but had much greater 
difficulty leveraging them to advance their campaigns. In addition to less favorable 
environments for their campaigns, the discussion of strategic variables, below, suggests 
ways in which framing, tactics, and cultural factors help explain the campaign outcomes. 
  
5.3 Strategic Factors  
 
 As discussed in chapter two, more or less favorable contextual factors matter, but 
their influence is mediated by a movement’s culture, framing processes, and strategic 
choices--how well activists create and adapt effective approaches given their context and 
target responses (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; McCammon et al. 
2008; Amenta et al. 2010; Jasper 2010). Most social movement research examining the 
impact of strategic adaptation on outcomes has focused on framing processes and the 
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extent to which groups develop culturally resonant frames that align with the movement 
context (Jasper 2010), or alignment between the general type of strategy adopted 
(insider/assimilative or outsider/contentious) and context (see, for example, Cress and 
Snow 1996, 2000; and Arthur 2011).  
 Framing decisions, as part of campaign strategy, clearly influenced outcomes in 
three of the four RFC campaigns examined: they supported a positive outcome at Pitt and 
contributed to negative outcomes at OSU and UGA. At UNC, frame alignment seemed to 
be less a function of campaign strategy than the discursive opportunity structure 
discussed above—the Food for All academic theme and related statewide initiatives. Also 
as predicted, the ability of students to “read” their context and opponent responses and 
make strategic shifts when their tactics did not seem to be working also influenced 
outcomes. A third factor that was not predicted in the model emerged as important 
because of its influence on both framing processes and tactics: campaign culture, 
particularly collective identity, that was influenced by RFC principles and goals related 
to, but distinct from, the RFC Commitment campaign objective.  
	
Table 5.7:  Variation Among Strategic Variables That Influenced RF Commitment 
Campaign Progress. 
	



































Adaptation Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
RFC Influence Low High Moderate Moderate 
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5.3.1 Framing processes 
 
 As described in chapter two, many scholars identify frame alignment and 
resonance as key factors in the influence of social movement framing, or meaning 
construction and communication (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Framing 
processes often become more strategic as a movement progresses, aimed at garnering 
sympathy from important constituencies and persuading targets, or people who can 
influence targets, that it is in their interest to grant the movement what it seeks. Further, 
framing processes, by defining movement identity and goals, often influence selection of 
organizational structures and tactics (Polletta 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). As with 
political opportunities, movement actors who recognize and respond strategically to 
discursive opportunities enhance their chances of winning their objectives (Gamson and 
Meyer 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).  
	 The model presented in chapter two predicted that campaign outcomes would be 
influenced by how well activists adjust RFC framing to align with their university’s 
organizational context. The four cases examined in this study largely supported this 
prediction, but with the important caveat that the ease or difficult of alignment was 
significantly influenced by contextual variables—opportunity structure. At Pitt and at 
UNC, student leaders framed the Commitment as a public relations opportunity for the 
university and emphasized Real Food standards consistent with their university’s 
academic and sustainability commitments. At UGA and OSU, the campaigns also used 
positive messaging early on, framing the RF Commitment as an opportunity, but targets 
at these universities were not persuaded that Real Food offered a public relations benefit. 
Both campaigns shifted later toward increasingly critical messaging and frames that 
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aligned with RFC’s growing emphasis on food justice. The justice frame at UGA and 
OSU resonated with a small core group of students and other progressive student groups 
but they were much less resonant with students outside these groups, with the campaign’s 
targets and individuals who could influence them, and with some potential allies, making 
it more difficult for student leaders to advance progress toward the Commitment. Strong 
critiques of conventional food production in the Real Food frames adopted at OSU and 
UGA likely contributed to the perceived risk of the Commitment by administrators there. 
 At Pitt, RF students framed the Commitment as an opportunity to support 
Western Pennsylvania’s regional food economy, an opportunity to improve dining 
options for students, and as a public relations opportunity for the university. Students at 
all four universities included this “benefits” messaging as part of their pitches, and it 






Another administrator who met with Pitt’s RF student leaders remembered that they were 
successful in framing the proposal in a way that helped demonstrate to Chancellor 
Gallagher its alignment with “university values.”  
 In addition to public relations benefits, Pitt students highlighted sustainability and 
health benefits of Real Food in ways that aligned with academic and student wellness 
priorities. Early in the campaign, during Real Food week events at Market Central, Pitt’s 
main student dining center, students emphasized the health risks associated with the 
																																																								
112 Interviewee Pitt 9. 
	 235	
overuse of antibiotics in conventional meat production and consumption of high fructose 
corn syrup, and the environmental and community benefits of regional food purchasing 
(Rosenblatt 2014; Lieberman 2015). The closest academic connections to food systems 
issues at Pitt were nutrition and dietetics in the School of Health and Rehabilitation 
Sciences, and the Department of Geology and Environmental Science, which includes a 
course in sustainability. The areas that RF leaders emphasized were well aligned with 
these academic areas of focus, along with Pitt’s desire to be viewed as a sustainability 
leader.113 Students indicated they had considered carefully how to frame the RFC 
standards to align with the interests of the Pitt administration. The formal messaging they 
built seemed tailored for their targets. In contrast, tabling and educational sessions 
designed to mobilize students and garner petition signatures reflected a broader range of 
RFC values, including social justice. 
 At OSU, Real Food framing processes often included all four areas of emphasis: 
local & community-based, fair to producers and workers, ecologically sound, and 
humane. By the time the campaign chose to escalate its tactics in early 2016, food justice 
had become the primary focus. The “food justice is racial justice” frame served to 
deepened the commitment of a small group of student activists, and it helped them align 
with other progressive, social justice groups on campus and in the Columbus community. 
The following statement by an RFC organizer reflected the sentiments of a core group of 
students who were highly motivated by the social justice frames of Real Food:  
Whenever I build relationships with students, it’s going to be relationships that 
are going to be had for the rest of our lives. Because they, too, hold that this is the 
																																																								
113 For example, the resident district manager for Sodexo—an individual who would be highly 
sensitive to the preferences of Pitt’s administration—publicly affirmed the value of signing onto 
the RFC Commitment and becoming the first Athletic Coast Conference school to do so 
(Rosenblatt 2014). 
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issue--racial justice, food justice, and working with farmers of color, students of 
color specifically, something that is talked about but at the same time, never 
talked about. And that is food and agriculture and race.114 
 
But while social justice frames seemed to deepen commitment on the part of some 
student leaders, it alienated others, sometimes making it hard to mobilize larger groups of 
students. As described in chapter 4, student leaders at OSU described a deliberate shift in 
messaging and tactics in 2015 in response to what they perceived to be stalling and 
stonewalling by the OSU administration. Some Real Food OSU leaders felt that shifting 
from a positive message emphasizing benefits for OSU and benefits for food system 
changes to one that was highly critical of OSU relationships with bad corporate actors 
would advance their campaign. This shift also appealed to a core group of students as a 
result of what they were learning about corporate agriculture, connections between 
corporate agriculture and OSU, racism in the history of land grant universities and access 
to agricultural lands in the U.S., and contemporary worker and contract farmer abuses in 
the food sector. Students began to shift the RF OSU frame (and began escalating tactics) 
not just because they believed it would be effective but also because the justice frame 
resonated “with the beliefs, ideas, and cultural frames of meaning [they used] to make 
sense of their situation and to legitimate collective action” (Taylor and Van Dyke 
2004:276). 
 After the Food Sustainability Panel was formed, RF OSU students and the 
Executive Director of RFC, presenting to the Panel, continued to emphasize the social 
justice aspects of RFC standards, in part because they felt that aspect was the least well 
understood by many Panel members. Several faculty or staff members of the Panel 
agreed with students that aspects of the RF Standards that administrators would likely 
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object to, including exclusions of GMO and CAFO products, should be discussed openly 
within the panel. However, they did not agree with RFC staff and OSU students that it 
was strategically wise to emphasize the “food justice equals racial justice” frame in what 
they viewed as an introductory, diverse forum intended to bring people on board, some of 
whom had very limited familiarity with social aspects of sustainability. A Panel member 
shared this recollection about the RFC presentations to the FSP in September 2016: 
I was really hoping that this series of events was going to turn everything around, 
and instead it ended up creating an opportunity for both sides to kind of dig in 
further. And we were further away from adopting the RFC [standards] than we 
were before these discussions, I believe.115 
 
 In addition to their shift toward a justice frame in discussions with targets, Real 
Food OSU leaders also used the food justice frame in their efforts to mobilize students. 
This choice reflected their strong commitment to the social aspects of sustainability and it 
facilitated connections with worker rights oriented groups, including the Student 
Farmworker Alliance on campus and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers chapter in 
Columbus. However, for OSU students interested in questions surrounding food sourcing 
on campus but with limited background knowledge of food system critiques, this frame 
was confusing and some believed it undermined student mobilization. A former student 
member of Real Food OSU who attended a rally that included RF and the OSU chapter of 
Black Lives Matter felt that, for most student observers, the association of the two groups 
did not make any sense because they did not have any familiarity with connections 
between racism and food production. A community ally agreed that the racial justice 
frame required more investment and education than the group may have been capable of 
pursuing: 
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It was very clear to me there was not the capacity to build the educational 
knowledge and infrastructure around that concept [food justice = racial justice]. 
There was too much possibility of it backfiring, which I think in some ways it 
did.116 
 
Thus, at OSU early positive framing did not resonate as it had at Pitt as a result of 
contextual differences. The shift toward more critical, food justice frames narrowed 
mobilization opportunities but enhanced solidarity with coalition partners who 
participated in the Reclaim OSU sit-in. That identity and solidarity contributed 
significantly to the decision of RF OSU leaders to leave the Panel, letting go of their 
opportunity to potentially win the Commitment. 
 UNC student leaders enjoyed a significant advantage over the other universities 
with respect to opportunities for strong frame resonance as a result of their campus 
context and their close collaboration with faculty allies. As discussed above, the Food for 
All academic theme provided a discursive opportunity structure (DOS) in which Real 
Food messaging about the problems with conventional production and the benefits of 
supporting North Carolina producers using sustainable practices were highly resonant 
(Koopmans and Statham 1999; McCammon et al. 2007). Further, critical messaging 
about conventional agriculture was not perceived as threatening at UNC, in that way that 
it was at OSU and, especially, UGA. Effective movement framing is the “result of the 
combined effect of a discursive opportunity structure and movement actors who deploy 
frames in ways that align or fit with this discursive opportunity structure” (McCammon et 
al. 2007:732). At UNC, students effectively leveraged the favorable DOS by using Food 
for All to highlight alignment between their campaign and UNC’s priorities. 
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 A second wave student leader at UNC, Claire Hannapel, was selected through a 
competitive process to serve on the Food for All Steering Committee. The selection of a 
Real Food student leader made clear to the Food for All team the congruence between 
RFC objectives and UNC’s teaching and research agenda in food systems. As discussed 
above, her position on the steering committee also provided a mobilizing structure for 
advancing the Real Food commitment—especially, for collaboration with faculty. In 
contrast to Pitt and OSU, at UNC the presence of closely involved faculty allies and the 
openness of student leaders in the second wave to consider their input influenced the 
ways in which campaign leaders adjusted framing and tactics to better align with context. 
Both students and faculty members at UNC reported that faculty members provided, and 
students acted on, advice to soften “contentious language” modeled after RFC-produced 
documents. In contrast to OSU and UGA, the concern seemed to be not about RFC 
critiques of conventional agribusiness but rather language (and actions) interpreted as 
critical of UNC for not having yet signed the Commitment. In UNC’s case, frame 
alignment with context was easy to accomplish, but language deemed personally critical 
created pushback.  
 As a result of the collaborative work of FLO and Carolina Dining Services, along 
with a generally favorable agricultural context for community-based sourcing, the UNC 
campaign enjoyed another great advantage compared to the other three universities in this 
study: UNC was already sourcing close to the 20 percent goal of Real Food while 
students were engaged in the second RFCC campaign. In February 2016, about three 
months before Chancellor Folt signed the Commitment, Scott Myers, UNC’s director of 
food and vending, was quoted in the student newspaper as saying that UNC would 
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probably reach 20 percent Real Food in 2016 (Conti 2016). Students were able to use the 
progress already made to frame the RFC Commitment, and UNC’s status as a leader in 
supporting North Carolina’s agricultural producers, as a public relations opportunity for 
the university. The resonance of this frame reflected both the favorable administrative 
and academic orientation toward sustainable agriculture and its relatively high degree of 
autonomy from the state’s conservative political context. That the university’s leaders 
believed Real Food afforded a public relations opportunity and did not create a 
significant risk of sanctions from stakeholders was reflected by an article published on 
the university web site in August, 2017, announcing that UNC had already surpassed 
Real Food’s 20 percent goal: 
Not only has UNC-Chapel Hill achieved the benchmark four years earlier 
than the challenge deadline, it surpassed this goal while maintaining meal 
plan price increases at or below the level of food and labor price inflation 
in the marketplace for the last decade. This means that students did not face 
surcharges or price increases in their meal plans in order to achieve the 
Real Food goals. (UNC Finance and Operations 2017:para. 2). 
 
This statement suggests that UNC’s dining services division was comfortable publicizing 
its Real Food Campus Commitment as long as it could also demonstrate cost 
containment. Similar to Pitt, and at odds with OSU and UGA, framing focused on 
university benefits resonated at UNC, following the change to a more supportive 
chancellor. 
 At UGA, student leaders in both waves of the campaign also reported that they 
had tailored their messaging at times in ways that were clearly designed to align with 
administrator interests or priorities. For example, when students prepared their talking 
points for a meeting with Provost Whitten, whose academic training is in health sciences, 
they emphasized public health problems such as obesity that could be addressed through 
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a commitment to Real Food. This frame had proven resonant at Pitt but did not help 
students advance their cause with administrators at UGA. They also tried the public 
relations frame that resonated at Pitt and UNC, where administrators used the Real Food 
Commitment to highlight their leadership role in an emerging area of campus 
sustainability. Neither of these frames resonated with targets at UGA, either. With 
Whitten, it was unclear to students why she was not persuaded by a health-based 
argument. With respect to the public relations frame, students reported that administrators 
asserted that UGA did not need to be a leader in every area (and, implicitly, that Real 
Food was not going to be an area it chose for a leadership role). 
 In addition to a university benefits frame, both waves of the UGA campaign felt a 
strong commitment to communicate the full set of Real Food principles in their meetings 
and messaging with targets as well as with the population they hoped to mobilize (mostly 
students). Like the OSU campaign, their framing reflected RFC’s language and priorities, 
and their messaging became more strongly tied to social justice goals in the second wave. 
This shift occurred alongside more assertive tactics and social media messaging. For 
example, during the RFC summit and rally at UGA in September 2016, a number of 
tweets challenged President Morehead with “who are you accountable to?” in an effort to 
draw attention to perceived Board of Regents influence on his response to Real Food.117 
 As discussed in chapter four, many individuals sympathetic to Real Food’s 
objectives at UGA felt that framing the campaign as a critique of conventional 
agriculture, and particularly conventional poultry production, undermined their ability to 
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ARE YOU ACCOUNTABLE TO? @BORUSG.” Retrieved July 20, 2018 
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win changes in Real Food purchasing at UGA. One UGA faculty member remembered 
advising a Real Food student by posing these questions: 
How do you recognize that the institution is going to feel like its hands are tied in 
particular ways? And how do you get them to be on your side and to help you. 
And to be able to see that they will get a lot of positive PR and positive attention 
for the small changes that they make, instead of saying, look, you guys are bad 
and you’re serving Big Ag and we hate Big Ag…Because this institution is not 
going to do that. This is Georgia, and this is the University of Georgia; there is a 
lot of deep, deep, monetary and political investment in agriculture in this state. 
And they are not going to burn that bridge. They can’t.118  
 
Thus, positive frames that had resonated with targets in more favorable contexts did not 
move administrators at UGA, and critical messaging about conventional agriculture, 
many felt, negatively affected the Real Food campaign’s opportunity to win the 
Commitment.  
 While frame alignment is a useful way to explain differences in resonance and 
relative progress toward achieving the Real Food Commitment at the four universities in 
this study, it is important to note that framing that hampered the Commitment campaigns 
at OSU and UGA may have served a different purpose that students valued as much, or 
even more, in OSU’s case, than winning the Commitment. As discussed in chapter 2, 
framing serves a variety of purposes within movements that often include diagnosis, or 
interpretation of the problem and its sources; prognosis, or proposed solutions to the 
identified problem; and “call to action” framing intended to motivate concerned 
individuals to participate (Snow and Benford 1988; Zald 1996). With multiple framing 
functions, “framing dilemmas” sometimes occur in which a frame serving one purpose 
may undermine a different purpose--for example, when a diagnostic frame useful with 
some audiences is overwhelming to other constituencies, producing “numbing effects” 
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that impede mobilization (Benford and Snow 1988:203). Similarly, at OSU and UGA, 
use of social justice frames and messaging confronting conventional agribusiness 
advanced some objectives while hindering others. The national SMO’s influence on these 
“framing dilemmas” is discussed further in section 5.3.4. 
 Movements that are able to integrate diagnostic, prognostic, and action frames are 
likely to have greater success mobilizing people sympathetic to the issues they address 
(Snow and Benford 1988). At OSU, several students and observers reported that a lack of 
congruence between racial justice frames and other Real Food frames such as the benefits 
of sustainable food production methods hampered student mobilization. Further, the 
racial justice frame narrowed the diagnostic frame to one that required greater knowledge 
of food systems and historical inequalities in food production than many students shared 
with the Real Food leaders. Limiting frames to ones requiring expert knowledge can also 
hamper mobilization of greater numbers (Snow and Benford 1988). 
 Consistent with these predictions, at both OSU and UGA, food justice frames 
supported collaboration with progressive student and community organizations but also 
limited mobilization opportunities with UGA students drawn to other aspects of 
sustainable food. “Food justice is racial justice” was confusing to students unacquainted 
with connections between racial disparities in access to agricultural land or worker rights 
in food production that disproportionately affect people of color. Student leaders 
recognized the challenge of a broad justice frame for sustainable food but saw that 
challenge as part of the educational role of their campaign, in support of movement 
building. As one student leader stated: 
Justice and sustainability are inseparable for us. But it’s very hard for people to 
understand, because a lot of what is pitched is sustainability stuff. And a lot of our 
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buy-in and make-up are white women who are interested in environmental issues 
and see the environmental effects. I think RFC has been a transformative process. 
Like, yes, this is a thing [environment], and this is something you should care 
about, but it’s also so much more than that. So that education process, 
enlightening, it needed to happen as part of our efforts on campus, too.119 
 
This statement reflects the challenge to simultaneously advance an instrumental Real 
Food objective, which many in the campus community associated with “sustainability 
stuff,” and the social justice and food system transformation goals that became more and 
more central to the group’s frames. Like the OSU campaign, UGA student leaders were 
unwilling to adapt frames if doing so seemed at odds with the meaning and identity that 
were central to their commitment. Thus, at OSU and UGA, where frame alignment was 
critically important due to the likelihood that administrators would perceive RFC as risky 
and student bodies less inclined toward progressive causes, RF leaders were unwilling to 
adapt frames when they were viewed as central to their identity and the group’s values 
and broader movement goals. This lack of flexibility contributed to their difficulty 
advancing the Commitment. 
5.3.2 Tactics 
 
 As discussed in chapter two, social movement scholarship varies in its 
conclusions about the influence on assertive/contentious versus assimilative/collaborative 
tactics on outcomes. The complexity of movement dynamics makes it difficult to 
demonstrate that a particular strategic choice was the key factor that produced a particular 
outcome (Giugni 1998). Connecting particular kinds of tactics with outcomes is further 
complicated by the fact that many campaigns and movements employ a range of tactics--
some contentious, some collaborative--at different points in time. Even for college 
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campus campaigns extending just a few years, connecting specific tactics with specific 
outcomes was a significant challenge. Target administrators who were willing to 
comment on the reasons for their decision to sign the Commitment did not necessarily 
share the full set of actions and considerations that mattered. At the two institutions that 
did not sign, no key decision-makers were willing to discuss the Real Food campaigns at 
all. My analysis of the effects of various tactics on campaign outcomes reflects a 
synthesis of the impressions and informed evaluations of as many stakeholders as 
possible, corroborated, whenever feasible, through public statements and accounts.  
 To summarize the influence of tactics on outcomes, at Pitt, the university with the 
most favorable context, students used collaborative/assimilative tactics alone to great 
effect and its effectiveness may have benefitted from comparison to more contentious 
campaigns underway. At UNC, the second wave employed both collaborative and 
moderately assertive tactics, and they engaged in strategic adaptation in response to staff 
and faculty feedback. OSU students engaged in both assimilative and highly contentious 
tactics, including a sit-in, which may have secured their positions on the Food 
Sustainability Panel but did not win the original desired outcome (the RFC 
Commitment). OSU students eventually withdrew entirely from an assimilative strategy 
and gave up on winning the Commitment. At UGA students employed a similar set of 
tactics as UNC but with less adaptation and with very different outcomes. These results 
support arguments for greater attention to strategic adaptation and capacity, particularly 
for campaigns operating in unfavorable environments, discussed in section 5.3.4, below, 
and in this chapter’s summary. 
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 At Pitt, student leaders felt strongly that assimilative tactics would be the most 
effective choice for the Real Food Commitment campaign, and it appears their judgment 
was sound. They based this conclusion on evidence from personal experience working to 
advance other initiatives at Pitt and from direct statements from administrators, who 
spoke negatively about more contentious tactics and also who felt strongly that learning 
how to petition administrators in a “professional” way was an important part of Pitt’s 
undergraduate endeavor.  
 While Pitt offered a generally supportive context for advancing Real Food, at 
times student leaders needed to reflect and adapt when they met with resistance. They 
also privileged their own local knowledge and strategic assessment over that of RFC 
staff. When they encountered problems with dining services early in the campaign and 
pushback from a trustee late in the process, they rejected suggestions to “escalate” the 
campaign and instead revised their assimilative tactics. Thus, while winning at Pitt was 
certainly supported by a highly favorable context, students and administrators felt it also 
resulted from an effective strategic approach. As one administrator shared, ““[The 
students were] willing to collaborate and listen to feedback…They were polite, 
professional, considerate, and had a positive attitude…taking a professional approach.”120 
Of course, it is not surprising that administrators would state a preference for more 
assimilative tactics, nor that they might deny “giving in” to more contentious tactics.  
 Pitt administrators provided examples of other student campaigns they had 
supported and ones they had not, and why. In their view, they generally support student 
initiatives in cases where they are able to do so, as long as students have completed 
extensive research and done “due diligence,” demonstrating their commitment to follow 
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through and ensure the project’s success, and when they have adopted a “professional” 
approach. They felt that the Real Food Pitt students had met these criteria exceptionally 
well. It is important to note that, in the view of student leaders, students in all of the four 
campaigns adopted a “professional” manner with administrators, at least initially, and did 
a great deal of research and analysis to present a compelling case to administrators. Thus, 
the success of the Pitt campaign’s assimilative approach must be viewed in relation to 
Pitt’s favorable contextual characteristics. 
 OSU’s Real Food campaign was the only one of the four that included highly 
contentious and riskier tactics. While it is very difficult to determine the effect of 
escalating tactics on the position of administrators regarding the Commitment, the RF 
OSU campaign’s tactics may have accelerated the timetable for establishing a panel to 
develop metrics for OSU’s food sustainability goal. In late spring, 2016, when the new 
InFact director arrived at OSU, he set up a meeting to talk with Real Food OSU leaders 
soon after arriving, signaling recognition that he had been informed that they were 
important stakeholders to engage.  
 Real Food students believed that their invitation to serve on the FSP was a direct 
result of their decision to escalate tactics and engage in the Reclaim OSU sit-in. Two 
indirect forms of evidence support the students’ belief that the sit-in may have 
contributed to their place on the FSP. First, the April 2016 sit-in won significant media 
attention that included strong criticism of the way in which the administrator on site had 
handled discussions with students. The Columbus Dispatch headline read “Occupation 
ends at Ohio State University’s Bricker Hall after arrests, expulsion threatened.” OSU 
representatives initially claimed students never been at risk of arrest or expulsion, but 
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students posted videos on YouTube in which Jay Kasey, OSU’s Senior Vice President for 
Administration and Planning, could be clearly heard referring to possible arrest and 
expulsion (Edwards 2016). More than 400 faculty members, students, and staff signed a 
letter supporting “Reclaim OSU” and condemning the administration’s handling of the 
sit-in (Huson 2016). This coverage and, specifically, the administration’s claim that it had 
sought to clear the building because university workers, due to report at 7:00am in 
Bricker Hall, were “scared” by the student protesters, also inspired an unflattering essay 
in The Atlantic (Friedersdorf 2016).  
 Media is a primary forum in which activists seek to advance their interpretation of 
events and movement frames. One of the reasons activists engage in disruptive tactics is 
to earn media coverage that promotes public sympathy for the protesters (Taylor and Van 
Dyke 2007; Amenta et al. 2009; Tilly and Wood 2009). Favorable coverage also 
demonstrates power, as “being visible and quoted defines for other journalists and a 
broader public who really matters” (Gamson 2007:251). Real Food and its partners in 
Reclaim OSU demonstrated they could generate embarrassing media and the support of 
400 faculty, staff, and graduate students through disruptive protest. If administrators had 
not already planned to offer seats on the Food Sustainability Panel to RF OSU leaders, it 
is hard to imagine that the sit-in would not have changed their mind. 
 While contentious tactics may have accelerated OSU’s process for implementing 
its 40 percent LSFB goal, they also may have had negative effects on the influence of 
RFC standards on OSU’s food purchasing metrics in the long-term. A continuing 
member of the FSP who was supportive of RFC standards remarked: 
The more stringent [the criteria] are, the less likely the board [of trustees] is going 
to be able to sign it. Especially because there’s already contention between the 
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Real Food Challenge and the board and the president of the university. So I’d 
imagine there’s going to be resistance to sign something that basically followed 
everything that RFC says (emphasis added).121 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, most Panel members (or faculty with knowledge of Real Food 
and the panel) who shared the group’s interest in rigorous LSFB criteria expressed 
concerns that the tactical decision to step down from the Panel was a mistake. They felt 
that the absence of Real Food leaders might mean that the final recommendations 
advanced by the panel to President Drake would be less rigorous than they would have 
been had the students remained engaged. Community allies shared the students’ 
assessment that cooptation was a real risk associated with Panel participation, but they 
did not share the students’ assessment that disengaging was the best course of action. 
Thus, in OSU’s case, assertive tactics likely supported concessions but not a “win,” and 
the decision to shift away entirely from assimilative tactics was viewed by multiple allies 
as a tactical misstep. 
 Both campaigns at UNC employed many of the standards tactics recommended 
by RFC, including signature petitions, photo petitions on social media, events featuring 
Real Food, and “unconventional gifts.” The second campaign also featured a national 
RFC summit that included strategic planning sessions and a “Come to the Table” march; 
Vice Chancellor for Finance and Administration Matt Fajack attended the rally and 
march, signaling the Folt administration’s openness to considering the Commitment. 
Immediately afterwards, he set up a meeting between Brad Ives, the administrator 
overseeing Carolina Dining and the Real Food student leaders, suggesting that the march 
had been an effective way to demonstrate the UNC community’s support for Real Food.  
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 The tactics adopted by RF UGA were very similar to those employed at its 
Southeastern neighbor, UNC. Like the UNC’s early FLO group, UGA students began 
with educational events that featured local foods and opportunities to learn about 
differences between conventional and alternative production methods. UNC held its 
“People, Power, and Pork” event challenging North Carolina conventional hog 
production in March 2008; UGA students held a similar event called “Foodstock” in 
2012 that was intended to launch a “pastured poultry campaign,” challenging 
conventional poultry production in Georgia.122 The decision to openly challenge regional 
CAFOs and promote pastured farms met with very different responses at UGA than it did 
at UNC, although it was some time before the UGA campaign realized it had provoked a 
strong response. The difference in responses was clearly tied to differences in the 
university’s relationships with agricultural and political stakeholders, as described at the 
beginning of this chapter. UNC’s campaign did experience some difficulties securing a 
sustained commitment to sustainable meat producers and ensuring that Calculator interns 
understood and correctly interpreted the Calculator’s CAFO exclusion.123 However, the 
hog industry at UNC did not appear to undermine Real Food’s appeal, whereas many 
sympathetic community members and faculty at UGA felt that targeting poultry in 
Georgia had had a significant, negative influence on RF UGA’s ability to advance their 
objectives with administrators. 
																																																								
122 Real Food UGA Facebook post, September, 28, 2012. 
123 At the end of fall semester, 2015, several interviewees reported that the Calculator interns who 
reported out on that semester’s LSFB purchasing results had incorrectly identified a conventional 
meat producer as Real. At the same time, a well established cooperative for marketing pastured 
meat was abruptly dropped by Carolina Dining. This incident underscored to students the 
importance of securing the RFCC, to ensure UNC’s commitment would be institutionalized and 
perhaps provide producers of Real meat and produce greater security in their contracts with the 
university. 
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 UGA Real Food students faced the most challenging context in which to mobilize 
students around food sustainability and food justice issues. RFC staff members and RF 
leaders in both the early and later waves of the campaign expressed a great deal of 
uncertainty about what strategic approach and specific tactics would be effective in this 
context. Some expressed some optimism that continuing to “escalate” contentious actions 
might force the administration to give them a fair hearing. Others wondered if the modest 
level of escalation they had employed (the 2016 Summit and “Come to the Table” march) 
had undermined their opportunities to advance Real Food with dining services; one 
student even felt that the group might have earned President Morehead’s signature if they 
had not shifted toward more contentious messaging and actions.  
 Several RFC staff interviewees compared the more moderate tactics at UGA with 
OSU’s sit-in and interpreted the difference as greater boldness among the OSU students. 
Most UGA students themselves described their decision not to escalate further 
differently, as a strategic assessment that further escalation would not be effective, and 
might even backfire. However, for one RF UGA student, the campus culture described in 
section 5.1 also was a factor: “…there was always kind of a worry to me about, I guess, 
being able to get a job when I graduated if we did something radical.”124  
 The contrast between outcomes at UNC and UGA demonstrates the strong 
influence of contextual factors on outcomes. At the same time, the Pitt and UNC cases 
suggest that, even in favorable contexts, strategic adaptation also matters. At OSU and 
UGA, evaluating the organizing environment and determining what tactics would be 
most effective would have been challenging for any progressive student organization, and 
the campus commitment to conventional agribusiness increased that challenge. At the 
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same time, cultural factors relating to RFC’s principles and movement building goal 
further complicated strategic choices in these two challenging campaigns. I turn to these 
dynamics next, and then explore evidence relating to strategic capacity to explain why the 
campaigns differed with respect to adaptation. 
5.3.3 Strategic adaptation and capacity 
 
 Social movement campaigns are more likely to win the outcomes they seek when 
they employ effective strategies that take advantage of opportunities afforded by the 
movement’s particular context (Guigni 1998; Ganz 2000; Amenta et al. 2010). The 
cultural resonance of frames and tactical “fit” helps explain why the effectiveness of 
strategic approaches is contingent upon context (Morris 1984; Benford and Snow 2000; 
Cress and Snow 2000; Rojas 2006). But what explains why some social movement actors 
figure out the right strategic “fit” and others do not? In other words, as in the four cases 
of RFC campaigns examined here, why does strategic adaptation vary? Strategic 
capacity and the elements that influence it provide some clues.  
 Strategic capacity is the ability of a movement or campaign’s leadership to 
develop effective strategy. Motivation, salient knowledge, and effective learning 
processes all support strategic capacity. Diversity of insider/outsider perspectives, 
experience, skills, and networks within movement leadership and membership tend to 
enhance these three elements of strategic capacity (Ganz 2009). In relation to campus 
campaigns, this perspective suggests campaigns that incorporate perspectives of faculty, 
staff, and community allies, are likely to have greater strategic capacity. Comparison of 
the OSU, UNC, and UGA Real Food campaigns provides support for this prediction, with 
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the exception that allies did not seem to matter to Pitt’s campaign success (the most 
favorable environment).  
 Motivation among core student leaders was strong in each campaign so I focused 
my analysis of strategic capacity on salient knowledge and learning processes and their 
sources in the campaigns. In the discussion that follows, I compare evidence of strategic 
adaptation and capacity at each of the four universities and their effects on outcomes. 
Then, in the final section on strategic factors, “The Role of Real Food Challenge,” I 
discuss ways in which characteristics and practices of the national SMO supporting the 
campaigns influenced strategic choices, adaptation, and capacity. 
 At Pitt, where the RF objectives were not viewed as threatening and 
administrators showed a strong commitment to mentoring student leaders, adaptation still 
mattered and it helps explain how quickly the campaign was able to win. In particular, 
the Pitt campaign demonstrated the ability to gather and evaluate salient knowledge about 
relevant decision-making processes, and to learn from their own experience and that of 
others advancing sustainability initiatives at Pitt. The campaign followed advice from 
RFC regarding early steps for gaining support—soliciting student and faculty signatures, 
for example. When they had developed a better understanding of whose opinions 
mattered most to the decision they sought, they became more targeted in their actions. As 
one student leader recalled: 
We eventually figured out that the person we really needed to get on board was 
the VC [vice chancellor] of business—you know, the director of housing and 
dining, because he is a higher up administrator who works directly with Sodexo. 
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As discussed above, the Pitt campaign also demonstrated a good understanding of what 
kinds of tactics were more likely to win a favorable response from administrators. Like 
students leading RF campaigns at other universities, the RFC staff person serving as 
advisor to their campaign advised “escalation” when facing this kind of frustration, or a 
delay in securing a follow up meeting. However, their knowledge of the local 
environment led them to reject that advice, which increased the likelihood of a successful 
outcome. 
 Chapter 4 described a key problem solving moment for the campaign, when 
students felt they were losing ground because a meeting that included a board member 
did not go well. In their response to that challenge, the Pitt students demonstrated their 
ability to learn from experience and develop creative solutions to the impasse. The 
solution they devised also relied on their evaluation that they were close to winning the 
Commitment, and that a “professional” approach would be more likely to win over the 
troublesome board member than would disruptive tactics. In a highly favorable 
environment, with a mobilizing structure (the Student Office of Sustainability) that 
facilitated accumulated knowledge and skills among Pitt progressives, Real Food Pitt was 
able to cultivate strategic capacity sufficient to win without expanding their network 
beyond the student body. In part, this was due to the fact that administrators openly 
discussed with students what it would take for them to agree to the Commitment. 
 Like Real Food Pitt students, OSU RF leaders regularly deliberated about 
strategic options and they made some choices that reflected an understanding of the 
effectiveness of past tactical decisions at OSU. For example, a faculty member familiar 
with a number of progressive campaigns and their history noted that the “Reclaim OSU” 
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coalition and its sit-in reflected a deliberate shift in tactics over time as a result of 
“cooptation” of individual initiatives by the administration. By working in coalition and 
engaging in more disruptive tactics, the member groups, including Real Food OSU, felt 
they could force concessions more effectively through coordinated “actions” than through 
continued negotiation on their own. Further, they had some evidence that a sit-in might 
produce concessions at OSU. In 2015, a rally and sit-in protesting racism at the Ohio 
Union (the central student center at OSU) resulted in a compromise with the 
administration (Powell 2015).  
 While I was unable to gauge the effectiveness of OSU’s strategic approach on 
winning the Real Food Commitment, because student leaders chose to refocus their 
energy in other ways, it was clear that the sit-in did not win the specific concessions it 
sought from the administration in the short-term. The Reclaim OSU sit-in participants 
asked administrators for two things: 1) a commitment to provide full access to the OSU 
budget to make transparent all corporate relationships; and 2) for President Drake to 
agree to the requests of at least one of three campaigns represented--Real Food, United 
Students Against Sweatshops, or OSU Divest (Huson 2016). Neither request was granted. 
It may be that administrators considered the three seats on the Food Sustainability Panel 
for Real Food OSU to be a compromise with the group. 
 Thus, at OSU there was considerable evidence of engagement in learning 
processes and search for salient knowledge resulting in strategic decisions perceived to be 
most likely to produce concessions. Real Food OSU had opportunities for expanding 
diversity in those deliberations through its long-standing relationship with Local Matters 
and through the community of faculty, staff, and graduate students who expressed their 
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support for the sit-in participants. At the same time, interview data suggests that while 
non-student allies sometimes provided advice, student leaders did not consider these 
allies to be part of Real Food and their strategic choices did not reflect input from 
community, faculty, or staff members. Possible reasons for this are discussed below, in 
relation to RFC principles. As described in chapter four, as the Real Food OSU group 
became more committed to social justice as the core of their work, for some this meant 
excluding students with different priorities relating to sustainable food. Students who 
wanted to remain engaged with dining services and OSU administrators following the 
“hard no” letter did not feel they had a place in the group, once RFC staff and RF OSU 
leaders had decided on escalation. An RF student who left the group shared “I think their 
rhetoric was making it an inflammatory issue, and people didn’t wanted to get involved 
because they didn’t want to be the super-activisty types of students in President Drake’s 
office…”126 The evolution of RF OSU framing and tactics toward a more contentious 
relationship with the administration and a social justice frame narrowed student 
participation to a core group that strongly embraced RFC principles. One of the students 
who chose to leave was a student senator in the Undergraduate Student Government 
(USG). That narrowing limited RF leaders’ knowledge of and access to the student body 
at OSU, with negative effects on their capacity to build a larger base, and the loss of 
potential strategic options through USG.127 
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127 At OSU, as at UGA, securing a formal student resolution in support of the RFC Commitment 
did not win the campaigns support from the president. My point here is not that working through 
USG to advance Real Food interests would necessarily have been effective, but rather that, by 
progressively excluding students with different views, the core RF OSU leadership significantly 
narrowed the group’s understanding of OSU’s student body and formal student governance. 
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 By limiting strategic decision-making to students, RF OSU leaders further 
constrained the diversity of experience, networks and skills that could have supported 
greater adaptation in response to the administration’s actions. A community ally agreed 
that Real Food had not built a base large and strong enough to win using the strategic 
approach it was employing:  
What [RF OSU] didn’t have the sophistication to do was analyze—those protest 
actions were energizing for a handful of people…What they couldn’t do was take 
that energy and that identity and make it grow at a conservative university like 







 Both campaigns at UNC showed some evidence of flexibility and adaptation, but 
the second campaign most clearly evaluated the context and target responses on an 
ongoing basis, with the help of allies, in ways that contributed to success. Student leaders 
in the second Commitment campaign made ongoing adjustments in strategy in response 
to administrator feedback, faculty advice, and their own evaluation of what steps would 
be most effective. At least one student pushed to “escalate” tactics further and adopt more 
contentious language, but others felt that response would undermine their ability to win. 
When faculty allies advised them to back off from actions that had put administrators on 
the defensive, they did so. As one student leader recalled “I thought that more 
confrontational tactics would become aggressive and alienating…I think it is important to 
find middle ground and push in a constructive manner. I struggled with that tension a lot 
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because one of the students was really against the administrators.”129 Second wave 
student leaders at UNC also recognized that while faculty allies might not have direct 
power with the chancellor, they did have personal relationships with some of the 
administrators who were influential. The first group of leaders, and RF students at the 
other universities, did not seem to recognize the value of these indirect links or use them 
to their advantage.130  
 These relationships increased the diversity of salient knowledge and experience 
available to UNC students, thereby enhancing strategic capacity. No other Real Food 
campaign appeared to integrate input from faculty members into their strategic decision-
making. UNC’s opportunity structure was generally favorable to the campaign, 
particularly after Chancellor Folt was hired, but there were many administrative 
objections to specific language and requirements in the Commitment document. In 
addition, because UNC already had reached almost 20 percent Real Food, administrative 
staff could have made a case to the Chancellor that the Commitment was unnecessary and 
that Carolina Dining should proceed independently. Student leaders recognized the value 
of a UNC “win” to other RFC campaigns in the Southeast, but to win Chancellor Folt’s 
approval they had to convince multiple administrative staff members that it was in their 
and UNC’s interest to take that step. By opening their strategic decision making to the 
input of faculty allies, they enhanced their ability to adapt their messaging in response to 
signals from key decision makers. RFC national staff also demonstrated flexibility in this 
case by negotiating modest changes in the Commitment directly with administrative and 
faculty representatives at UNC. Interestingly, the phone calls in which these negotiations 
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130 At OSU and UGA that strategic option was likely constrained by the less favorable context. 
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took place did not include any students. UNC leaders also appeared to have more flexible 
interpretations of the role of youth in Real Food leadership (elaborated below, in 5.3.4). 
Thus, at UNC strategic adaptation supported by strong relationships with allies supported 
the campaign’s successful outcome in a context that was favorable. 
 At UGA many students reported a great deal of frustration with what they 
perceived as a lack of openness of the administration to their proposal, and also their 
struggle to identify an effective strategic approach in such an unfavorable environment. 
While unwilling to engage in the sit-in tactics used at OSU, the second wave of UGA 
students largely adopted framing and tactics developed by RFC and promoted through 
RFC meetings, including the use of “unconventional gifts” and a “Come to the Table” 
rally and march. None of the tactics they tried seemed to have much effect on their 
targets, and students felt uncertain about what would be effective in their challenging 
context. RFC national staff also expressed uncertainty about what tactics to explore next 
at UGA. 
 As described above, allies at UGA were limited by the strong commitment to 
conventional agribusiness that led some deans and faculty members to feel they could not 
openly support the RF Commitment. However, some faculty members highly 
sympathetic to the students indicated openness to participating in confidential strategic 
discussions. At least one reported having shared the perspective held by many potential 
faculty and community allies familiar with Real Food that the students should evaluate 
what was possible given UGA’s particular context and tailor their messaging and strategy 
to align with that reality. Specifically, they questioned the strategic value of openly 
criticizing conventional poultry production practices, through campaign messaging and 
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educational events they sponsored on campus. A member of the sustainable agriculture 
community in Georgia described that perspective in this way: 
You don’t tug on Superman’s cape! The State of Georgia is one of the largest 
chicken producers in the world. You can’t take them on…These [students] don’t 
have the resources to take them on. They’ve got to be more subtle than that. 
You’ve got to ask for what you can get. You try to shut down Georgia’s poultry 
industry? No way. That’s not going to happen.131 
 
Consistent with these faculty and community perspectives, some RF UGA students 
favored continuing with an assimilative strategy focused on advancing Real Food 
purchasing, with or without the Commitment in place. However, the core group in the 
second wave was uncomfortable adjusting the group’s frame and the broader movement 
goals, as discussed above in the framing section.  
 In a context that is highly unfavorable in relation to the objective that activists are 
seeking, the ability to gather and evaluate salient knowledge about power structures and 
decision making processes and brainstorm creative solutions to ongoing roadblocks is 
critical to developing effective strategy. UGA students engaged in many one-to-one 
conversations with staff, faculty, and deans whom they trusted during both waves of the 
RF campaign, and were largely discouraged by what they heard regarding their likelihood 
of success given UGA’s context. Regular deliberation about strategy was limited to 
students and RFC staff with similar backgrounds and experiences as the UGA leaders, 
limiting the knowledge base, experience, and network connections available to them. 
Further, at UGA many students expressed frustration that RFC national’s models, 
resources, and strategic support was not tailored to “fit” their environment. They felt that 
they often received advice that was more appropriate for “blue states” or, at least, more 
progressive campuses. As one student shared: 
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A lot of the actions that the national movement supports…like sit-ins and these—
just these really big escalation steps, that other campaigns in other parts of the 
country have used to get attention…I mean we had discussions about how a lot of 
those could just be really poorly received here in the South...132 
 
Many Real Food UGA students recognized they did not have the range of knowledge and 
skills within their campus team or with the national RFC team to figure out how to win, 
given their context. They did not expand their knowledge base by drawing in a more 
diverse group at UGA, in part because it was difficult for allies to speak openly there. In 
addition, the second wave’s embrace of RFC principles influenced the kinds of allies they 
embraced. Section 5.3.5, below, expands upon the ways in which RFC mission, goals, 
structure and strategic support influenced the campaigns and their outcomes. 
5.3.4 Real Food Challenge’s influence on campus campaigns 
 
 As described above, a group’s strategic capacity, or ability to read signals, choose 
effective frames and tactics, and adapt as a campaign progresses, is influenced by the 
extent to which its leaders and organization foster access to salient knowledge, heuristic 
processes, and build motivation. College undergraduate student activists are likely to 
need a great deal of support with heuristic processes and salient knowledge, for while 
they know many things about their campus environments, they often have little 
experience with the power relationships involved in administrative decision making or 
with organizational change processes more generally.  
 To what extent did the national SMO Real Food Challenge support this capacity 
within the four campus campaigns? How did the SMO’s structure, tools, and network 
influence the campaigns’ strategic choices and their outcomes? Each campaign engaged 
in regular reflection, pursued some investigations of salient information, and showed 
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some flexibility in problem solving, but in the more challenging environments—OSU and 
UGA—where innovation likely was most important, the campaigns were unwilling or 
unable to adapt in ways that might have supported greater progress toward winning the 
Commitment objective. Results of this case comparison suggest that RFC’s movement 
building goal and network enhanced motivation and biographical outcomes but 
undermined progress toward winning the Commitment in the less favorable 
environments. A strong focus on youth and the partners RFC prioritized reduced access 
to salient knowledge and greater diversity of perspectives weighing in on strategic 
choices. In addition, the national team and national network themselves were limited in 
their ability to help students in the unfavorable environments build the skills and salient 
knowledge needed to support greater strategic capacity. 
5.3.4.1 The Movement Principle: goals and collective identity 
 
 The decision of RFC founders to launch a college campus-based initiative as part 
of a broader movement for a more sustainable and just food system reflected two 
perceived opportunities: first, the buying power of food and beverage dollars represented 
by university dining; and second, the potential for mobilizing youth, specifically, around 
food sustainability and food justice issues. RFC’s six principles reflect the ways in which 
the group sees its work as embedded in and contributing to a global movement for food 
justice (Real Food Challenge N.d.a). In 2011 RFC decided to develop the Campus 
Commitment and a framework for implementation at an end of year retreat. Staff 
members felt that the Commitment, a “concrete ask,” would help students with their 
campaigns to convince dining services to let them audit their purchasing using the RFC 
Calculator. It also would institutionalize plans for annually increasing the amount of food 
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that was Real. RFC staff modeled the Commitment after the President’s Climate 
Leadership Commitment to work toward carbon neutrality (Second Nature 2018).  
 Real	Food	Challenge	leaders	view	the	Real	Food	Commitment	Campaign	as	
an	effective	strategy	aligned	with	its	broader	goal	of	building	a	strong	youth	
component	within	the	sustainable	food	movement.	While each of the four campaigns 
examined in this study adopted securing the RF Commitment as its primary goal, the 
extent to which RF student leaders embraced Real Food principles and the related, 
broader goal of food system transformation varied. Further, that variation mattered to the 
Commitment campaigns. Collective identity refers to “an individual’s cognitive, moral, 
and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution” 
(Polletta and Jasper 2001:285). For Real Food student leaders who strongly connected 
with the RFC community and principles extending beyond campus food procurement, 
RFC principles and movement goals sometimes influenced framing and tactics more than 
an instrumental assessment of what it would take to win the Commitment on their 
campus.  
 Collective identity in movements sometimes can inspire strategic choices that are 
at odds with instrumental rationality (Polletta and Jasper 2001). At OSU and UGA, where 
the broad movement goal was most likely to be viewed as threatening, embracing and 
including food system transformation goals in campaign frames and communications was 
consistent with identity but likely was not effective strategically. A number of students 
discussed their commitment to the movement, beyond the Commitment campaign, in 
ways that suggested their identification with the movement strongly influenced framing 
and tactics. In other words, consciously or not, it was at least as important to them to 
	 264	
“speak truth” about the food system as it was to win the Commitment, which sometimes 
led them to strategic decisions poorly aligned with their context. As explained by an OSU 
student leader, building a progressive organizing culture on campus and beyond—
working toward “the world that we can be living in and creating,” became more 
important than LSFB product shifts at the university.133 
 As described in chapter four, directly following Anim Steel’s presentations at 
OSU in November, 2016, Real Food students on the Food Sustainability Panel asked for 
a vote on recommending the Commitment to President Drake, which narrowly lost. They 
then decided to leave the Panel and focus their energy in other directions. Several 
students and Panel faculty/staff members described that decision in ways that suggest 
they prioritized movement partners, the social justice element of Real Food, and their 
long-term commitment to the food justice movement over the short-term objective of 
advancing Real Food purchasing at OSU. A Panel leader remembered the students’ 
explanation of their decision in this way: 
[The students] understood what we [FSP leaders] were trying to do, but they were 
trying to be true to their commitments to this group, and it was even to other 
groups--it wasn’t just to RFC, it was also to groups working on broader human 
rights issues. Which did not help them in terms of the administration or board of 
trustees here. But, nonetheless, they were part of a much larger coalition, that in 
part was driving things, and it was explained to us that they needed to remain true 
to that, but that, nonetheless, they appreciated the fact that we were trying to 
repair the relationship [between OSU administration and RF OSU].134  
 
The student leaders of RF OSU, including the representatives on the Panel, were seniors, 
which may also have influenced their decision: how best do we want to use our 
remaining time at OSU? For the core group who saw themselves working on food justice 
and related issues far beyond graduation, commitment to the movement and to movement 
																																																								
133 Interviewee OSU 1. 
134 Interviewee OSU 12. 
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coalition partners was a higher priority than incremental advances with OSU’s dining 
services practices. 
 Like students at OSU, some of UGA’s Real Food leaders strongly embraced Real 
Food principles and goals, with similar effects on framing and strategic choices. By the 
time students had received a “soft no” regarding the Commitment, several RF UGA 
students recognized and valued the emotional and movement-building opportunities 
offered by coalitional social justice work, even if it did not lead them toward winning the 
Real Food Commitment. This UGA’s student statement bears close similarity to 
statements from some OSU leaders: 
We are in the process of creating our image to be more of a social justice type 
movement and not just a more kale in the dining hall sort of movement. And so 
we are working with social justice organizations –like undocumented rights and 
farmworker rights…Having people like that to back us is definitely helpful for 
actions, and it’s also just work that we fully support. Obviously we are here to 
work on the food system but that also encompasses social justice work, economic 
justice work, and things like that so our values and our morals align with what 
PAC [Progressive Action Coalition] does so its also just like this grounding piece 
for all of us individually.135 
 
At UGA, some student leaders felt they could advance the Commitment and broader 
movement frames simultaneously, but their framing choices, aligned with RFC core 
values, provoked a negative response from administrators that likely weakened their 
ability to influence food purchasing.  
 In strong contrast with UGA and OSU, students involved in the implementation 
of the Commitment at Pitt remarked that one of the key leaders responsible for 
persuading administrators to sign did not identify as an “activist” because the group did 
not engage in “activisty” tactics such as marches, rallies, and sit-ins. When asked if that 
was a tactical decision or more a personal preference, the campaign leaders responded 
																																																								
135 Interviewee UGA 6. 
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that it had been both—personally, they had not felt comfortable with the disruptive 
“actions” OSU students were engaged in, and they also had felt that contentious actions 
would not be effective at Pitt. 
 At UNC, the student leaders who led the winning campaign for the Commitment 
fell somewhere in between those at Pitt and at OSU/UGA. While holding a strong 
personal commitment to movement building and food justice, they were flexible in terms 
of messaging and tactics, as well as being open to faculty guidance, as described above. 
They and their allies’ ability to “read” their environment, along with the positive 
contextual variables described above, helped them win in a matter of a few months. At 
the same time, the commitment to movement building and systemic change led one 
leader to wonder whether, if they succeeded in getting the Commitment signed but the 
UNC administration did not really understand and fully embrace all four elements of Real 
Food, had they really won? The fact that a winning campaign leader expressed discomfort 
and gave voice to this tension between “speaking truth” – advancing the community’s 
understanding that Real Food is food that “truly nourishes producers, consumers, 
communities, and the earth”136 – and securing the RFC Commitment speaks to the 
significance of this potential tension for other campaigns that identify strongly with RFC 
movement principles.	 
5.3.4.2 The Participatory Principle and campaign support 
 
 RFC’s “Participatory Principle” is described in this way: “Believing the ends 
reflect the means, we seek a means that maximizes participatory planning, decision-
making, and leadership structures within an intentional space where all voices are heard 
																																																								
136 From the Real Food Challenge web page “What is Real Food?” Retrieved July 24, 2018 
(https://www.realfoodchallenge.org/what-real-food/). 
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and respected” (Real Food Challenge N.d.a:Para. 8). In keeping with those beliefs, RFC 
provided regular opportunities for campus leaders to gather, learn, and share, and its 
organizational structure was fluid, with student leaders often serving, for a time, as field 
organizers or as part of advisory teams. Students at three of the four universities agreed 
that meetings and retreats organized by RFC were “energizing” and “motivating.” High 
motivation supports persistence, creativity, and energy—important to sustaining activist 
campaigns, particularly in challenging environments (Ganz 2009). Story telling was part 
of the experiences that students and organizers shared during RFC gatherings. One of the 
resources provided in RFC’s online toolkit is “Storytelling for Organizing: A guide for 
reflecting on and developing your public narrative” (Real Food Challenge N.d.e). 
Developing and sharing narratives in social movements can facilitate transformation of 
consciousness and strengthen commitment to the movement (Freeman 1970; Polletta 
1998; Ganz 2009). 
 Reflections of student and ally participants in RFC campus events suggested that 
these events were more successful in strengthening commitment to the movement and 
providing critical emotional support than they were in providing strategic support helpful 
to the Commitment campaigns. The organizational structure of RFC, decentralized and 
highly participatory, was consistent with some aspects of the structures Ganz (2000) has 
shown facilitated strategic capacity in the case of the United Farm Workers (UFW): 
…leaders who take part in regular, open, and authoritative deliberation gain 
access to salient information, participate in a heuristic process by means of which 
they learn to use this information, and are motivated by commitment to choices 
they participated in making… (P. 1017) 
 
RF students at UGA, UNC, and OSU described the participatory structure and processes 
that RFC promoted in very positive terms—clearly, this principle supported motivation. 
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However, evidence from this study also suggests that participatory structures and 
processes within a campus-based movement did not necessarily support access to salient 
information and the generation of diverse and innovative options from which to choose—
additional factors critically important to strategic capacity (Ganz 2000, 2007, 2009). 
While RFC staff, organizers, and student leaders clearly embraced participatory and 
democratic decision making, and encouraged everyone to share their ideas, campaign 
tactics often aligned with the tactical repertoire developed by RFC, even if they did not 
align well with a particular campus context. It was left to student campaign leaders to 
challenge recommended frames and tactics when they felt they did not align well. As 
discussed above, limited use of non-student allies limited problem-solving capacity that 
could have supported tactical innovation. The perceived disconnect between what seemed 
to work elsewhere and UGA’s context sometimes generated a great deal of anxiety for 
RF UGA leaders trying to adapt RFC advice for their context. One student leader 
expressed that struggle in this way:  
It’s a difficult calculation because I’m never sure if my instincts to have very de-
escalated tactics at UGA is conservative or comes from not being brave enough, 
not feeling confident enough, or if it’s an actual smart assessment of what the 
situation is. And I think this sort of national, chapter-based, unpaid, student-run 
structure lends itself to that kind of anxiety, because you have a support system 
above you who doesn’t know very much about the kind of day-to-day politics or 
student newspaper politics involved in trying to plan a rally, get press coverage, 
and not that many people show up…I think it could be easy to be painted as 
hysterical. There were all kinds of ways to lose any sort of political capital you 
had, so I felt at the time we had to be really careful if we wanted to actually do 
something. And I don’t care about being friendly to the administration, it was just 







137 Interviewee UGA 11. 
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5.3.4.3 The Youth Principle 
 
 As described above, building a youth movement to transform the food system was 
a powerful part of Real Food engagement, particularly for the OSU and UGA campaigns, 
and commitment to that goal influenced the approach they took to the Commitment 
campaigns there. Related to its youth movement-building goal, the Real Food “Youth 
Principle” views young people as the “driving force in this movement because of our 
collective ability to demand and achieve widespread structural and social change” (Real 
Food Challenge N.d.a:Para. 5). RFC’s language about the role of youth in activism 
reflected public perceptions, constructed through coverage of 1960s New Left 
movements, that youth tend to be more creative, innovative, and willing to engage in 
risky actions (Scott 2016). This principle was evident in the composition of RFC staff 
and board members and in the trainings and tools RFC provided that were designed to 
create life-long activists, an important outcome of youth participation in college activism 
(see, for example, McAdam 1999). 
 For two of the universities in this study, OSU and UGA, identification with Real 
Food’s youth identity had a negative effect on strategic capacity by constraining full 
utilization of allies. I will use the example of RFC’s power mapping resource as an 
illustration. Many students attended RFC events where time was devoted to reflect on the 
experiences of other campuses and to sketch out a plan of action for their own campus. 
They were introduced to techniques for evaluating their particular campus context, 
including power mapping.138 However, the students interviewed reported they were not 
able to apply the power-mapping tool to advance their campaigns. Students’ 
																																																								
138 Power mapping is a community organizing technique in which actors identify the targets of 
their objective and then “map” individuals with the power to influence those targets (Bobo 2001). 
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understanding of university bureaucracy is often limited to the formal relationships that 
can be uncovered through an organizational chart. Faculty, staff, and other members of 
the university community who have been on campus for many years often have a great 
deal of relevant knowledge to add to that of the students. Limiting power mapping to 
student leaders limited the usefulness of the tool.  
 Potential allies also felt that, while the students’ understanding of food system 
issues was very strong, their research sound, and their commitment impressive, they 
seemed to make assumptions about the power and impact of particular tactics without a 
strong understanding of how they might function in their particular context. One 
supportive observer noted the following: 
I went to a couple of [RFC] weekend conferences and events here. A lot of it was 
good—they were building camaraderie amongst the activists and building support 
for their work—[but] it was never clear to me on an ongoing basis how much they 
were doing to help students understand the importance of how you strategize and 
make a plan and …even though it’s “sexy” to go for the demonstration or march, 
helping people develop a plan and stay on point as much as possible [is really 
important].139 
 
 Whether explicitly or implicitly, the youth focus of the RFC network constrained 
the diversity of ideas, perspectives, and expertise available to the campaigns by limiting 
















 The Youth “Principle” states an interest in capitalizing on inherent strengths of 
youth generally and college students specifically, including their greater willingness and 
availability to engage in contentious protest. As discussed in chapter 2, student protest is 
not without risk if it violates campus rules or breaks laws, but most students do not have 
their livelihood and the wellbeing of dependents on the line when they protest, as would 
many staff and faculty members. Disruption can an important source of power for 
activists without direct access to institutional processes (Piven and Cloward 1977; 
Tarrow 1994). But, disruptive tactics also can backfire (see, for example, Rojas 2006). 
Students’ ability to figure out decision-making structures and norms, and power 
relationships, in general, is significantly hampered by the short period of time they are on 
campus and the short timeframe of many campaigns, including the RFC campaigns. At 
UGA, where students faced the most challenging context in which to lead food 
sustainability and justice organizing, their access to allies already was constrained by 
faculty and administrator concerns about openly supporting the Real Food campaign. At 
the same time, they underutilized opportunities to seek and incorporate advice and 
engage faculty in strategic planning. This is not to say that faculty and staff members 
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could have helped them figure out a way to get the Commitment signed; indeed, few, if 
any, felt that was a possibility. What they could have done was helped students 
understand the university in a more sophisticated way that supported their capacity to 
evaluate their options. As one potential faculty ally at UGA shared: “[The students should 
ask:] How do we find the place for movement within an institution? In an institutional 
context that we know is going to be incredibly challenging?”140  
	 As described above, faculty allies served an important role as “buffer” and 
“translator” between the second UNC campaign and the administration when relations 
became tense. Use of faculty allies to enhance strategic capacity marked one of the 
differences between the early, unsuccessful effort to convince Chancellor Thorp to sign 
the Commitment and the successful campaign with Chancellor Folt. A student leader in 
the early effort indicated that they had reduced their communication with faculty allies 
over time because faculty had many time constraints, and also because the power 
mapping exercise they carried out (part of the RFC toolkit) suggested that faculty 
members did not have much power to influence Chancellor Thorp. A student at UGA 
made the same comment about investing time in cultivating faculty allies there; because 
they did not directly influence the president, they were not a priority. The contrast 
between the early and later campaigns for the Commitment at UNC illustrates the value 
of considering potential allies for the relevant, strategic ideas and skills they may bring to 
the campaign, regardless of any persuasive power they may have held with respect to 
administrators. The second campaign at UNC involved faculty allies in meetings and 
negotiations, and student leaders took their advice seriously. Students, faculty members, 
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and administrators all referred to this factor as a contributor to the positive campaign 
outcome. 
5.3.4.4 The Partnership Principle 
 
 The RFC partnership principle includes a commitment to partners both on and off 
campus: “Collaboration with administration, dining services, food producers, community 
groups, and other allies is critical for reaching our goals” (Real Food Challenge 
N.d.a:Para. 6). At the four universities in this study, relationships with these partners 
varied significantly. In each case, the campaigns eventually developed what they felt 
were good working relationships with dining services. However, at UGA and OSU, those 
relationships were not reflected at higher administrative levels, in contrast to Pitt and 
UNC where auxiliary services staff members met regularly with students.  
 At UGA, Real Food’s relationship with dining services appeared to be negatively 
impacted by the group’s unfavorable reception by higher administrators. At OSU, when 
Real Food OSU decided to end their relationship with the Food Sustainability Panel, 
students cited their responsibility to and sense of solidarity with food producers and with 
other social justice oriented groups on campus and in the community. Thus, whether 
explicit or not, they had come to feel that they could no longer attempt to maintain 
partnerships with OSU representatives and also maintain partnerships with groups with 
whom they felt strong solidarity. In addition, two past RF OSU leaders were organizing 
around Fair Food in Columbus, so that personal connection facilitated engagement with 
the Student Farmworker Alliance on campus and Fair Food organizers more broadly who 
were working to convince the fast food chain Wendy’s to commit to the Coalition of 
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Immokalee Workers’ Fair Food program. As one student described the spring 2017 
campaign to “Boot the Braids” off the OSU campus (described in chapter 4): 
It was also an opportune time because RF OSU’s president from a couple of years 
ago… she was working with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers and the 
Alliance for Fair Food doing organizing for them. So, the fact that we were very 
deeply in collaboration with her already and that she had been advising our group 
for years, leading our group for years, is still here and is now working with the 
Boycott Wendy’s campaign, it just seemed like a beautiful and opportune 
moment…to combine our power and see what it means to stand in deeper 
solidarity with farmworkers and with everyone fighting for a fair food 
system…141 
 
5.3.4.5 The Real Food Campus Commitment 
 
 The structure of the RFCC itself may have contributed to the difficult choice that 
OSU students felt they had come to with respect to the Food Sustainability Panel. RFC 
purposely decided to allow little flexibility in the Commitment itself and the structures it 
puts in place because it considered the RFC standards to be a minimum benchmark, and 
because its leaders believed the Commitment and its implementation structure to be 
crucial for accountability in a campus environment where student leaders turn over every 
four years. The “all or nothing” aspect of winning the president or chancellor’s signature 
made it difficult for some student leaders to identify and celebrate “small wins,” critical 
for developing a sense of efficacy in a campaign and sustaining momentum. As a former 
student organizer argued: 
You don’t win if you can’t actually celebrate incremental wins; it is very hard to 
maintain momentum if you don’t actually get to win. And I think the Real Food 
Campus Commitment, because of its specificity, even hyper-specificity, you just 
have way fewer opportunities to win…I feel like the RFCC campaigns were set 
up to feel like the only win is when you get this exact thing signed by only the 
president and you have the entire food systems working group, and it’s not that 
it’s unattainable—I think it was the right goal for visionary young people, we 
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wanted that. But it limits the incremental wins that you can experience which is 
bad for a campaign.142 
 
 In summary, the RFC principles and the regular opportunities that RFC provided 
for community building, information sharing, and strategic planning served RFC’s long-
term goal of fostering a youth movement and motivating students very well. At the same 
time, RFC’s structure, principles, and strategic support seemed to assume that its 
planning toolkit and tactical repertoire could be easily adapted for any campus 
environment, usually by students alone, to support winning campaigns. In the more 
favorable contexts, Pitt and UNC, students were able to adapt RFC resources effectively 
(at UNC, with faculty support); at OSU and UGA, where the context was less favorable, 
RFC resources did not support and in some cases constrained greater strategic capacity 
for evaluating options and innovating. 
5.3.5	Summary:	Strategic	factors	and	campaign	outcomes	
 
 In all four campaigns student leaders had access to RFC advice, networks, 
organizing tools, and Calculator support. However, the extent to which the campaigns 
utilized these resources, and the extent to which the students adapted tactical and framing 
options to align with their campus environment, varied. With respect to collective identity 
and framing, OSU and UGA showed evidence of stronger identification with and use of 
frames associated with social justice values than did the other campaigns. Figure 5.3 
illustrates tendencies in frame alignment and tactical flexibility in the four campaigns. 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of Cases with Respect to Frame Alignment and Tactical 
Flexibility 
 
 At Pitt, Real Food students were able to build the strategic capacity needed to 
develop frames and tactics aligned with their context through student networks. Their 
strategic planning also was aided by the openness and availability of administrators who 
were more straightforward about what it would take to win the Commitment than at the 
other universities. At UNC the path to winning was less clear but students effectively 
integrated faculty allies into the campaign, which was facilitated by the Food for All 
theme. Faculty integration supported greater strategic capacity for the second 
Commitment campaign. Students also aligned campaign frames effectively with the 
supportive sustainable agriculture context, and demonstrated flexibility when adapting 













 At OSU and UGA, demands for strategic capacity were much greater because 
opposition to the RFC Commitment was significant. The challenging nature of the 
environments at OSU and UGA with respect to food system reform meant that 
developing and adapting effective strategies was much more difficult than it was in the 
other two cases. It was also true that framing and tactical choices sometimes contributed 
to that opposition, sometimes deliberately and sometimes unintentionally. At OSU 
disruptive tactics and earned media effectively demonstrated power, but not enough for a 
“win”—at least, not within the timeframe students were hoping for. A shift back to more 
assimilative tactics and framing through the FSP might have produced further gains, had 
students remained. Their choice to leave was strongly influenced by RFC movement 
goals and principles and the collective identity of a core group focused on social justice. 
RF OSU leaders sometimes consulted with allies but strongly privileged the preferences 
of students, consistent with RFC youth frame. 
 UGA shared some of the same dynamics as the OSU campaign but faced an even 
more challenging environment in which their experience with other groups suggested that 
disruptive sit-ins would not win concessions and would likely backfire.143 In addition, 
they unintentionally strengthened the opposition to Real Food by focusing on poultry 
production early in the campaign. RF UGA’s access to allies was constrained by an 
environment strongly hostile to conventional food system critiques, and they appeared to 
																																																								
143 In January 2016 campus police arrested six UGA students when they refused to leave a 
campus building where they were sitting in to protest the Georgia Board of Regents policy on 
undocumented students. In contrast to OSU, where administrators denied they would have 
arrested students, UGA’s public statement was unapologetic about the arrests: “UGA’s freedom 
of expression policy permits campus protests on all publicly available areas of campus” 
(Golderman 2016). While the sit-in did earn local media, it did not seem to produce any 
concessions from the university. 
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underutilize advice shared in confidence. UGA students recognized they needed support 
developing strategic capacity and that the RFC’s resources and skills did not include 
enough locally relevant knowledge. At the same time, like the OSU core, many UGA 
core leaders strongly embraced RFC goals and principles in ways that constrained their 
willingness to adapt frames and tactics, even when they had evidence that it had 
backfired.  
 
5.4 Summary of Qualitative Analysis 
 
 Opportunity structures that included variables both inside and outside the 
universities significantly influenced the outcomes associated with Real Food Challenge 
campaigns at Pitt, OSU, UNC, and UGA. All four campaigns undertook robust efforts to 
research regional food system opportunities, educate and mobilize students, learn from 
winning campaigns at other universities, build relationships with decision-makers on 
campus, and, for some, help build a national, youth-led Real Food movement. The two 
campaigns with more favorable contexts build networks with strong salient knowledge 
that supported their ability to adapt as needed and align tactical approaches and frames 
with target priorities and culture. In the two less favorable contexts, OSU and UGA, 
leadership diversity and salient knowledge were constrained both by context (risk to 
allies) and by ideology (youth principle), which had negative effects on strategic 
capacity. In addition, at these two universities strong identification of core Real Food 
leaders with movement goals and principles sometimes contributed to tactical and 
framing choices at odds with instrumental objectives (winning the Commitment 
campaign). 
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 The results of this comparative analysis suggest that contextual, organizational, 
and strategic factors all shaped RFC campaign outcomes and that interactions between 
contextual and strategic factors were most significant. This evidence supports the 
findings of other studies that when movement actors align strategy and tactics with 
environmental or organizational context, they are more likely to succeed. However, 
analysis of the RFC cases examined here also challenge the idea that certain types of 
tactics (assimilative versus assertive) and certain kinds of frames (oriented toward 
constituents or oriented toward targets) typically align with particular contexts. They 
therefore challenge the organizational mediation model, which predicts a consistent 
relationship between university context and the type of tactical approach and frames most 
likely to result in positive outcomes for campus campaigns (Arthur 2011:138). In the four 
Real Food Challenge campaigns examined here, frame and tactical alignment is more 
complex and contingent than the organizational mediation model suggests. 
 While mobilizing structures were utilized or developed in each of the four cases, 
variation in the kinds of networks that students used effectively, and the fact that these 
structures did not support campaign “wins” at UGA and OSU, suggests that 
organizational factors were less important than contextual and strategic variables. The 
opportunity structures, specifically commitment to conventional agribusiness, support for 
sustainable agriculture, and openness to student initiatives, clearly influenced target 
responses and the resonance of movement frames. Strategic flexibility and adaptation 
helped UNC and Pitt students win. At OSU and UGA, the complexity and challenge of 
their environments made strategic capacity particularly crucial, and it was constrained by 
the campaigns’ strong identification with RFC principles and movement goals.  
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 At UGA and OSU, to some extent a small core of student leaders came to 
recognize that pursuing the broader movement goals of RFC, to which they felt a deep 
connection, might lead them further away from the concrete objective of food product 
shifts in university dining. When the Commitment campaigns were launched nationally 
and at OSU and UGA, neither RFC staff nor student leaders foresaw that framing and 
tactics that aligned well with the Commitment objective, on conservative-leaning or 
agribusiness-connected campuses, might align less well with broadening understanding 
of the four aspects of sustainable food and building a movement. However, by the time 
OSU students chose to leave the Food Sustainability Panel several students understood 
they were giving up their influence in food purchasing and choosing solidarity with food 
justice stakeholders and movement-building objectives. At UGA this kind of choice was 
not as clearly stated, and some students expressed regret at past tactical choices that may 
have contributed to a loss of influence; others shared ideas about insider strategies that 
might have been effective, such as identifying high profile donors sympathetic to Real 
Food. But at least one or two second wave UGA leaders agreed with the OSU student 
leaders that education and mobilization around food justice had become the primary 
objective of the group. One former student leader and regional field organizer spoke to 
this tension between the Commitment campaign and RFC’s growing food justice frame: 
I think [RFC was] really at the forefront of training people and framing the issue 
as an intersectional one; the Real Food Wheel has always been at the front of 
everything we’ve done. [The wheel] was created as a guide and vision and 
movement metaphor since the very beginning. But the rest of the…food space 
was so quickly orienting around consumer choices…It’s way easier for people to 
latch onto a consumer thing because it’s individual choice…But the flip side of 
that is that it’s then hard to switch to a different frame [like food justice] when 
people feel like they’re saving the world because they are purchasing organic kale 
tomorrow.144  
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 The results of this study support the importance of aligning tactics and frames 
with context, supported by strategic capacity, on outcomes, particularly for campaigns 
operating in highly unfavorable environments. By extension it also suggests that national 
SMOs supporting campaigns across a wide range of college campuses could enhance 
their support for effective strategy by diversifying the kinds of organizing expertise and 
tools they provide and by encouraging greater diversity among campaign members and 
allies (these ideas are elaborated in chapter six).  
 The results of this study also underscore the importance of differentiating between 
a movement’s strategic capacity and the intelligence, motivation, and commitment of the 
activists. In each of the four campaigns examined in this study, student leaders included 
top performing students with a great deal of knowledge about conventional and 
alternative food systems, as well as environmental and social criticisms of conventional 
production. At UGA, where students were unable to advance the Commitment or Real 
Food purchasing much at all, their leaders including students who won prestigious 
national awards for environmental leadership. As one former student described: 
A lot of the people who have been involved and continue to be involved at UGA 
are –they’re not the typical Georgia students; they’re the people on incredible 
scholarships or are at the top of their departments where they are working as 
undergrads…That sounds a little self-aggrandizing, but seriously…these are 
really smart people.145 
 
To function as full-time, top-performing students and engage in the day-to-day research, 
reflection, and problem solving required to advance a campaign that challenges a strongly 
held interest at the university was a very tall order. UGA students did seek to expand 
their problem-solving community by discussing UGA’s political landscape with students 
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involved in other progressive organizations on campus, and they reflected upon the ways 
in which sustainability groups adopting different kinds of tactics within the Go Green 
umbrella group had advanced—or failed to advance—their goals. However, they largely 
confided in and sought new ideas from young people very similar to themselves, 
significantly limiting the kinds of diversity in leadership and networks that enhances 
strategic capacity. 
 RFC supported the campaigns with a wide variety of organizing tools, a great deal 
of background information about the food system and its history in the U.S., and regular 
opportunities for building solidarity and replenishing their energy. At the same time, 
greater and more effective utilization of faculty, staff, and community allies for strategic 
planning, broader and more diverse networks that could creatively evaluate options in a 
highly unfavorable context, and greater understanding and discussion of the trade-offs 
and choices associated with winning the Commitment and advancing the food justice 
movement may have helped UGA’s talented students advance Real Food in dining 
services and/or mobilization for food justice further. 
 Chapter six highlights ways in which these findings contribute to social 
movement scholarship. It also explores the implications of these findings for RFC and for 
other social movement organizations that also seek to support campus-based campaigns 






CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
What successful movements do is highly important in understanding their 
success, and what they do is adapt their tactics to signals from the broader 
environment about what will work. (McCammon et al. 2008:1140) 
 
It’s hard to assess the effectiveness of any given tactic until you’ve witnessed it 
and looked back on it… I have always measured the dual bottom line of RFC, 
which is to say, yes, winning the Commitment but also building a base of leaders, 
or movement work for the food justice movement. So I would say everything we 
trained on and all of the tactics that students in RFC, especially at the big schools, 
have learned to employ, and particularly the power analysis that they have learned 
to employ, feels unbelievably valuable and has been an enormous contribution to 
those people’s lives, and also because they are in the movement…146 
 
How does the evidence from Real Food Challenge campaigns presented and analyzed in 
this dissertation support, and extend, McCammon et al.’s assertion? What do these 
findings mean in relation to the reflection of an RFC organizer, above, about a “dual 
bottom line”? As expected, the winning RFC campaigns effectively aligned their strategic 
choices with “signals from the broader environment.” But, it is also true that the winning 
campaigns had significantly more favorable environments with which to align, given the 
nature of the Real Food Challenge objectives. There are limits to what skillful framing 
and tactical alignment can accomplish when the values and priorities of a campaign’s 
organizational environment is quite different from—or, in this case, is even in direct 
opposition to--that of the campaign itself (Vasi 2006:439). It is hard to see how any 
strategic approach at UGA would have convinced President Morehead to sign the RFC 
Commitment, although incremental progress toward the spirit of the agreement was 
almost certainly feasible. Pitt, in contrast, was as favorable a context as one can imagine 
for a Real Food Challenge campaign--at least, for a large, public university. And yet, the 
																																																								
146 Interviewee RFC 3. 
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campaign may very well not have succeeded had student leaders followed RFC advice 
and failed to interpret correctly the most effective strategy for their particular setting.  
 The result of this study of local and sustainable food and beverage purchasing and 
Real Food Challenge activism to promote it extends social movement outcome literature 
on the role of tactical and frame alignment, collective identity, framing dilemmas, and 
strategic capacity in shaping outcomes. Its conclusions also can inform the priorities and 
structure of federated SMOs like Real Food Challenge that seek to support student 
campaigns on a wide variety of campuses. The national quantitative analysis revealed a 
modest influence of regional advantage, with Pacific Coast and Northeastern states 
leading in Local and Sustainable Food and Beverage (LSFB) purchasing. The qualitative 
case study of Real Food activism and its outcomes provided evidence for a high degree of 
complexity, including both geo-political context and university characteristics, in the 
factors influencing adoption of one specific option for advancing LSFB—the Real Food 
Campus Commitment. The collective identity, movement values, and strategic choices of 
activists, in relation to these contextual variables, also significantly influenced their 
campaigns, the response of administrators to their demands, and their ability to advance 
Real Food. 
 This study contributes to social movement theory in several ways. First, it 
strongly supports the body of scholarship on outcomes that emphasizes alignment 
between contextual factors and strategic choices. It extends that scholarship by 
challenging conclusions and models that suggest specific kinds of frames and tactics 
necessarily align with specific contexts. The comparison of RFC campaigns suggests 
that, for this particular student movement, the “fit” between context and strategic factors 
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was not predictable or consistent. In other words, while it was true that “one size did not 
fit all” in terms of the campaigns’ strategic approach, it was also true that what size 
worked best with what context could not be predicted reliably through a simple model. 
Instead, I argue that effective strategy was contingent on multiple environmental 
variables. Further, those variables sometimes shifted during the course of a campaign 
(e.g., a change in chancellor and an expanding discursive opportunity structure at UNC). 
 The second contribution of this study’s findings follows from the first: that the 
complexity and contingency of “what works” supports recent social movement 
scholarship calling for increased attention to strategic adaptation and strategic capacity. 
The variation and contingency in the four cases examined here supports the need for 
greater attention to strategic aspects of social movements if we are to better understand 
why and how they “win” or “lose,” not just when and where. Beyond that affirmation, 
what does this comparative study contribute to scholarship on strategy? First, it strongly 
supports the idea that diversity—of experience, skills, social location (especially “insider’ 
versus “outsider”), and networks with salient knowledge—is an important facet of 
strategic capacity on college campuses. Second, this study uncovered a significant link 
between RFC’s “Youth Principle,” its implications for utilization of allies, and, as a 
result, diversity and strategic capacity. With recent growth in youth-led movements, the 
finding that a powerful emphasis on youth leadership can reduce strategic capacity is 
important. 
 Third, the analysis of differences in Real Food Challenge campaign outcomes 
provides new insights into framing dilemmas and the ways in which collective identity 
and ideology influence strategic adaptation (and, by extension, outcomes). My findings 
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suggest that self-awareness, particularly with respect to distinguishing between ideology, 
identity, and instrumentality in decision-making, should be examined as a component of 
strategic capacity. 
 More generally, these findings have implications and provide insights that may be 
helpful to Real Food Challenge and other SMOs that support campaigns on a wide 
variety of college campuses. Williams (2016) uncovered strategic variables that 
contributed to innovation in the SMO United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). 
However, his analysis was at the SMO level—he examined strategic processes and 
innovation in USAS, not in the campus-based campaigns guided by USAS. He did not 
examine factors influencing campus-by-campus outcomes. All four RFC cases 
individually, as well as the comparative analysis presented in chapter five, suggest ways 
in which RFC and other federated, campus-based SMOs might support greater strategic 
capacity and effective strategizing. For example, SMOs might explore how to encourage 
local campaigns to more closely collaborate with allies and organizations that already 
have relevant local knowledge, skills, and networks. Finally, beyond social movement 
theory and campus activism, this dissertation has implications for an area of research in 




6.1.1 Social movement outcomes within organizations 
 
 As I have noted earlier in this manuscript, within the literature on social 
movement outcomes, scholarship on outcomes for activism within organizations, 
including universities, is very limited. The study that is most similar to this investigation 
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is that of Arthur (2011), which compared activism seeking new academic programs 
(Asian American Studies, Queer Studies, and Women’s Studies) on six college campuses. 
Arthur developed and tested a two-by-two Organizational Mediation Model (OMM) that 
predicted “fit” between specific tactics and framing choices and two elements of context: 
administrative openness/flexibility and mission. Where mission fit well and openness was 
high, the model predicted assertive tactics and framing aligned with a core constituency 
would be most likely to result in a “win.” When mission was not favorable but the 
administration open, the model predicted assimilative tactics and constituency-based 
frames work best. Where mission fit but the administration was less open, it predicted 
assertive tactics with mission-aligned framing as the best strategy, and where both 
variables were unfavorable it predicted that assimilative tactics and framing aligned with 
mission would work best. Neither of the “winning” RFC campaigns supported the 
predictions of this model, and activist and ally perspectives about what might have won 
the commitment at OSU and UGA also were not wholly consistent with the model’s 
predictions. 
 Thus, the results of this study suggest that the organizational mediation model that 
was tested using campaigns for curricular change is not necessarily predictive for other 
kinds of campus activism. My analysis of the contextual variables influencing the 
favorability of campus context with respect to RFC campaigns also suggests that the 
OMM’s variable “mission” is not broad enough to capture all the university 
characteristics that shape targets’ responses to a particular campaign. In the case of RFC 
campaigns, conventional and sustainable agriculture research and teaching, campus 
culture with respect to progressivism and organizing, and political relationships that 
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influenced the autonomy of decision-makers were important variables not captured by 
even a broad interpretation of “mission.”  
 Another limitation to Arthur’s model, and to other studies that have drawn 
tentative conclusions about “fit” between particular tactics and frames and particular 
contextual variables (see also Cress and Snow 2000) is that they “flatten” frames and 
tactics to two options and assume that a single approach characterized the whole 
campaign. However, many in-depth case studies, including the four examined here, and 
literature that surveys movement framing and tactics (see, for example, Benford and 
Snow 2000; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004) have concluded that multiple frames and a 
variety of tactics are very common in social movements. Timing, capitalizing on 
opponent missteps, and ongoing adaptation, as well as contextual fit, often matter a great 
deal (Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; McCammon et al. 2008; Guthman and Brown 2016). 
Simplified models for highly complex processes, while helpful for building and testing 
theory, run the risk of inadvertently omitting dynamic elements that may provide a fuller 
explanation of variation in outcomes. The evidence from RFC campaigns presented here 
support arguments for the importance of strategic adaptation in response to signals from 
multiple contextual variables. Further, it supports recent attention to the elements found 
(or not) within social movements and SMOs that support such adaptation: strategic 
capacity (Ganz 2000, 2004, 2009; Williams 2016). 
6.1.2 Framing dilemmas, collective identity, and strategic capacity 
 
 As McCammon et al. (2007) and others have pointed out, most research on frame 
alignment investigates its effects on participant mobilization, not on outcomes. The 
results of this study extend scholarship on “framing dilemmas” by demonstrating its 
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importance for outcomes as well as mobilization (Snow and Benson 1988). As described 
in chapter five, many second wave RF students at OSU and UGA identified powerfully 
with RFC values and beliefs that influenced the frames they used in their messaging. 
RFC social justice and, especially, racial justice frames were highly resonant for a small 
group of progressives but were alienating for student drawn to RFC for other reasons. To 
some extent, the “dilemma” or disconnect between different elements of RFC framing 
was a result of differences between RFC’s movement goals and its Commitment 
campaign. For students engaged in food system critique through their coursework and 
with opportunities to learn at RFC summits and strategy sessions, the link between LSFB 
purchasing goals and working for racial justice in the food system was clear and 
compelling. However, for students less familiar with food system critiques, and for some 
students who became engaged through the lens of environmental sustainability, “food 
justice is racial justice” left them feeling that Real Food was not for them. 
 Strategy and tactics reflect collective identity and values as well as rational, 
instrumental evaluation of what is most likely to be effective. In some cases, activists 
deliberately privilege identity and values in tactical and framing choices, even when they 
recognize that doing so will put a policy or institutional objective at risk (Downey 1986; 
Epstein 1991; Jasper 1997; Poletta and Jasper 2001). To what extent did students at OSU 
and UGA self-consciously make distinctions between “instrumental” and “ideological” 
frames and tactics? As I discussed in chapter five, there was some evidence that RF OSU 
leaders weighed tradeoffs and reflected upon the role of their values and identity in 
evaluating whether to leave the Food Sustainability Panel. At the same time, the sharply 
contrasting evaluations of the Real Food presentation to the Food Sustainability Panel at 
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OSU demonstrated limited understanding of how RF social justice frames were being 
received by FSP members, including those who considered themselves allies of Real 
Food. At UGA, and among RFC staff, I did not find evidence that campaign leaders and 
advisors had considered the implications of a “framing dilemma” or discussed ways in 
which they might modify the way they presented Real Food for different audiences.147 
Interviews with students at UGA suggested they had continued trying to advance the 
Commitment and deepen their participation in the food justice movement using the same 
set of frames and tactics, even though they were not well aligned with UGA’s context. 
 Ganz (2009) has compared skillful social movement leadership teams to those of 
artisans, whose creativity is supported by mastery of their tools of the trade, honed 
through experience. Beyond a tactical repertoire appropriate to the movement’s 
objectives and context, movement leadership teams benefit from diversity that supports 
adaptation and problem solving. Reflexive and open deliberation also is key to learning 
and adaptation (Ganz 2009). The RFC analysis presented here draws attention to a 
specific element of that reflexivity that deserves greater attention: self-awareness of 
ideology, identity, and its role in the strategic planning process. The cases of RF OSU 
and UGA, in particular, suggest that open discussion of instrumental and ideological 
objectives, collective identity, and the extent to which the group’s strategic decisions are 
embedded in its ideology and identity are an important component of strategic capacity. 
 The RFC cases at OSU and UGA make clear some of the challenges of 
maintaining and building different forms of diversity with a single campaign or 
movement. Social movement actors and scholars have long understood there are tradeoffs 
																																																								
147 As described in chapters four and five, early in the campaign at UGA students adjusted their 
portrayal of RFC to align with what they perceived to be the priorities of different administrators. 
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between breadth and depth in movement goals and framing. Most movements seek to 
maintain enough breadth and flexibility to facilitate large-scale mobilization while honing 
a coherent set of shared understandings, values, and goals important to collective identity 
and motivation. This dilemma continues to be a source of both public and scholarly 
attention and debate within contemporary movements such as the Women’s March 
(Fisher, Dow, and Ray 2017; Chira 2018).  
 While challenging, case studies emerging from other universities suggest it is 
possible to create and sustain a diverse, insider/outsider approach that offers opportunities 
for students who are deeply committed to a broader movement’s goals as well as students 
interested in more discrete objectives and roles. Bratman et al. (2016) has described many 
advantages of a “big tent,” insider/outsider approach to the fossil fuel divestment 
campaign at American University (AU). While the campaign has not yet succeeded in 
divestment (a Board of Trustees decision), it has made many gains consistent with RFC 
goals, including transforming campus discourse about sustainability and climate change 
and building a large and diverse network of advocates on and off campus. The fossil free 
AU team recognized that diversity in student membership would support greater tactical 
diversity. “Engaging inside decision makers and conducting research attracts students 
who are usually interested in policy and only official avenues to create change. Building 
pressure and power through outside actions, on the other hand, involves more radical 
students who are comfortable with confrontation, though might not have the patience for 
lobby sessions and lessons in endowment finance” (Bratman et al. 2016:686). 
 In addition to RFC’s strong social justice perspective, the youth principle was 
another aspect of RFC’s ideology that sometimes constrained diversity. Other social 
	 292	
movements in which youth played leading roles can offer some ideas about how to 
incorporate the benefits of youth leadership with a more diverse leadership team in order 
to enhance strategic capacity. While the 1960s “youth frame” was a powerful aspect of 
identity in New Left activism, many young people already understood its limitations and 
felt that, in the long-term, it could limit the broad base needed for widespread social 
change (Scott 2016). 
 One of the best-known and most closely investigated examples of youth activism 
is the role of SNCC (the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) in the Civil Rights 
Movement (CRM). Ella Baker, who was 47 in 1960, pushed for keeping SNCC 
independent and organized in a grassroots fashion. Baker and many youth felt that young 
people were more willing to engage in the riskiest direct action, so SNCC’s youth 
membership and activities contributed to an association between more radical and risky 
tactics and youth that persists today. However, SNCC’s community organizing networks 
in the Deep South, outside campuses, sought to recruit all ages to the movement (Scott 
2016). While SNCC leaders often clashed with leaders in the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Southern Christian leadership 
Conference (SCLC) over tactics, they also understood the value of experience. “Some 
young activists prided themselves on being ahead of their elders, but there was still an 
emphasis on seeking out local adult leadership to drive the organizations” (Scott 
2016:32). As Morris (1984) has argued, in part the efficacy of the Birmingham 
campaign’s strategy resulted from the carefully coordinated integration of youth 
leadership, the salient local knowledge of Birmingham’s Alabama Christian Movement 
for Human Rights, and the resources and connections of the NAACP and SCLC. Many 
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youth involved in SNCC and other CRM groups recognized the strategic benefits of 
diversity to effective strategizing (Scott 2016). 
 The “non-stop” picket protesting Apartheid outside the South African embassy in 
London’s Trafalgar Square that lasted from 1986 to 1990 provides another example of 
radical youth activism embedded in more diverse leadership teams. “The Non-Stop 
Picket created an atmosphere where young people’s political opinions and motivations 
were taken seriously” (Brown and Yaffe 2017:164). However, it did so in an inter-
generational environment in which older and younger people and people with diverse life 
experiences could learn from one another. Thus, a movement can empower youth and 
capitalize on their strengths without limiting the movement’s leadership to youth. 
“Although some activities effectively became differentiated between age cohorts, and 
there could often be misunderstandings and tensions between different generations of 
picketers, habitually, people of different ages worked together, got to know each other, 
and learned political lessons from each other” (Brown and Yaffe 2017:169). 
6.1.3 Knowledge for what? Contribution to Social Movement Stakeholders 
 
 One of the criticisms that has been made of the structural emphasis in social 
movement theory’s “dominant paradigm” is that it begs the question posed by Richard 
Flacks in a 2004 book chapter: “Knowledge for what?” The “cultural turn” in social 
movement theory to re-engage with social and cultural processes at work within 
movements reflected more than a recognition that these processes matter to mobilization 
and outcomes. Another element was an interest in making scholarship more relevant to 
social movement actors. Some—certainly not all--social movement scholars view their 
research in relation to the interests and needs of the actors engaged in the movements 
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they study. If structural factors matter most, what does that offer social movement actors? 
How can scholarship inform SMOs and activists interested in being more effective in 
achieving the outcomes they desire, given the context in which they find themselves? 
Understanding the interplay of contextual, organizational, and strategic factors often 
requires delving into the messy, dynamic experiences of movements as they unfold. 
 My ability to conduct the research for the qualitative portion of this dissertation 
was supported by the approval and cooperation of the Real Food Challenge national staff 
members. Quite reasonably, in early conversations with me they wanted to know why I 
was interested in studying RFC and what I hoped my research would accomplish. In 
those conversations, I shared my own background in environmental education and 
advocacy, which seemed to provide me some legitimacy that “social movement scholar” 
had not. I made clear that my hope was for this study to not only satisfy the requirements 
of my PhD program and contribute to social movement scholarship, but also that it might 
help RFC staff and student activists gain a better understanding of the organization, the 
campus campaigns, and how to win their objectives. In the section that follows, I 
summarize ways in which findings from chapter five might inform the work of RFC and 
other similarly structured SMOs. 
 This study’s findings regarding framing dilemmas has particular importance for 
campus-based movements, like Real Food UGA, that are functioning in environments 
that seem to be highly unfavorable to their objectives. Having lost (at least in the short 
term) the campaign to secure the Real Food Commitment, as well as the internship with 
Dining Services that Real Food was instrumental in creating, UGA students continued 
working to educate and mobilize progressive students around food justice through events 
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and in collaboration with the Progressive Action Coalition. In essence, while no students 
described that strategic shift in this way, they redoubled their efforts to shift the campus 
culture that formed part of the unfavorable opportunity structure constraining their 
campaign. “Culture plays an important role in creating political opportunities, and not 
just in the subjective perceptions of insurgents” (Polletta 2004:100). If a conservative 
leaning student body with a low engagement in civic engagement allowed the 
administration to ignore them, could they increase their power by changing the campus 
culture? One of the faculty members who underscored the power of agricultural interests 
at UGA also noted the great potential power of students and parents at the university. 
 How might a small group of Real Food students build and leverage student power 
more effectively? And what, exactly, should they seek to accomplish, given aspects of the 
environment that will be very hard to shift? This is where greater diversity could support 
the difficult campaigns, by building stronger strategic capacity. RF UGA maintained a 
relatively diverse group of students in terms of majors, perspectives on framing and 
tactics, and collective identity. What the group lacked was a sustained effort to integrate 
the insider knowledge, networks, skills, and experience of faculty, staff, and community 
members and draw on those resources when engaged in strategic planning.  
 In the section above I summarized some of the ways that identity and ideology 
influenced strategy at OSU and UGA. Interview data also suggested that assumptions 
about certain kinds of tactics and their efficacy likely constrained flexibility. A number of 
RFC and campus leaders seemed to assume that public displays like rallies, marches, and 
especially sit-ins, are disruptive, and therefore demonstrate power, and that assimilative 
tactics often lead to cooptation. There is a great deal of evidence in social movement 
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literature supporting the potential power of disruption to win concessions. However, 
assuming that public displays are necessarily disruptive, and, if disruptive, are 
necessarily more effective than “insider” strategies is not well founded, particularly for 
activists targeting organizational change. For example, Katzenstein draws on examples of 
feminist change from within to challenge the idea that institutionalization necessarily 
results in a “routinization and deradicalization” of movement objectives (1998:211). She 
found, instead, that the institutional location and its particular characteristics influenced 
the extent to which institutionalization diluted or softened movement goals, and that 
activism from within was sometimes quite disruptive. Continuing participation of Real 
Food students on the Food Sustainability Panel at OSU offered opportunities to produce 
disruption—but disruption of a different nature than that produced by the sit-in. That was 
very difficult for the students to see. Again, the complexity and contingency of 
relationships between context and strategy point to the importance of tactical flexibility 
and greater attention to building strategic capacity for federated SMOs that support 
campaigns in a wide range of settings. 
 A related element for RFC and other like SMOs to consider in expanding the 
tactical repertoire they share with campuses is the question of overt versus covert action. 
A former Real Food leader at UGA noted that more covert tactics might align better with 
Georgia’s context. In chapter two I briefly discussed the concept of “tempered radicals” 
as workplace insiders who also identify as outsiders because of values and beliefs at odds 
with their environment (Meyerson and Scully 1995; Meyerson 2001; Scully and Segal 
2002). Tempered radicals often employ covert strategies for gradually changing 
organizational practices and policies in order to maintain their insider status. While 
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evidence for the efficacy of covert approaches is largely limited to case studies and 
ethnographies, this element of strategy also is worth considering for SMOs supporting 
campaigns in highly unfavorable environments. “By remaining veiled, such action can 
appear nonthreatening or may even be ignored by elites until its impacts become 
undeniably apparent” (Morrill, Zald, and Rao 2003:394). A former UGA Real Food 
leader reflecting back on their strategy wondered if greater subtlety would have been 
more effective in Georgia: 
I feel like you have to be more artful in your playing down here and it has to be –
you have to have a smile on your face and you shake their hand…and be buddy-
buddy… Like they say in the South you smile but then behind their back—that’s 
where the work gets done. And I think that’s how it has to be played down 
here.148  
 
 It is important to consider how an already overstretched, federated SMO might 
implement some of these recommendations. The level of resources and support that RFC 
offered campus organizers was extraordinary for a tiny SMO with four national staff 
members. As one staff member described: 
The folks [on campuses] who seem like they are really ready to go, or at least 
committed and want support, often we’ll pair them with an organizer who 
becomes their support--in some cases more like part of a team, and in other cases 
more of an actual coach who can give organizational support or who will devise 
tactics with them, etc. And then, really often, so that more people on campus get 
the download, they’ll invite us--organizers or volunteer organizers--to partner 
with them to do a series of workshops. So maybe that original team of four people 
at a regional training that got inspired and got a few skills can then share skills in 
a deeper way with people on campus or can deepen [their skills] themselves.149 
 
This process and the networks that RFC already has in place can be used to expand 
strategic capacity by identifying opportunities for integrating more and diverse local 
partners into the process, particularly individuals and groups with knowledge of 
																																																								
148 Interviewee UGA 8. 
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university decision-making. Many students interpreted the value of faculty and staff 
potential allies only in terms of their ability to directly influence the Commitment 
decision. Campus and community partners also have essential knowledge and skills about 
university decision-making and the university’s political context that can support 
campaign strategizing, whether or not these individuals have any direct power. The 
national SMOs can encourage the expansion of campus strategic planning teams without 
burdening their limited staff time and resources; doing so may even reduce the support 
needed by regional organizers once the campus networks have been strengthened.  
 Finally, the significance of contextual variables to the outcomes of Real Food 
Campus Commitment campaigns and the evidence that greater flexibility likely would 
have supported greater gains in less favorable campus environments suggests that 
federated SMOs like RFC should carefully consider the benefits and disadvantages of 
promoting a single instrumental objective across all campuses nationwide. RFC staff 
indicated they did not consider the Commitment campaign or various elements of the 
strategic toolkit shared with organizers to be prescriptive. However, the guidance of the 
national organization was highly influential, especially for students who strongly 
embraced the broad vision of the organization. Given the many demands on their time 
and limited experience with organizing, many student volunteer activists are likely to 
draw upon the advice and resources of the national organization as much as possible. It is 
clear that college campuses vary significantly with respect to the frames and tactics that 
will be most likely to win a particular campaign objective. Thus, federated SMOs like 
Real Food Challenge can support positive outcomes on a wider range of campuses by 
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carefully considering how to incorporate greater flexibility in their objectives and 
toolkits, as well as by supporting stronger strategic capacity.  
6.1.4 Political and corporate influence on college campuses 
 
 An unexpected result of this study emerged regarding the influence of contextual 
variables on ally availability. Findings from OSU and, especially, UGA suggest that 
corporate and political influence on university culture can negatively influence the 
availability of faculty and staff allies for student activists engaged in campaigns 
unpopular with powerful stakeholders. These findings are relevant not only to research on 
campus activism but also to a growing body of work on the implications of corporate and 
other external influences on colleges and universities. While a full consideration of this 
study’s fit within the body of literature on the corporatization of higher education is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will briefly explain what my findings suggest in 
terms of future research. 
 Many scholars have documented two ways in which university research has 
changed since the mid-1970s: 1) commercialization of academic research has intensified; 
and 2) policy, regulatory and legal frameworks shaping academic research and 
development (R&D) have changed in fundamental ways (Nelson 2004; Vallas and 
Kleinman 2007; Mowery 2011). Concerns about these changes are diverse and include: 
the potential for corporate bias in research questions and conclusions; a reduction in 
knowledge sharing that reduces innovation; erosion of public trust in university science 
and its recommendations; and subtle changes in the culture of academia (Nelson 2004; 
Vallas and Kleinman 2007; Gaskell 2008; Mowery 2011; Biddle 2007, 2012; Kukla 
2012). At the same time, within higher education some have raised concerns about 
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academic freedom and free speech in an era of shrinking public budgets for public 
universities, greater dependence upon corporate, foundation, and government grants, and 
debates over how best to support academic freedom and facilitate shared governance 
(see, for example, deBoer 2016; Mynlieff, Chattopadhyay, and Boyden 2018).  The 
example provided in chapter five of Virginia’s Farm Bureau getting involved in Virgina 
Tech’s plans to expand its cage-free egg purchasing and the results of this study 
regarding contextual influences on university response to Real Food Challenge activism 
at UGA suggest that scholarship in the area of “academic capitalism” (Slaughter 2004) 
might consider its influence on student organizing and civic engagement, as well as on 
teaching and research. 
 A growing number of college campus-based movements target university 
investment or purchasing, such as fossil fuel divestment, anti-sweatshop, Real Food, and 
cage-free egg campaigns. University structures generally provide little institutionalized 
opportunity for faculty or students to participate in deliberation about corporate contract 
or investment decisions (Slaughter 2004). Evidence of political and corporate influence in 
university decision-making and its influence on student movements targeting campus 
purchasing points to opportunities for research that synthesizes perspectives from 
academic corporatization literature, organizational theory, and social movement theory. 
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
 
 Chapters two and three described limitations of this study with respect to access 
to interviewees and potential problems with the national dataset used to examine 
variation in LSFB purchasing. In this section I will briefly extend my discussion of 
limitations in the qualitative portion of the study. The qualitative research design was 
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purposefully broad and flexible, designed to capture as complete a picture as possible of 
the variables that mattered in the four RFC campaigns. This design supported a 
comprehensive evaluation of many different kinds of variables, and it uncovered several 
factors that were not anticipated in the theoretical model presented in chapter two. At the 
same time, this approach posed significant challenges for analysis and the presentation of 
results, due to the many ways in which variables intersected. In addition, a broad 
examination is better suited to revealing which variables had some influence than it is in 
explaining which variables mattered most.  
 As discussed above, while models can lead scholars to overlook complexity and 
contingency, they are important for building a knowledge base within the field and 
directing attention to variables that past research suggests are worth examining. While no 
single model can fully capture the multiple ways in which contextual, organizational, 
cultural, and strategic factors shape movement outcomes, they are helpful for pointing to 
further research and new research questions. With that intent in mind, Figure 6.1 presents 
a modified version of the theoretical framework that guided this research project. It 
reflects many elements in the hypothesized model along with unanticipated ways in 
which collective identity and movement goals influenced strategic capacity and tactical 




Figure 6.1: Real Food Challenge Campaign Dynamics 
 
 The breadth of this study was advantageous for uncovering multiple mechanisms 
influencing RFC campaign outcomes. Its breadth also means that some of my 
conclusions are more suggestive than definitive, offering direction for future work that is 
more focused on specific variables. In particular, the results of this study suggest many 
possibilities for further research in collective identity, strategic capacity, framing, and 
allies in campus movements. How does collective identity influence tactical and framing 
decisions? How do student-led campaigns recognize and respond to framing dilemmas, 
and how does it matter? How do campus-based campaigns build and maintain staff, 




































and ‘outsider’ strategies? More broadly, how can federated SMOs capitalize on variation 




Protest movements have important benefits for modern societies in the way they 
develop and disseminate new perspectives, especially but not exclusively moral 
visions. (Jasper 1997:16) 
 
It was important to understand the balance of emotion and analysis, or strategy, 
involved in pushing for the Real Food Commitment.150 
 
 
 My hope is that this study is helpful to other scholars interested in expanding 
“movement-relevant theory” within social movement scholarship (Bevington and Dixon 
2005). Theoretical frameworks are critically important for synthesizing and advancing 
understanding of patterns and trends in social movements. At the same time, the models 
scholars develop and refine are shaped by the kinds of questions they pose, and those 
questions do not always overlap with the questions most relevant to movement actors: 
how and why do we succeed? How can we build greater strategic capacity? How do we 
foster the knowledge, skills, and networks that can help us adapt and innovate? For, as 
one Real Food activist at OSU described their continuing activism, “…why else are we 
doing this work?”151  
 Finally, I would like to return to my discussion of the literature on social 
movement outcomes from chapter two, where I noted that part of the reason that this 
scholarship lags in comparison to studies of emergence and mobilization may be that 
causal relationships are difficult to determine, outcomes are often many and varied, and 
																																																								
150 Interviewee UNC 1. 
151 Interviewee OSU 1. 
	 304	
some may occur years and even decades following peak activity. The primary focus of 
my research questions was the objective of securing Real Food Campus Commitments, 
which RFC had made the primary focus of the campus campaigns. At the same time, to 
differing degrees student Real Food leaders and RFC staff held that objective alongside 
other, less tangible ones, and each campaign resulted in a variety of changes, including 
the biographical impacts of college activism well documented for other movements. All 
four Real Food campaigns included in this study produced outcomes that were of 
significance to a number of students, whether or not they secured the Real Food Campus 
Commitment. And for many students I spoke with, participation enriched their learning 
and growth in ways that their coursework and other kinds of social networks had not. 
Jasper (1997) writes: 
Virtually all the pleasures that humans derive from social life are found in protest 
movements: a sense of community and identity; ongoing companionship and 
bonds with others; the variety and challenge of conversation, cooperation, and 
competition. Some of the pleasures are not available in the routines of daily life: 
the euphoria of crowds, a sense of pushing history forward with one’s projects, or 
simply of making the evening news, of working together with others, of sharing a 
sense of purpose. And, perhaps most of all, the declaration of moral principles.  
(P. 220) 
 
For some students, participation in Real Food campaigns was centered around the 
instrumental goal of getting the Commitment signed; for others, that was an important 
objective but it became almost secondary to other goals: standing in solidarity with 
communities adversely affected by conventional agricultural systems; finding one’s place 
in the sustainable food movement; and building community with others who planned to 
be in the fight “for their whole lives.” Research in the future that follows the career paths 
and civic engagement of Real Food students may identify indirect and perhaps 
unintentional outcomes associated with their participation in campaigns.  
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 Acknowledging that some aspects of social movement outcomes are difficult to 
measure, it still is the case that most campaigns identify and try hard to win specific 
outcomes. In addition to aligning tactics and frames to make the most of the context in 
which student activists find themselves operating, SMO staff and student leaders can 
strive to make more explicit the full range of goals, objectives, and values shaping their 
decision-making as they engage in strategic planning. The results of this study suggest 
that this aspect of reflexive practice may be an important component of strategic capacity 
that has not been emphasized in social movement literature. Multiple identities, goals, 
and objectives are not inherently problematic for a movement or campaign, but they may 
become so when they are not recognized, carefully considered, and evaluated as part of 





INTERVIEW DATA CODES AND FREQUENCIES 
 
Table A.1: Interviewee references relating to codes, sorted by interviewee type. 
 
Code or Theme 
Occurrences by Interviewee Typei 
Students Faculty Admin & 
Staff 
RFC Community 
Tactics 163 (1) 40 (2) 25 (2) 24 (2) 17 (1) 
Internal context  126 (2) 55 (1) 41 (1)   4 (10) 10 (5) 
Target Response   92 (3) 13 (7) 22 (3)   8 (8)   6 (7) 
Mobilizing 
Structures 
  67 (4) 18 (5)   5 (9) 19 (5)   6 (7) 
RFC influence   62 (5) 13 (6) 13 (6) 32 (1)   4 (8) 
Identity & Solidarity   51 (6)   4 (11)   4 (10) 20 (4)   6 (7) 
Strategic Capacity   49 (7)   4 (10) 13 (5) 15 (6) 15 (2) 
Framing   48 (8) 30 (4) 11 (8) 20 (3)   6 (7) 
Allies   47 (9) 12 (8) 16 (4)   7 (9) 13 (3) 
Vision & Goals   42 (10)   9 (9)   2 (11) 11 (7)   7 (6) 
External Context   36 (11) 32 (3) 11 (7)   2 (11) 11 (4) 
 
 
Table A.2: Interviewee references relating to codes, sorted by university. 
	
Code or Theme Occurrences by Universityi 
Pitt OSU UNC UGA 
Internal Context 51 (1) 45 (3) 30 (2) 106 (1) 
Tactics 47 (2) 68 (1) 35 (1)   95 (2) 
Target Response 28 (3) 58 (2)   0 (10)   47 (5) 
Strategic Capacity 24 (4) 32 (5)   0 (10)   25 (9) 
Mobilizing 
Structures 
19 (5) 32 (6) 13 (8)   32 (7) 
RFC influence 13 (6) 26 (7)   5 (9)   48 (4) 
External Context 11 (7) 15 (11) 19 (3)   45 (6) 
Framing 10 (8) 20 (9) 16 (5)   49 (3) 
Allies   9 (9) 37 (4) 15 (7)   27 (8) 
Identity & Solidarity   2 (10) 22 (8) 17 (4)   24 (11) 
Vision & Goals   1 (11) 19 (10) 15 (6)   25 (10) 
 
i The first number indicates the number of times an interviewee made a comment relating 
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